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ABSTRACT
China had since the fifties developed a system of 
occupational welfare which provided 'from cradle to grave7 
benefits and services to urban state-sector employees, who 
depended on their work units, or danwei, for health 
insurance, retirement pensions, housing, various kinds of 
subsidies both in cash and in kind, various collective 
facilities and services such as nurseries, dining halls, 
clinics, bathing facilities, and, in large units, even 
schools and hospitals. It was a very ' rare and extreme 
situation of 'near-complete7 welfare dependence.
This study explains the origins and the nature of this 
unique system of welfare and describes how it has undergone 
changes in market transition.
Based on the case study of a large-scale state-owned 
enterprise, the study shows that in the course of market 
transition Chinese occupational welfare has undergone very 
radical changes. Empirical evidence and field data show 
that these changes have come about through three separate 
yet inter-related processes at the individual, the work 
unit, and the government level: the process reshaping
dependence, the process reshaping the danwei welfare 
economy, and the process reforming Labour Insurance. The 
system emerging from these changes is no longer a unitary 
system worked entirely through the danwei bureaucracy and
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is no longer the exclusive rights and privileges of a 
particular group of workers. The new system has broken with 
the near-complete dependence of the past and it no longer 
exempts individuals from their shares of risks and 
responsibilities. Emerging from the change is a model of 
welfare pluralism with unique cultural and institutional 
characteristics.
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A Note on the Romanization of Chinese
There are several systems for rendering Chinese words in 
the Roman alphabet. The most widely used today are the 
pinyin system used in the People's Republic of China, and 
the older Wade-Giles system, which until recently was 
almost universally used in English-language publications. 
This thesis uses the official pinyin system. In a number of 
cases, renditions in Wade-Giles have also been given in 
parentheses.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Nature of Chinese Occupational Welfare: 
A Liteature Review
Introduction
This study is about 'occupational welfare' in the 
People's Republic of China: how it came about, how it
works, its sociological, economic and welfare implications, 
and, in the latest phase of the country's economic reforms, 
how it responds to changes induced by market transition.
Since the fifties, occupational welfare has been the 
predominant mode by which welfare benefits and services are 
distributed in China.1 Work units, or danwei,2 provide 
their members with comprehensive welfare 'from the cradle
1 In 1991, for instance, the country spent Y109.4 
billion on labour insurance, a key component of 
occupational welfare, but only Y7.1 billion on direct 
services and poor relief, and Y14 billion on poor families 
in the rural areas (Zhu 1993:46,47,53). Poor families in 
rural villages have access to a 'Five Guarantee Scheme' 
(see, for example, Chow 1988:51), which 'guarantees' food, 
housing, clothes, medical care and burial expenses. In 
1991, while only 2.66 million rural poor people benefited 
from the 'Scheme', 60 times as many (162.7 million) urban 
workers and retired workers were enjoying welfare and 
protection provided through their work units (Zhu 
Ibid:47,49). In 1991, there were 343 million urban and 2.5 
times as many (855 million) rural residents (State 
Statistical Bureau 1995:59).
2 'Danwei, "work unit", is an administrative term 
referring to the organization of almost all urban 
workplaces under the authority of the central government' 
(Henderson and Cohen 1984:139).
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to the grave7. Urban employees depend on their work units 
for a wide range of benefits and services covering health 
insurance, retirement pensions, housing, nurseries, 
canteens, bathing facilities, various kinds of subsidies 
both in cash and in kind and, in large state organisations, 
even hospitals and schools.3 The work unit is at once a 
workplace and an 'urban village7 (Henderson and Cohen 
1984:5), a 'microcosm of an urban community and welfare 
organization7 (Bian 1994:177), a 'multi-functional7 (Lu 
1989; Li 1994) social structure and, in the view of some, 
a 'total community7 (Shirk 1993:31). Indeed, Chinese 
occupational welfare has turned work units into 'mini- 
welfare states7 (Leung 1992: 6) each assuming a wide range 
of welfare responsibilities.
Why was such a system of occupational welfare created 
in China? What are its economic implications for the work 
units and sociological and welfare implications for their 
members? What in this system has changed after the 
introduction of economic reforms since 1978? In what ways 
have these changes altered workers7 dependency on their 
units and affected their life chances and ways of life? How 
are they reacting to these changes? These and related
3 The Dagang Petroleum, for example, had 189 canteens, 
37 nurseries, 9 hospitals, 37 clinics, 3 0 primary schools, 
21 secondary schools, and numerous shops, grocery stores, 
bathrooms and other facilities. It was a typical example of 
a 'da erh chuan' work unit, i.e. it was large and all- 
embracing (Dagang Shiyou Guanli Ju, 1996:70-71). Smaller 
work units may not have as many facilities and services. 
Nevertheless, they tend to be 'xiao erh chuan', i.e. small 
but also all-embracing.
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questions will engage and configurate discussion in the 
chapters to follow.
The Concept of Occupational Welfare
'Occupational welfare' includes 'those benefits that 
accrue to wage and salary earners over and above their pay, 
including those referred to as fringe benefits' (Bryson, 
1992: 131) and covers, in Britain for example, such
benefits as private pension schemes, paid holidays, sick 
pay, death benefits, cheap meals, motor cars and season 
tickets.4 With few exceptions these are the 'prerogatives 
of the private sector' (Rein and Rainwater, 1986: vii) .
Entitlement to occupational welfare is based not on 
citizenship but on the job status which applies to selected 
groups of the working population according to merit, work 
performance and productivity (Abel-Smith and Titmuss, 1974: 
31; Taylor-Goodby and Dale, 1981: 159-60).
Titmuss (1958) as early as 1958 drew the field's 
attention to occupational welfare. He likened 'social 
welfare' to the visible tip of the iceberg with two other 
forms of welfare, 'fiscal' and 'occupational' welfare, 
hidden from view, and made a strong case for considering 
all of them. However, sticking to 'the principle of a
4 See, for example, Moonman (1973:xi) and Titmuss 
(1958) .
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unitary and institutionally dominanat statutory welfare 
system' (Pinker 1992:276), Titmuss has a very negative view 
of occupational welfare. In his view, occupational welfare 
raises 'questions of equity' and the 'whole tendency.... is 
to divide loyalties, to nourish privilege, and to narrow 
the social conscience' (1958:52), 'simultaneously enlarging 
and consolidating the area of social inequality' (1958:55) . 
He believed that only in the public sector could effective 
re-distribution be achieved.5
This concern, that the private provision of welfare 
could produce inequitabale outcomes, has been shared by 
Sinfield (1978), Field (1981), Hoven (1982), Reddin (1982), 
Walker (1984:28), Green (1984) and many others, who pointed 
out that in addition to direct state welfare in cash and 
kind there exist systems of private, occupational and 
charitable welfare within the general structure of state 
subsidy and regulation. The net effect of redistribution 
within these systems is regressive, towards the better off 
and most powerful groups. Papadakis and Taylor-Goodby 
(1987) also drew attention to the social control 
implications of occupational welfare. Pension schemes, for 
example, 'might reinforce mechanisms of control which 
induce conformity by an employee to guidelines devised by 
the employer as a precondition for the realization of
5 This position is not shared by 'modern
conservatives' who are critical of a social policy based on 
rights, citizenship, and entitlement because it neglects 
the importance of obligation, responsibility, and duty 
(Meade 1986).
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benefits.' (Papadakis and Taylor-Goodby 1987: 176)
Yet 'most writers on the welfare state are silent on 
occupational welfare' (Bryson, 1992: 132).6 There are
surprisingly few treatises on the subject and few attempts 
which study the 'ways in which the public and the private 
sector interact in the provision of social protection' 
(Rein, 1982:133). The preoccupation of welfare state 
writers with 'the idea of state responsibility for welfare' 
(Mishra, 1984: xi) and their reluctance to recognize
occupational welfare as an area for government intervention 
at all largely explains.
The Origins of Occupational Welfare
Explanations of the origins of occupational welfare in 
Western capitalist countries have mostly stressed either 
one or a combination of three factors: culture, internal 
labour market, and worker power. Let me take each in turn.
1. Culture: This view draws attention to the important 
part played by paternalism, 'a relationship between the 
agents in any economic organization in which the employer 
acts towards his employees in a manner somewhat similar to 
that of a father toward his children' (Bennett and 
Iwaoshino 1963: 224). The relationship implies a pattern of
6 The index to Esping-Andersen's widely-cited The 
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) , for example, 
does not have any item on 'occupational welfare'.
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mutual obligations which requires the employer to be 
benevolent and employees obedient, loyal, and subordinate. 
'The quid pro quo. . . is that the workers be loyal and 
committed to the company' (Doeringer 1984: 281). In Japan, 
where workers enjoy employment security and preferential 
welfare (Vogel 1979; Pinker 1986; but see also Sethi, 
Namiki, Swanson 1984; Kendall 1984; Oliver and Wilkinson 
1988 for some more qualified positions) , Dore (1973) 
notices that the ideology of paternalism with its 
reciprocal responsibilities and duties had been refashioned 
into a conscious managerial strategy attempting to cope 
with an acute shortage of skilled labour following the 
decision to industrialize in 1867. Paternalism is not, 
however, a Japanese trademark. In Britain, as Perkin (1969) 
has shown, paternalism was at the heart of the system of 
patronage and dependency which characterized pre-industrial 
society with its vertically structured bonds of loyalty and 
allegiance. Russell's (1991) case study of occupational 
welfare in Britain also leads her to conclude that the 
'paternalistic style of personnel management, with its 
emphasis on company-provided occupational welfare, has a 
long pre-history in Britain' (p.xi):
The paternalist's philosophy reflected a unitary 
concept of the occupational community where, ideally, 
harmony prevailed, each individual having his 
function, his symbolic duties, his reciprocal 
obligations, and his ties of dependency. Attention to 
the welfare...for deserving long-service employees was 
an expression of the paternalist's sense of 
responsibility and duty. From the viewpoint of labour 
management welfarism served as a means of encouraging 
reciprocal sentiments of gratitude, loyalty and co­
operation on the part of the recipients' (p. 271).
- 16 -
Welfarism was also popular in the United States in 
the mid-1920's. 'Welfare capitalism arose out of the 
corporations' concern for finding a way of creating in 
their workers a sense of loyalty', and welfare programs 
became one specific part of a strategy that aimed at 
'harmonizing' the interests of capital and labour (Edwards 
1979: 91) .
2. Internal labour market: This view, expounded mainly 
by labour economists, explains fringe benefits by way of 
the concept of 'internal labour market'. Traditional views 
on labour markets focus on external markets, seeing a 
market in which competing (potential) employers face 
competing (potential) employees. This implies a situation 
in which there are few attachments between workers and 
firms and high labor turnover. As firms grow larger and 
more powerful, they try to bring more and more of their 
environments under control and 'internalize', so to speak, 
forces which can potentially upset their profits and 
existence. Hence the creation of 'internal labour markets' 
through which to arrange the purchase and sale of labour 
power within the firms. Internal labour markets consist of 
such mechanisms and institutions as hierarchical job 
ladders, limited ports of entry, inducements to stay on the 
job, promotion ladders and so on. Seen in this light, 
benefits and earnings are one part of the institutions and 
mechanisms which make up the internal labour market. But 
while non-Marxist economists regard earnings and benefits
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as a means for maintaining labour stability, which is seen 
to be essential to a firm's productivity (Doeringer and 
Piore 1971) and long-term profitability (Chandler 1977), 
neo-Marxists regard them as part of 'a system ...contrived 
and consciously designed to perpetuate the capitalist's 
control over the firm's workforce' (Edwards, Reich and 
Gordon 1973:5).
3. Worker power: In this perspective, capitalists are 
not so much interested in as compelled by the organized 
power of occupational groups to providing more earnings and 
benefits to the employees (Kalleberg, Wallace, and 
Althauser 1981). Elbaum's (1984) study of American iron and 
steel industry during World Ward I and the Great 
Depression, for example, concluded that 'the primary cause 
of internal labour market was pressure collectively exerted 
by workers for employment security and advancement with 
consequences that included rigid internal promotion rules 
and a wide range of freedom for competitive constraints and 
wage structure' (1984:101). Benefits and welfare could also 
result indirectly from labour power. Jacoby's (1984) study 
of American manufacturing firms in the 30's and 40's 
noticed, for instance, that pecuniary welfare and fringe 
benefits had arisen out of competition with unions to 
secure employee loyalty. Firms which introduced such 
'managerial innovations' 'refused to bargain over these 
benefits and stressed to employees that unions had not been 
responsible for them' (Jacoby 1984:52).
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Clearly not all of these perspectives are relevant for 
understanding the origins of occupational welfare in China. 
Internal labour markets, for instance, presuppose profit- 
seeking firms and external labour markets characterised by 
competition and mobility. Such capitalist institutions are 
largely nonexistent in the planned economy. Indeed, before 
1978, Chinese leaders ideologically rejected these 
institutions. They believed in the superiority of a planned 
socialist economy and were unwilling to grant ideological 
legitimacy to a labour market for state enterprises (Davis 
1990:88). Before 1978, there was strict administrative 
control over job assignment; wages and benefits were 
centrally regulated; salary increases were determined by 
state budgets; career promotions followed ranking systems 
imposed by central planners; employers were not allowed to 
lay off workers; and employment was virtually for life. 
There were neither external nor internal labour markets. It 
was only during the economic reforms of the 1980s that some 
limited labour markets began to gradually come into 
existence. Even then, in the urban state sector, there were 
'extremely high levels of immobility' and 'state employees 
were "stuck"..., frustrated by their inability to take 
advantage of the reform leadership's stated goals of 
reducing bureaucratic controls over employment practices' 
(Davis 1990: 87). Chinese occupational welfare cannot be 
explained, therefore, in terms of the functions and logic 
of internal labour markets.
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The worker power perspective is also largely 
irrelevant. There was no autonomous occupational power, and 
trade unions were under the leadership of the ruling 
Communist Party, co-operating with the government and 
workplace management to control rather than serve workers. 
Their jobs were to 'transmit the party line to workers, 
encourage production..., engage in political education, and 
execute a range of welfare chores' (Hoffmann 1974:134). 
Attempts by early leaders of All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU) to define for the trade union a more 
independent and pro-worker role were attacked, labelled as 
'anti-Party' 'economism' and 'syndicalism', and politically 
stigmatized (Ouyang 1994). Trade unions were disbanded in 
1967 and not formally reconstituted until 1974.
The culture perspective does appear to be relevant. 
Paternalism, as Walder (1986) points out, was inherent in 
the ideology and practice of the Chinese firms. Paternalism 
had also been found to be prevalent among former Soviet- 
type societies. It characterized the relationship between 
the state and state enterprises (Kornai 1986: 52-61) and 
had been the 'main mode of legitimation' (Feher 1982: 69) 
for communism before its demise. In these societies,
'(s)ocial benefits serve...to inspire loyalty to the state' 
(Rimlinger 1971: 254) and, 'thanks to the social services, 
the state gains considerably in legitimacy and support' 
(Mishra 1977: 144).
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In seeking to explain the origins of occupational 
welfare in China, this study has taken the position shared 
by such writers as Hall (1986), Skocpol (1985), Berger 
(1981), and Steinmo et al (1992) . This position, 
'historical' or 'new institutionalism', maintains that one 
should bring the historical context of a national society 
back in and examine a policy or an institution by situating 
it in both the context of political and societal 
institutions and a broader matrix of contesting interests 
and ideas.
Scholars (for example, Stark and Nee 1989) in the 
fields of China and East European studies insisting this 
position are critical of approaches which regard these 
countries as either some variants of communist totalitarian 
states or as modernizing countries on an evolutionary 
course converging with that of modern industrialism. They 
question many of the fundamental assumptions underlying 
these approaches, for example, the image of an atomized 
citizenry in the totalitarian model and the idealized image 
of Western development in the theory of modernization. They 
criticize these overarching paradigms for their failure to 
attend to the complex realities and many diversities in 
these societies. Also, they were dissatisfied because 
during the 1980s 'the shift to attempted reforms dramatized 
the lack of fit between the analytical problems constructed 
by the competing theories and those faced in the societies 
themselves' (Stark and Nee 1989:7). Turning away from these
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theories, the new institutionalists have instead subscribed 
to the view that state socialism represents a distinct 
social formation that has its own institutional logic and 
dynamics of development and insisted that theories 
explaining processes and outcomes in state socialism must 
take into account the institutional arrangements specific 
to socialism.
This study of Chinese occupational welfare has been 
oriented by similar recognitions. In endorsing the new 
institutionalist position, it maintains that Chinese 
occupational welfare must be studied in its own national 
and historical contexts, and as part of an institutional 
configuration characteristic of state socialism. Great care 
has to be exercised, therefore, in applying and using 
concepts which derive meanings from very different 
societal, cultural, and institutional contexts, concepts 
such as internal labour market, occupational welfare and 
paternalism.
The Nature of Chinese Occupational Welfare
Chinese occupational welfare follows from an 
employment relation distinctly different from that typical 
of a market economy. In the market economy, an employment 
relation is primarily a labour market relationship: 'a
specific contractual exchange of efforts and skills for 
money and other compensation' (Walder 1986:16).
- 22 -
Occupational welfare is one component of an employer- 
employee exchange equation.
In China, employment in the state enterprise is not 
primarily a market relationship. It is rather 'a position 
that establishes the worker's social identity and rights to 
specific distributions and welfare entitlements provided by 
the state'(Ibid:16). Occupational welfare follows from an 
employment relation which relates the individual to the 
state and which at the same time defines the former's 
rights and entitlements and the latter's obligations. Such 
rights and entitlements are not extended, however, to all 
citizens. They are limited only to a selected sector of the 
citizenry: urban workers in employment in the state sector. 
This means, in the early 1950s, around 80 per cent, in the 
late 1980s, around 70 per cent, and in 1996, 66.7% of the 
urban labour force (State Statistical Bureau 1989:101; Hu 
1996:126; see also Table 1.4).7
The danwei is therefore more than just a workplace. It 
brings the state and its state-sector urban citizens 
together and articulates a relationship of entitlements and 
obligations between them.
7 '(P)ermanent workers in state industrial enterprises
are the only segment of the industrial labor force to 
participate fully in the welfare state' (Walder 1986:40). 
Temporary workers are largely denied these benefits. 
Benefits for workers in the collective sector are unstable 
and never approach the same level of the state sector.
- 23 -
But the danwei is also more than just the meeting 
place between state and society. In a 'redistributive 
economy7 (Polanyi 1977; Szelenyi 1983; Kornai 1984; Nee 
1989, 1990; Walder 1992; Lee 1994) which collects and
distributes goods through centralized decision making and 
bureaucratic hierarchies, danwei has become the principal 
organizational framework through which the socialist state 
allocates resources and redistributes income. Danwei 
membership is an important status because it entitles a 
worker to the goods and incomes 'redistributed7 by the 
state to its urban population. In market economies, such 
goods and incomes would have been supplied basically 
through the market.
Occupational welfare is an integral part of such 
state-distributed goods and income.8 It typically includes
8 It appears that this is not unique to China. Simpura 
(1994) , for instance, also notices that in Russia and the 
Baltic countries there was a system very similar to what 
was found in China: 'Production and consumption were, in a 
way, organized in the same units. Production units, and all 
other workplaces as well, were not only a source of 
monetary income but also distributive channels for various 
commodities and services to the workers... The workplaces 
were responsible for the satisfaction of a large part of 
the material and social needs of the employees. Commodities 
and services were distributed throught he workplace. The 
technical management ran the production, trade unions were 
in charge of the distribution of goods and services, and 
party organs dealt with control and co-ordination. All 
these three functions were interwined, both on the level of 
workplaces and of the municipalities. In western terms, the 
need for services outside the workplaces was relatively 
limited7 (p.165). Manning (1992) also notices that 'Soviet 
welfare was, in Titmuss7s terms, largely reminiscent of 
occupational welfare7 (p.42). What distinguishes the 
Chinese system from its Soviet counteparts was that Chinese 
workers were dependent on occupational welfare to a much 
greater extent, as explained by Walder: 'The Chinese
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the following types of benefits and services (Leung 
1992:13-14; see also Chow 1988:29-45; Guo et al 1990:3-4; 
Walder 1986:59-67):
1. Labour insurance: This is a non-contributory scheme 
covering retirement, sickness, injury, medical care, 
invalidity and death, funeral expenses, survivorship, 
maternity and sick leave. The range of benefits under the 
scheme are 'mandated by the government and in principle 
meant to be fairly uniform across work units' (Hussain 
1993:16). The provisions of main benefits covered by the 
scheme are as shown in Table 1.1.
2. Allowances and subsidies: These include allowances
given out in cash, on a monthly basis, on, for example, 
heating, transportation, food, single-child, as well as 
heavily subsidized benefits such as housing, electricity 
and water. Housing is easily the most important of these. 
State enterprises control about half of all urban housing 
stock (Whyte and Parish 1984:82) and state workers depend 
on their danwei for heavily subsidized quarters, paying
pattern differs from the Soviet in two important respects. 
First, the Soviet Union has not had a system of job 
allocation through labor bureaus since the early 1930s, 
relying instead on local advertisements, word of mouth, 
and, in recent decades, employment agencies. Second, the 
rates of labor turnover there are considerably higher in 
the state sector than interviewsd and document suggest is 
the case in China' (Walder 1986:74-5). Granick (1991) 
concludes also that China is the norm rather than the 
exception among centrally planned socialist economies in 
providing some form of an iron rice bowl for state 
employees.
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rents that 'rarely exceed the equivalent of one or two 
days' pay' (Walder 1986:65). Employees who do not live in 
danwei housing but remain in private or municipally owned 
housing can receive money grants from their enterprises to 
repair their quarters.
3. Collective welfare: Most work-units provide free or 
almost free services in a number of the following: clinics, 
primary schools, bathhouses, kindergartens, sports 
facilities, barber shops, canteens, club houses, 
recreational centres, old-age centres, reading rooms, and 
daycare and kindergarten, an important service for the 
typical family in which both spouses work. In general, the 
higher the level of government, the more resources there 
are, and the better the collective welfare programs and 
facilities available to work-units (Walder 1992; Bian 
1994:177-207). Schools and hospitals are common among 
large-scale units. In 1995, one-third of China's hospital 
beds were in unit hospitals and as many as 6.1 million 
pupils went to schools run by work-units (Ming Pao, 6 
December 1995).
4. Individual welfare: Provided mainly through union 
cadres at the cell group level to workers who have personal 
or family problems, this includes job placement for the 
physically disabled, mediating family, interpersonal and 
industrial disputes, counselling delinquents, promoting 
family planning and family education, assisting poverty-
- 26 -
stricken households, and caring for the retired elderly.
5. In-kind distribution: Workplaces are also points 
of distribution of ration coupons not only for highly 
sought-after industrial goods--sewing machines, bicycles, 
radios, watches, and furniture--but also for additional 
coupons for grain and other foodstuffs above the rationed 
amounts. Before 1979 this was important simply to assure 
supplies. After 1979 it is important to get better brands 
and pay low state prices. Many enterprises also buy grain, 
fruits, meat, eggs, fish, clothes, furniture, and 
housewares and distribute them to their employees. One 
study has suggested that the distribution of consumer goods 
accounted for 10 percent of the total personal income of 
employees in state enterprises (Guo et al 1990:5).
These benefits and services are generally non­
contributory, non-fee-charging, free, and when fee- 
charging, on only a nominal basis. And, in general, these 
are distributed or made available to workers on an 
'egalitarian' (Guo et al 1990:2) basis. Together they 
'could add at least 50 percent to money wages' (Hu and Li 
1995:168).
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Table 1.1 Selected Labour Insurance Benefits Provided to 
Permanent Workers in State-Owned Enterprises
Item
Work-related injury or illness
Work-related disability
Non-work related injury or illness
Non-work-related disability 
Injury or illness of dependents
Death benefit
Benefits for death of minor dependents 
Maternity benefits
Old-age pensions 
Unemployment relief allowance
Provisions
100% cost of treatment, medicine, hospital, and travel.
100% wage during treatment. Food 2/3 cost paid. Registration fee paid 
by patient
Pension 40-90% former wage until death or recovery. Partial disability 
resulting in change to lower-paying job: 10-30% of prior wage as 
supplement, up to level of former wage
Fees, costs, medicine paid. Employee pays for expensive medicine, 
travel, and meals. 60-100% wage up to 6 months, 40-60% thereafter 
(amount depends on seniority)
40-50% wage as a pension for permanent disability
Entided to treatment at clinic or hospital attached to experprise. 50% cost 
of treatment and medicine. Expensive medicine, travel, hospital room, 
meals, registration fee, examination fee, and medical tests paid by family
Work-related: Lump sum, 3 months pay.
25-50% pay to minor dependents until working age.
Non-work-related: 2 months pay as lump sum. 6-12 months pay, lump 
sum, to minor dependents
Lump sum 1/2 month pay for child over 10 years; 1/3 month for child 
under 10; no benefit for child under 1 year.
90 days leave at full pay (15 to 45 for miscarriage). Pre-natal care paid 
by enterprise, at factory clinic or hospital. 4 yuan supplement on birth of 
each child. 8 yuan for multiple births.
Male: At age 60, with 25 yrs. seniority, and 10 yrs. with present 
enterprise, 60-90% pay, depending on seniority. If continues work after 
retirement age, 10-20% pay in addition to full pay.
Female: Same, but retirement age is 50, with 20 years seniority and 10 
years at current job
Workers with 5 or more years o f service: up to 24 months’ support; during 
the first 12 months, 60 to 75 percent of standard wage; during the next 12 
months, 50 percent (thte standard wage is calculated as the worker’s 
average monthly wage over two years before leaving the enterprise); and 
for workers with less than 5 years o f service: up to 12 months’ support at 
60 to 75 percent ofstandard wage
Source: Zhan (1993:206-284); Walder (1986:44)
It is only too clear that, because of all these 
benefits and services, workers cannot but become highly 
dependent on their danwei for satisfying a broad range of 
their needs. Through the late 1970s, in China, such 
dependence was accentuated by the fact that there was also 
a scarcity of alternatives and no real 'exit' (Hirschman 
1970) option: 'movement between enterprises was tightly
restricted; residence controls were strictly enforced; 
housing and consumer goods were in extremely short supply; 
and common consumer items and even basic foodstuffs were 
rationed through the workplace7 (Walder 1986:17). Shortages 
were compounded by the fact that wages had been kept low 
and effectively frozen throughtout the 1960s and 1970s 
(Parish 1981:39). During these years, there were few 
commodities to buy from the market and little to buy with. 
Such shortages and controls easied in the 1980s. A major 
theme discussed in the chapters to follow is on how the 
economic reforms begun in 1978 by the Chinese patriarch, 
Deng Xiao-ping, challenged and upset this pre-existing 
pattern of dependence, creating new problems and 
possibilities for danwei workers.
The Chinese system of occupational welfare has 
resulted in a number of social and political consequences. 
One significant consequence is that it has provided an 
important source of regime legitimation in China. As Walder 
(1986) points out: 'The extraodinary job security and
benefits, the goods and services distributed by the state
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enterprise in a situation of scarcity that affects other 
sectors of the workforce more severely, is an important 
source of acceptance of the system' (p.249). Occupational 
welfare vindicates the 'superiority of socialism' and its 
care for the welfare of the working class (Saich 1984:153). 
Indeed, the popular support that the Chinese Communist 
Party developed in urban areas in the early years of the 
Republic depended to no small extent on 'the ability of the 
new government to equitably and honestly distribute goods 
and services so that popular consumption needs would be met 
at low and stable prices' (Whyte and Parish 1984:103).
A second consequence is that it has turned work units 
into gemeinschafts, communities which encompass many
aspects of the life of their members. As encapsulated in 
one popular expression, 'qiyie ban shehui,' or in English, 
'enterprises run the society' (Bian 1994:177), each work 
unit is in effect a 'small society' (xiao she hui) , a
microcosm of the urban community. It integrates in one 
structure such a wide range of functions and
responsibilities it no longer is just an economic
organization. The Chinese saying, 'the mayor governs the 
factory managers, and the factory managers govern the 
society' (Leung 1992:2), vividly highlights this 
gerne inschaftlich character of the work unit.
The geme ins chaftlich character of the work unit is 
underpinned also by two important conditions, firstly, by
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the fact that it has 'a lifetime, relatively immobile 
membership'9 (Womack 1990:324) and secondly, by its 
tendency to reproduce membership by recruiting from among 
close kin and relatives (Leung 1992:5; Davis 1988). There 
was preferential distribution of job opportunities to 
family members (Walder 1986:66) . Many spouses worked in the 
same unit (Henderson and Cohen 1984:36) and, between 1978 
and 1986, when dingti ('replacement') was allowed, many 
retiring parents simply passed their jobs to their 
children. State-sector jobs became virtually inheritable 
(Gold 1980; Davis-Friedmann 1981; Shirk 1981). The work 
unit is like a 'small society' in the sense that it is 
close to self-sufficient both in terms of reproducing its 
population and in terms of the wide range of services which 
it provides to its members. In most cases, members of this 
'small society' share such services and many aspects of 
their life together over long periods of their life time.
Within their 'small societies', factory managers are 
responsible not only for organizing production, but also 
managing the welfare of workers and their dependents 
(Walder 1989). They are like paternal heads of extended 
households who assume diffuse responsibility over the 
welfare of their members (Yue, 1991, quoted in Leung 
1992:6). 'Marriage, divorce, childbearing, education, job
9 Two-thirds (65.2 percent) of'the workers interviewed 
in a 1988 survey of urban residents had never worked for 
another work-unit. Around one quarter (24.0 percent) had 
moved their jobs only once (Li and Wang 1992:278).
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assignment, job transfer, and the resolution of conflicts 
all involve the knowledge and, in most cases, approval of 
these leaders; they are also responsible for the personal 
well-being of their staff' (Henderson and Cohen 1984: 42). 
A survey of Guangzhou residents, for example, noticed that 
'(w)hile one's boss rarely comes into the picture in Hong 
Kong, seeking help from the danwei chiefs is not that 
unusual in Guangzhou, particularly when one has marital or 
family problems, when the family encounters financial 
dificulties, or when one has difficulties in work or 
career' (Lee 1995: 17). Managerial relations have been
described as paternalistic ( Henderson and Cohen 1984; 
Walder 1986;) or 'fief-like' (Boisot and Child 1988) and 
the state-owned organisation and management as 'a clan-like 
structure with a heavy emphasis on informal communication, 
patriarchal decision-making, guranteed pay, and egalitarian 
performance criteria based on the hierarchy' (Baird et al. 
1990) .
But danwei leaders are not just paternalistic figures. 
Wielding power over the bureaucratic allocation of 
resources, they are effectively also 'gatekeepers'10 (Vogel 
1989:409-14) whose decisions have important implications 
for the life chances of their subordinates. As they 
operated with considerable personal discretion over such
10 On the concept of 'gatekeeper' , see also Pahl 
(1975) which defines 'gatekeepers' as 'those crucial urban 
types...who control or manipulate scarce resources and 
facilities' (p.206).
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decisions, 'a competitive effort by subordinates to 
manipulate personal ties (with them) in order to get their 
needs met was inevitabale' (Whyte 1991:267) .11 This has led 
to a proliferation of 'clientelist ties' (Walder 1986) and 
networks of personal connections, or guanxi12 (Yang 1994), 
which trade favors and advantages against, irrespective of, 
or exploiting formal rules and relations. Guanxi networks 
and rampant 'back-door practices' have become the dominant 
landscape of Chinese organizational life.
Workers' dependence on the danwei for satisfying a 
broad range of their needs, hightened by the lack of 
alternatives outside and exit from the unit, has another 
important consequence: it underpins danwei's control over 
many aspects of their life. Because the danwei is in actual 
fact a branch of government and its leaders state and party 
officials, such control is more than economic. It is also 
political: it reinforces the state's domination over 
society.13 Work units not only provide many essentials of
11 The concepts 'rent' and 'rent-seeking bahaviour' 
also throw light on the strategic position of the 
'gatekeepers'. In the light of these concepts, rent can be 
'administratively generated' (Krueger 1974), as when, 
within the danwei, power to mediate the distribution of 
welfare is given to certain 'gate-keeping' positions. 
Occupants of these positions appropriate the value of the 
rent in the form of bribes (financial corruption) or 
political loyalty.
12 The cultivation of personal connections (guanxi) is 
not, however, new. It is a prominent feature of Chinese 
society (Fried 1954) .
13 The crucial notion here is that unequal exchange 
between two parties, in which one depends on the other for 
services or resources, results in a power relationship
- 33 -
life. But, as Whyte (1991) notes: 'They supervised the
leisure time activity of their members, ran local 
cleanliness campaigns, organized innoculation drives 
against diseases, mobilized the flocks to guard against 
crime dangers, mediated interpersonal and marital disputes, 
and screened applicants for marriages and divorces (and 
eventually for childbearing). They regularly organized 
mandatory political study sessions for employees and 
required the latter to submit to criticism and self- 
criticism rituals, and they occasionally extended the 
activities to dependents of employees as well. The 
bureaucratic overseers in such urban work units had no 
clear limits on what activities and thoughts of employees 
(and family members) they could supervise and control' 
(p.261-2). The result was a 'highly intrusive and 
penetrating system' which 'maximize(d) official control 
over primary groups at the urban grass roots' (p.262).
These then are the formidable 'social facts' of danwei 
life. As 'exit' is unlikely and 'voice' difficult when 
workers are 'facing a reward system that penalizes the 
voicing of genuine criticisms of conditions and of group 
demands' (Walder 1986:247), the only real 'option' for most 
has been that of 'loyalty' (Hirschman 1970), in other 
words, of staying on. In the context of the danwei, the 
'loyalist' response of the Chinese workers has given rise
between them. See Emerson (1962) and Blau (1964) for some 
classic statements on this perspective.
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to a distinct set of shared values and attitudes, 
orientations, and habituated behaviour, or 'culture' in the 
broad sense of the term, that enable them to come to terms 
with the conditions of danwei life and, indeed, 'beat the 
system' (Walder 1986:247). This culture consists of, first 
of all, the value of obedient compliance with the direction 
and wishes of cadres and leaders; secondly, of passivity, 
of, indeed, expecting and looking to danwei leaders to make 
all possible decisions; thirdly, the attitude which takes 
it for granted that workers be cared for by the danwei and 
which regards it as danwei's obligation and responsibility 
to cater to the many needs of its members; and fourthly, 
the expectation that, in the provision and distribution of 
welfare, no one should be left out and every one should 
have an equal share, the value, in other words, of 
'egalitarianism' (pingjun zhuyi). What has emerged is, in 
short, a culture of paternalistic dependence.14 The culture 
obliges the danwei and its members to their respective 
'carer' and 'cared for' roles and stabilizes their 
reciprocal expectations: while workers can be expected to 
be co-operative and compliant, the danwei is expected to do 
whatever it can to take 'good' care of its workers. The 
culture perpetuates dependence just as it also reinforces 
paternalism. An important theme discussed in the thesis is 
on how economic reforms and the rise of the mixed economy 
had given rise to changes which upset this culture and
14 See Yu (1991) for an insightful discussion of this 
culture.
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forced the danwei and its members to make adjustment to new 
risks and opportunities. It looks at how their response and 
adjustment was shaped by the culture and the extent to 
which they moved away from its influence.
Chinese occupational welfare is thus much more than 
just 'fringes' marginal to employment relations and life at 
the workplace. It is an integral part of life in a state 
redistributive economy. It underpins the paternalism and 
particularism that pervades danwei relations. It fosters 
workers' dependence on and ties them to their respective 
work units. It is at the root of the power-dependence 
relationship between danwei and its members. It helps to 
turn the workplace into a gemeinschaftlich community that 
encompasses and controls many aspects of the life of its 
members. It is also an important means by which the 
socialist state legitimates its rule.
The Economics of Chinese Occupational Welfare
In economic terms, Chinese occupational welfare is 
also far from being just 'fringes'. For the workers, it is 
what provides them basic security, various essentials of 
life and scarce commodities. Throughout the sixties and 
seventies, when wages were low and when there were serious 
shortages in all kinds of consumer goods and services, 
occupational welfare was the de facto life-line for many. 
As conveyed in one popular expression, 'low wage, high
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welfare' (digongzi, gaofuli) , occupational welfare has an 
importance surpassing that of money wage. It is obvious, 
also, that in money terms, occupational welfare is an 
important source of additional income. For instance, 'total 
work-related insurance and other types of welfare 
expenditures may be as high as 526.7 yuan per worker, or
81.7 per cent of the average wage. This does not include 
the value of access to low-cost housing' (Minami 1994:217). 
In the area of housing, rents have been very low, absorbing 
just under one and a half per cent of the average family 
income. A state employee in a 50 square metre flat might 
have benefited to the tune of nearly 100 yuan per year for 
maintenance and administration costs alone (Ibid).
It goes without saying that, for the units, 
occupational welfare is a hefty financial commitment. In 
1994, welfare expenses in state enterprises, not including 
housing subsidies, amounted to Y162.87 billion, or about 32 
percent of the total money wage bill of Y517.74 billion. In 
1978, the share was only 14 per cent (Y6.69 billion of 
Y46.87 billion), as shown in Table 1.2.
A major reason for this staggering growth of welfare 
expenditures had been the rapid increase of welfare for 
retired workers. There were 8 times as many retired workers 
in state enterprises in 1994 than in 1978 and, in less than 
20 years, expenses on retirement benefits had increased by 
more than 60 times, from less than 2 to over 100 billion
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yuan (see Table 1.3) . In 1994, 45 percent of the labor
insurance and welfare funds in state-owned enterprises were 
spent on pensions paid to retired workers, as shown in 
Table 1.4.
Medical care was the next most expensive benefit. In 
1994, almost one-third of the labor insurance and welfare 
funds were spent on medical care for employees and retired 
workers. The cost of medical care had risen by almost six 
times between 1986 and 1994 (State Statistical Bureau 1988, 
1995) and was expected to rise at an annual rate of 3 0 
percent (Li 1996:66) . The increase in cost was partly due 
to an increase in prices and a change in the quality of the 
services (Hussain 1993:26), and partly due to the ageing of 
the population15 and an increase in the number of state- 
sector employees covered by medical care insurance.16 In 
1994, work units were on the average spending as much as 9 
percent of their wage bill on medical care. There were also 
reports of cases in which work units were spending more on 
medical care than on the wages of their workers.17
15 The proportion of the population aged 60 and above 
increased from 7.6 percent in 1982 to 8.9 percent in 1989 
(Zhou 1995:158).
16 The number of state-sector employees receiving 
medical-care insurance provided through workplaces 
increased by 90 percent from 72 million in 1980 to 137 
million in 1991 (Zhou 1995:158).
17 A survey of 28 state-owned enterprises in Guangzhou 
found 15 of them spending all their labor insurance and 
welfare funds on health care (Bo and Dong 1993:196).
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But housing was the most expensive of all. Housing was 
heavily subsidised, when workers were spending only around 
2 percent of their household income on housing. Rental 
payment covered but a very small fraction of the total cost 
of new housing or maintenance and repair. In 1993, housing 
subsidies were estimated to be about Y130 billion, more 
than the sum of expenditures on old-age pensions and 
medical care and nearly as much as the entire amount spent 
on labour insurance and welfare funds (Guojia Jinji Tizhi 
Gaige Weiyuanhui 1995:48) . With the housing stock more than 
doubling during the 1980s, subsidy costs also grew very 
rapidly.
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Table 1.2 Labour Insurance and Welfare Funds* as
Percentages of Total Wage in State-owned 
Enterprises 1978-1994
Labor Insurance 
and Welfare 
Funds 
(billion vuan)
Total Wage 
Bill 
(billion vuan)
Labor Insurance 
and Welfare 
Funds as 
Percentage of 
Total Waae
1978 6.69 46.87 14 .3%
1980 11.60 62.79 18.5
1984 21.04 87.58 24.0
1985 26.99 106.48 25.3
1986 34.00 128.85 26.4
1987 41.18 145.93 28.2
1988 53 .34 180.71 29.5
1989 62 .80 205.02 30.6
1990 77.01 232 .41 33 .1
1991 90.49 259.49 34 .9
1992 108.66 309.04 35.2
1993 137.45 381.27 36.1
1994** 162.87 517.74 31.5
Insurance and Welfare Funds: Paid by work units to
their retired workers and employees on top of their 
wages and salaries, this includes, for employees: 
medical care allowances, funeral expenses and 
provisions for family of the deceased, various kinds 
of subsides for living expenses, subsidies for such 
facilities as nursery, kindergarten and barber shops, 
subsidies for one-child families; and, for retired 
workers, pensions, allowances and subsidies, medical 
care cost, transportation subsidies, funeral expenses, 
and so on. Housing subsidies and food allowances are 
not included.
As from 1994, subsidies for transportation as well as 
barber and bath fees are covered by 'wages'.
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1995: 108, 685).
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Table 1.3 Number of Retired Workers (million) and Labour 
and Insurance funds for Retired Workers (billion 
yuan), in State-owned Enterprises, 1978 - 1994.
Number of 
Retired 
Workers 
(million)
Ratio of 
Employees to 
Retired 
Workers
Labor Insurance 
and Welfare Funds 
for Retired 
Workers 
(billion vuan)
1978 2.84 26.2 1.63
1980 6.38 12.6 4.34
1984 10.62 8.1 8.46
1985 11.65 7.7 11. 92
1986 13.03 7.2 16.16
1987 14 .24 6.8 20.05
1988 15.44 6.5 25.64
1989 16.29 6.2 30.97
1990 17.42 6.0 38.24
1991 18 .33 5.8 45. 97
1992 19 . 72 5.5 57.28
1993 21.43 5.1 75.28
1994 22 .49 4.8 102 .20
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1995: 688, 690).
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Table 1.4 Labour Insurance and Welfare Funds for Employees and 
Retired Workers in State-owned Enterprises 1994 
(billion yuan)
For Employees (billion Y)
Subsidies for Public Welfare 12.02
and Facilities
Expenses for Cultural and 2.14
Sports Activities
Medical Care 3 0.92
Funeral Expenses and Pensions for 1.21
Dependents
Subsidies for Living Expenses 1.17
Subsidies for Family Planning 1.68
Subsidies for Heating in Winter 2.71
Others 8.82
Sub-total 60.67
For Retired Workers
Pensions* 73.35
Medical Care 16.36
Funeral Expenses and Pensions for 1.45
Dependents
Transportation subsidies 1.08
Subsidies for Heating in Winter 0.67
Others 9.2 9
Sub-total 102.20
Total 162.87
♦Pensions: This includes pensions for retired workers and 
cadres
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1995: 686, 688)
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The Socialist Firm in Market Transition
Workers' heavy dependence on their work units for 
occupational welfare is mirrored at the macro level by the 
heavy financial dependence of the work units on the state.
In the pre-reform days, the state sector was 
administered by the command economy. The 'socialist firm' 
depended on the state for every thing from output targets 
to wage funds. In conditions of 'soft budget constraints' 
(Kornai 1986), it was not required to be sensitive to cost 
and price considerations and could always rely on the 
'paternalistic state' (Ibid: 52-61) to bail it out of
trouble. Survival was guaranteed by the state regardless of 
its performance , and its growth was determined by central 
planners who allocated resources on the basis of 
bureaucratic procedures. As Kornai incisively analyses: 
'Because budget constraints are lax, the firm has little 
pressure to use resources and investment efficiently. In 
fact, it often has every incentive to use them 
inefficiently: rewarded for expansion and physical output, 
the socialist firm's managers seek to hoard and hide 
reserves and to maximize the resources and investments 
allocated to it. For this reason, the firm's demand for 
resources is theoretically limitless. This perpetual hunger 
for resources, in turn, gives rise to chronic shortages 
throughout the economy as firms pump the state for more 
workers, equipment, raw materials, and investments
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irrespective of their financial situation or ability to use 
those resources efficiently' (Stark and Nee 1989:9).
As in other socialist economies, China eschewed hard 
budget constraints. 'The soft budget constraints for 
industry resulted in inefficiency, low productivity, waste, 
and chronic shortages, especially of consumer goods and 
foods. All of this cost the state a great deal of money' 
(Gold 1990:162). Working under soft-budget conditions,18 
state-sector enterprises could largely disregard the cost 
and efficiency implications of occupational welfare. They 
could afford generous welfare provisions to their employees 
firstly because these were all paid for by the state: 
'their benefits are passed directly to the state budget and 
do not represent a cost to enterprise management, because 
a fixed proportion of the wage bill is set aside each year 
for funding these provisions, and the funds cannot legally 
be used for other purposes' (Walder 1986:43). Secondly, it 
was because their growth and survival had nothing to do 
with profit. It had more to do with their size and the 
scale of their production. 'The permanently loss-making 
enterprises can survive and even expand. The final amount 
of profit is not decided by the market but through 
bargaining between the enterprise and its superior 
authorities' (Kornai 1990:192). There was therefore little
18 Kornai visited China in 1985 and found that the 
phenomenon of 'soft budget constraint' was prevailing there 
too: 'In the course of our talks with Chinese economists
they used this expression, which they had learnt from 
Hungarian literature, repeatedly' (Kornai 1990:192).
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pressure on enterprises to run occupational welfare 
efficiently, cut cost, and reduce expenditure. The pressure 
was rather in the opposite direction: in Kornai's words, to 
'pump' the state for ever more allocations. Throughout the 
period from 1949-1989, state subsidies to support ailing 
enterprises and regulate the supply and prices of goods 
amounted to as much as 20 percent of state expenditure 
(Leung 1994) . 'It was this type of support, even in the 
face of inefficiency and low productivity, that provided 
the metal for the "iron rice bowl" and which enabled people 
to keep their jobs and feel secure irrespective of their 
own performance or that of their enterprise' (Westwood and 
Leung 1996:3 83).
The institutional environment for occupational welfare 
has been radically transformed by the economic reforms 
introduced since 1979. 'Market transition' (Nee 1989, 1991,
1992) reduces the role of bureaucratic allocation and 
increases the role of the market. In less than ten years' 
time, it has ushered in a 'mixed economy' which 'retain(s) 
some elements of the traditional Soviet-type economic 
system along with the adoption of some elements of market 
socialism' (Dernberger 1989:21), with a dominant but 
shrinking state sector co-existing with an expanding non­
state sector. The mixed economy is characterized by the 
'coexistence of multiple ownership forms' (Nee 1994:6). It 
consists of not only state- and collective-owned 
enterprises but a growing number of 'private business'
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(siying qiye) , share-holding companies and various forms of 
joint ventures with foreign and overseas Chinese capital. 
Market transition has also given rise to mixed or 'hyprid 
organizational forms' at the 'grass-roots level' (i.e., in 
the firm). 'Within many firms today, the market and 
planning coexist: some subunits are operated according to 
the principles of a market economy, while others are still 
state- or collective-owned and operated according to the 
principles of a planned economy.... A typical firm is now 
a hybrid' (Su 1994:199).
In 1994, there were 8 million enterprises in the non­
state sector employing 22 million workers. Their output 
accounted for 25 percent of the country's gross output 
value of industry. State-owned enterprises were still the 
main employer, employing two-thirds (66.4 percent) of 
China's urban labor force. But they were producing only 
one-third (34.1 percent) of the country's industrial output 
(see Table 1.5). In Guangzhou, both in terms of number of 
employees and size of capital asset, the non-state sector 
has grown to almost as big a size as the state sector 
(Guangzhou Shi Tongji Ju 1995:76-78).
The downscaling if not yet dismantling of the command 
economy has many implications for both the danwei and its 
workers.
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Table 1.4 Number of Enterprises, Number of Employees (million), and Gross Output Value 
of Industry by Sector, 1994
State-owned 
Enterprises
Collective-
owned
Enterprises
Individual- 
owned
Enterprises
Other
Ownership
Enterprises
Total
Number of 
Enterprises
102,200
1,863,000
8,007,400
44,500
Number of 
Employees 
(in million)
43.69
16.04
6.07
No. of
Employees in 
Percentage
66.4
24.4
9.2
Gross Output 
Value of 
Industry (in 
billion vuan)
2,620.08
3,143.40
885.32
65.9 100.0
1,042.14
7,690.94
Gross Output 
Value of 
Industry in 
Percentage
34.1
40.9
11.5
13 .5
100 . 0
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1995: 375, 376)
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For the danwei, the most important implication is that 
it is now required to be profit oriented and 'be solely 
responsible for its profits and losses' ('zifu yingqui') . 
It has to work with 'hard budget constraints' and face the 
possibility of bankruptcy.19 Occupational welfare cannot 
but enter into cost-efficiency considerations. The question 
now haunting every danwei is: Can it still carry on with 
its welfare responsibilities? The question is a realistic 
and pressing one. Many state enterprises, especially ones 
with an ageing workforce or large retired sector, are in a 
very poor shape to compete with enterprises in the non­
state sector, which provide fewer welfare benefits to their 
employees, and which usually also have a younger labour 
force20 and enjoy tax concessions.21 Many have, therefore,
19 The State Council introduced the Bankruptcy Law in 
November 1988, but few enterprises took that course in the 
beginning. In the first six months of 1992, 'fifteen state- 
operated and forty-one other enterprises declared 
bankruptcy. These figures are minuscle...However, this 
small number of bankruptcy is a great improvement over the 
previous five years during which only two state-operated 
and ninety eight other enterprises went bankrupt'(Field 
1993:251).
20 In 1994, the ratio of employees to retirees was 5.1 
in state-owned enterprises and 12.5 in the non-state 
sector. Expenses on retirement benefits were respectively 
Y102.20 billion and Y2.73 billion (State Statistical Bureau 
1995) .
21 The taxation of enterprises depends on their 
ownership. State-owned enterprises, urban collectives, 
rural collectives, private enterprises, . individual 
household enterprises, foreign enterprises, and joint 
ventures are all taxed differently. Joint ventures and 
foreign enterprises are taxed more lightly than domestic 
enterprises, except village and township enterprises. Large 
and medium-sized state-owned enterprises pay 55 per cent of 
their profits in tax, while small enterprises are subject 
to a progressive tax scale rising from 10 to 55 per cent. 
Urban collectives pay taxes on the same progressive rate
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performed very badly; the number that lost money and the 
amount of their total losses have been on the increase 
since 1985. In 1995, 'officially, 42.2% of SOEs (state- 
owned enterprises) reported losses. Many unofficial sources 
indicate that about one-third of SOEs that reported profits 
were actually in the red' (Lee 1996:270). In 1994, state- 
owned enterprises reported a total loss of 36.6 billion 
yuan. The loss amounted to 9 percent of the state's total 
revenue.
In a large scale survey of state-owned enterprises, 
the State Council asked each general manager to identify 
three main reasons for losses. In descending order the top 
three reasons reported were 'heavy burden of social 
services', 'poor internal organization structure', and 
'heavy historical burden'. The major historical burdens 
were 'surplus labour', or concealed unemployment, and 
'retired workers' (Lee 1996: 270-271). It was obvious
occupational welfare was the main if not the only culprit 
to be blamed for the failure of state-owned enterprises.
The blame was not groundless. The 'heavy burden of 
social services' has affected the performance of state- 
owned enterprises in several important ways. First, it has 
raised the cost of production. Secondly, it has eaten into
structure as small state-owned enterprises. Township and 
village enterprises only pay a 20 per cent tax. 'The 
application of different rates of tax to different bases 
for different types of enterprises distorts the economy by 
preventing equal competition' (Wong et al. 1995:59).
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funds for capital accumulation and reinvestment. Thirdly, 
it has led to over-sized and inefficient management 
structures. Fourthly, when welfare is taken for granted and 
when 'non-wage compensation may be even greater than that 
of wages7 (Hu and Li 1993:172), it has undermined wage 
incentives.
The 'burden of social services7 has been particularly 
heavy on 'old7 enterprises. Besides having 'ageing 
facility7 (Lee 1996:264) and outdated technology, hence low 
quality product, these firms are also more likely to have 
ageing workforces and big retiree populations, hence also 
huge medical and pensions bills. 'Old7 enterprises have 
become entrapped in vicious cycles of low productivity, 
heavy social service burden and swelling debts.
Many state-owned enterprises were also entangled in 
'triangular debt7.22 Before 1985, the financial needs of 
state enterprises for long-term and infrastructure 
investment were met by state allocations. The policy of 
'converting fund allocation to bank loans7 (tou gai dai) in 
1985 has changed the rule of the game on capital budgeting. 
Instead of obtaining fund allocation from the state, state- 
owned enterprises had to turn to state banks for loans. 
However, following the 'cold shower7 policy introduced in
22 The 'triangular debt7 problem indicates a debt 
chain in which firm A is indebted to firm B, firm B to firm 
C, and firm C to firm A (See, for example, Lee 1996:274- 
277) . As a result, all have found excuses not to repay 
their debt. Triangular debts are bad debts.
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1991, bank loans had become difficult to get. By 1993, many 
state-owned enterprises were locked in 'triangular debts', 
which in 1995 ran up to 700 billion yuan (Ming Pao 6, 
December 1995). It was estimated that 'about one-third of 
state bank loans may be bad7 (Lee 1996:275) and, as a 
result, the financial position of many state banks was 
'shaky7 .23 'Most SOEs will not be able to borrow additional 
capital in open, free financial markets and will face 
bankruptcy if the creditors have the power to call in their 
credits and loans7 (Lee 1996:270). In-the-red enterprises 
had got state banks into big financial troubles.
The state-sector was no longer the predominant sector 
which it once was. In 1994, it was producing only 34 
percent of the country's gross output value of industry, 
less than half of its share in 1962 (State Statistical 
Bureau 1995). Notwithstanding its declining importance, 
however, it was still the country's largest employer and 
the producer of around 60 percent of the state's revenue 
(Li 1996:64-65). Even more importantly, it was what still 
stood for socialism and public ownership. The 
'haemorrhaging losses' (Lee 1996:296) of the state 
enterprises had, therefore, many grave implications. It 
drained the state of an important source of its revenue. 
Were in-the-red enterprises to go bankrupt, millions of 
workers would be forced out of their jobs. This could lead
23 The accumulated losses among state banks during the 
first six months of 1995 amounted to 2.9 billion yuan (Li 
1996:63) .
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to a string of social problems.24 Also, many state banks 
would be in trouble if their debtors went bankrupt. It 
could all add up to a major financial 'crisis'.
The 'crisis' is not simply financial. Because danwei 
welfare has been an important means by which the socialist 
state legitimates its rule, any failure to continue to 
deliver and any attempt to roll back such welfare or make 
the recipients pay for what has hitherto been made 
available to them free or largely free could touch off a 
'legitimacy crisis', a crisis reminiscent of what some neo- 
Marxist writers (Castells 1977, 0'Connorl973) would
describe of the fiscal and political problems plaguing the 
capitalist state.25 Danwei members are bound to ask: Why
24 There were reports of an alarming increase of 
incidents of 'fights, strikes, petitions and 
demonstrations' . Many of these had to do with social 
security and welfare issues, for instance, workers 
frustrated by their displacement from jobs in loss-making 
enterprises without proper compensation and assistance 
(Feng 1996:11, 284).
25 Castells so describes the 'crisis in the provision 
of collective consumption': the more the state assumes 
responsibility for the provision of social resources, the 
more the whole area of collective consumption becomes 
politicized; the fiscal crisis of the state forces it to 
react by cutting its level of expenditures and redirecting 
resources from the support of labour-power to the direct 
support of capital; a reduction in the level of such 
provision carries with it the possibility of a strong and 
politically organized lower-class reaction against the 
state itself (Castells 1977). O'Connor argues that the 
capitalist state must try to fulfill two basic and often 
mutually contradictory functions--accumulation and 
legitimization. 'This means that the state must try to 
maintain or creat the conditions in which capital 
accumulation is possible. However the state also must try 
to maintain or creat the conditions for social harmony. A 
capitalist state that openly uses its coercise forces to 
help one class accumulate capital at the expenses of other
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should we pay for what used to be our entitlements? Is this 
any longer the socialism which we have worked all our lives 
for? What has happened to socialism? In this 'crisis' lurks 
the danger of the urban state-sector citizenry withdrawing 
its consent and support of communist rule. The 'crisis' 
has, therefore, posed a difficult question to the socialist 
state: How can it strike a balance between the twin goals 
of socialist legitimacy and economic growth? The 'crisis' 
has also posed a difficult question to state-owned 
enterprises: Is there a way out of the dilemma between
welfare obligation and productive efficiency?
The rise of the mixed economy has created, however, 
not just new problems but also new opportunities, for 
example, the opportunity of fee-charging, if only on a 
partial basis, what has all along been distributed free or 
largely free to danwei members. There is now the new 
possibility of wedding market and redistribution, or, in 
other words, of going quasi-market: what used to be
benefits and welfare can be priced and offered, and not 
just to the market within but also the market external to 
the danwei. In short, there are now numerous possibilities 
of combining welfare and business and linking the
classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis 
of its loyalty and support. But a state that igmores the 
necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation 
risks drying up the source of its own power, the economy's 
surplus production capacity and the taxes drawn from this 
surplus (and other fornms fo capital)'(O'Oconnor 1973:6). 
The contradictory nature of these two basic functions gets 
the capitalist state into sucessive fiscal and legitimacy 
crises.
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bureaucracy to the market. These then provide the basis of 
a new danwei economy of welfare, a 'mixed economy of 
welfare7.
For the workers, the mixed economy has created new 
structures of opportunities centred on the marketplace. 
There is a growing job market for not only full-time but 
also part-time jobs, and, which is very unlike state-sector 
jobs, there are few barriers against mobility (Feng and Xu
1993) . In a very important way, .therefore, this breaks down 
the monopoly of the state sector on job opportunities and 
extends the range of economic opportunities and personal 
choice. It becomes possible, as in Hungary, for families to 
'build lives on two pillars: one in the formal, and another 
in the informal sector7, and 'build into their long-term 
strategies the stable existence and wide acceptance of the 
second economy, ....to plan and economize the work and 
participation of their members, tending to follow an 
optimal division between the two economies7 (Szalai and 
Orosz 1992: 155-6). The rise of the mixed economy enables 
workers to move away from their near-complete dependence on 
the danwei. 'Exit7 from the danwei, partially or totally, 
is now possible, and, through strategies which often 
strategically involve their family members, optimize 
advantages obtainable from both the state sector and the 
non-state economy, for example, security and welfare from 
the former and opportunities and profit from the latter. 
Near-complete dependence on occupational welfare gives way
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to a distinctive 'mixed economy of welfare', distinctive 
with regard to the role of family and the changing
relations between work and welfare across the traditional 
public and the new private sectors.
But while workers enjoy a new sense of freedom and a 
much wider range of choices and opportunities afforded by 
a mixed economy, they are also exposed to risks and 
problems never experienced before. 'To those who have lived 
within or managed a Soviet-type economy for three decades, 
these instabilities can be quite alarming7. (Beijing Review 
1990: 20). The prospects of bankruptcy and job layoffs
threaten their livelihood. Two-digit-level inflation
reduces their real income.26 The widening gap between their 
income and the much higher income earned by workers in the 
non-state economy also creates among state-sector workers 
a heightened sense of relative deprivation and inequity.27 
The frustration and anguish in such feelings is vividly 
expressed in the popular expression, 'Duan qi wan kuai chi 
rou. Fang xia kuai zi ma H a n g ' ('Cursing between
mouthfuls7). For the first time, security cannot be taken 
for granted and the danwei can be undependable. For the 
first time, there are risks also in state-sector jobs. The
26 The consumer price index in cities (preceding
year=100) was 114.7 in 1993 and 124.1 in 1994 (State
Statistical Bureau 1995:233).
27 According to one official source, in 1990, private- 
sector entrepreneurs were earning 2.2 times more than the 
average state-sector workers (State Statistical Bureau
1991:18-20).
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'iron rice bowl' and the practice of 'eating out of the 
common pot' are becoming things of the past.
Research Questions. Concepts and Hypotheses
The study describes a unique system of social welfare 
undergoing a process of social change and, on the basis of 
empirical evidence and fieldwork data, attempts to re­
appraise the relevance of a number of key Western concepts 
and theories to Chinese welfare, for example, the notions 
of obligations and entitlements, mixed economy of welfare, 
and the family as the strategic means by which individuals 
optimize their life chances and welfare opportunities.
Chinese occupational welfare is unique in that it is 
a very rare and extreme case of near-complete dependence, 
a situation in which the employer assumes the widest 
possible range of responsibilities for the welfare of the 
employees and the employees have the fewest possible 
alternatives for satisfying their needs . It departs 
radically from more common situations of limited dependence 
in which the employer assumes obligations over only a 
limited range of welfare and benefits and the employees 
have other alternatives for satisfying their needs. These 
two modes of occupational welfare dependence can be 
regarded as positioned wide apart from each other on a 
continuum.
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In the Chinese context, near-complete occupational 
welfare dependence of workers on their danwei is a defining 
feature of urban life in a state redistributive economy. In 
it is embodied the socialist state's obligations towards 
its urban citizenry and the latter's rights and 
entitlements as state employees. It is constitutive of the 
gemeinschftlich danwei community which embraces and 
controls many aspects of the life of its members. It 
explains socio-cultural features such as paternalism, 
egalitarianism and particularism which characterize life in 
the danwei community. It provides an important means by 
which the communist regime gains consent of its rule from 
the urban workers. It is a source of legitimation.
The purpose of this study is to explain such a unique 
system of occupationl welfare: how it came about, how it 
worked, how it coped with market reforms, and how it has 
changed. The focus is on its response to change.
More specifically, the study addresses three sets of 
questions:
1. How do we explain the origins of the Chinese model 
of near-complete occupational welfare dependence? How did 
it come about? In the style of 'new institutionalism' , what 
were the contexts--cultural, institutional, historical, 
political--within which it was brought about?
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2. How is it organized? How does it work? with what 
sorts of economic and political logic? in terms of what 
sorts of ideas and values? and with what social, economic, 
moral, and welfare implications?
3. Market transition has since 1978 shifted the state 
redistributive economy towards a mixed economy with a 
dominant but declining state sector and a growing non-state 
sector. In what ways has this change affected the work 
unit, the danwei community, and the individual workers? 
What are the problems as well as opportunities which this 
change has brought about? In what ways has this change re­
ordered and re-shaped occupational welfare obligations and 
entitlements? In what ways has it re-configurated the uses 
which workers make of welfare and resources available from 
both the 'traditional' state and the new private sectors? 
How has the socialist firm responded to the challenge of 
the market and resolved, if at all, the difficult dilemma 
between discharging its welfare obligations and ensuring 
productive efficiency?
On the basis of empirical evidence and field data, it 
is argued in the chapters to follow that in the course of 
economic and social change, Chinese occupational welfare 
has shifted away from near-complete dependence towards a 
distinctive pattern of limited dependence that combines in 
a unique way strategic uses of the mixed economy. Emerging 
from this change is a hybrid configuration, a mixed economy
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of welfare which provides new substance and meanings to 
occupational welfare, reshapes workers' welfare dependence, 
and creates new opportunities as well as problems for the 
socialist firm and its members, with far-reaching 
implications.
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CHAPTER TWO
Research Method
The Method of Participant Observation
This study is mainly based on participant-observation 
and informant interviewing at a state-owned enterprise in 
the city of Guangzhou in the province of Guangdong in 
China, over a period of four months between September and 
December 1994. During this period, I paid several visits to 
the enterprise, lived in its vicinity and observed it in 
close range.1 My role was a researcher from Hong Kong 
interested in knowing how the enterprise ran its 
occupational welfare. It was in this role that I gained 
access to different kinds of information and conducted 
informant interviewing with the help of two sets of 
'guides' constructed before I entered the field, a 
'Fieldwork Checklist' (Appendix I) , which helped me identify 
relevant information while talking to people and asking for 
materials, and an 'Interviewing Schedule'(Appendix II), 
which guided my interviews with informants. Interviews 
ranged from formal meetings to informal conversations. I 
taped most of these and made notes of the rest. All 
together 28 informants were interviewed. Among them were 
senior cadres, managers, professionals, technicians and
1 I visited the enterprise again in December 1995.
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workers (Appendix III).2
In my other field roles either as a 'research- 
participant' or as a 'real participant' (Gans 1982:398-9), 
I also took part in a number of events and functions at the 
enterprise, joining the activities of cadres, managers, 
technicians and workers as their guest. These roles enabled 
me to observe activities and meanings in their natural 
settings.
The data used consisted of interviews, field-notes and 
documentary materials given to me upon my request, 
including various publications, organizational charts and 
a set of in-house newspapers.
Gaining entry into the field was the most difficult 
part. The socialist firm 'has remained a black box in 
conventional analyses of state socialism' (Burawoy and 
Lukacs 1985:723). Part of the reason must have been the 
great difficulty Western researchers have in gaining entry 
to the field and obtaining the trust and co-operation of 
enterprise cadres and workers. It is difficult to gain 
entry into the socialist firm because it is not simply an 
economic organization: it is in fact also one part of the 
state bureaucracy. Gaining entry into the socialist firm is 
just as difficult as gaining entry into the state
2 Pseudonyms are given to protect the identity of the 
informants.
- 61 -
bureaucracy of a communist state. In China, a study like 
this one would have been inconceivable in the seventies 
when 'politics takes command7 and when 'struggles7 were 
going on, from time to time at fever pitch, against 'class 
enemies7. Contacts with outsiders, particularly Westerners, 
were politically risky and had to be avoided. Contacts with 
the 'Chinese people in Hong Kong and Macao7 (Gangau 
tongbao) were as risky and shunned. I had been lucky. The 
study was conducted in one of China7 s most 'open7 cities 
and during one of the most 'liberal7 times in post-Mao 
China. Being Chinese and speaking the same language, I did 
not run into cultural barriers that might have separated 
Western researchers from their field. I was also helped by 
a useful link with the Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences 
with which I have had many years of collaboration. The 
Academy introduced me to a number of enterprises and asked 
for their permission for me to do fieldwork in their 
plants. Some of these requests were outright rejected. But 
some did respond positively. Lastly, I was also helped by 
my appointment some eighteen months before going into the 
field by the Chinese Government as its Hong Kong Affairs 
Adviser. The appoinment gave me a 'respected7 identity and 
status which helped my acceptance. During the first day in 
the field, I was given a reception by the danwei at which 
I was formally presented to senior cadres and department 
chiefs. The occasion sanctioned my activity in the plant 
and smoothed the way ahead. Later on, I also found out 
that, prior to my visit, plant management had sent notices
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to all workshops and departments explaining my visit and 
asking for their co-operation and support. This had 
greatly helped my field activities.
Fieldwork was carried out in two phases. In the first 
phase, I concentrated on meeting and interviewing the 
danwei's leaders (including its party secretary) and tried 
to gather as much factual information as possible on the 
danwei, the operation of its various benefits and services, 
its problems and how it coped with change. In the second 
phase, I talked to workers and tried to find out their 
perceptions and experiences, their 'stories' both of 
themselves and of their danwei. These accounts were 
inevitably subjective. But to make sure that they were 
reliable, I cross-checked one account with another on 
consistencies and factual accuracies. For example, I asked 
all of them how much they were earning when they first 
joined the plant, how much they were earning now, how much 
they were paying for rents and the sizes of their flats and 
so on. Also, to make sure that I was not interviewing a 
biased group of workers, I tried to include in my 'sample' 
a balanced mix of both male and female workers, workers of 
various age groups, and workers of various levels of 
skills.
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Case Study
The site was the Dong fang Heavy Machinery Works 
(DFMW)3, manufacturer of a wide range of machinery 
products, including petrochemical equipment, pressure 
vessels, centrifuges, separators and sugar mills. DFMW is 
one of the largest of its kind in China and is among the 
largest state-owned enterprises in Guangzhou.4 In 1994, it 
had over 5,200 workers. Its many workshops, buildings and 
dormitories occupy 550,000 square meters of land along the 
east bank of the Pearl River in the south-western part of 
the city (Figure 2.1) . Established in 1948, the enterprise 
is nearly as old as the Republic. As will be described in 
Chapter Four, during the last two decades, this 'old' 
enterprise, just as other state-sector enterprises in 
China, had been through various reforms and changes which 
have the overall effect of reducing its dependence on the 
state, increasing its autonomy, and enhancing its 
orientation as a profit-seeking firm in a socialist economy 
in market transition. At the time of fieldwork, the 
enterprise was in the final phase of a process of 
enterprise reform which was turning it into a holding 
company and its various workshops and sub-units into
3 Pseudonym.
4 Chinese industrial firms are categorized as 'small', 
'medium', or 'large' according to sector-specific 
productive capacities rather than by the numbers of 
workers. However, as a rule large and medium-sized firms 
have more than one thousand enmployees, and small firms 
have fewer than one thousand employees (Shirk 1993:30). 
DFMW was, by this standard, a large industrial firm.
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subsidiary companies.
Typical of a large-scale state enterprise, DFMW 
provides a comprehensive range of benefits, goods and 
services to its employees and their families. It operates 
a hospital, a school, a nursery, a day-care centre, a 
technical school, and four canteens. It runs its own 
security and fire brigades. It provides low-rental housing 
to over 3,000 families. Typical of an old plant, it has a 
large and growing retiree population. In 1994, it had over 
2,300 retired workers. Just like in other state 
enterprises, its employees enjoy comprehensive 'from cradle 
to grave' benefits and welfare, including, among others, 
retirement pensions, medical and health insurance, injury, 
disability, and death benefits, various benefits for women 
workers, and holiday, sick leave, and leave of absence 
benefits. Also, as in other state enterprises, its 
employees are paid various subsidies and allowances. (See 
Table 2.1 for an example of the kind of subsidies and 
allowances listed on the pay-cheque of an ordinary worker). 
In these senses the enterprise is 'large and 
comprehensive' . Hence it has all the features of a danwei 
experiencing the problems commonly shared by state-sector 
enterprises as they brave market competition: the problem 
of having to shoulder a welfare 'burden' that has grown 
heavier and heavier over time and the problem of having to 
compete with nonstate enterprises on unequal grounds.
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Table 2.1 Itemized Pay Cheque of an Ordinary Worker*
Credits:
Basic wage Y144
Productivity wage Y17
Seniority subsidy Y5
Contribution to superannuable fund Y7.2
Water, electricity and vegetable subsidies Yll
General subsidy Y12
Non-staplefood subsidy Y15.44
Transport subsidy Y8
Coal subsidy Y4
Single-child allowance Y5
Debits:
Contribution to superannuable fund Y14.4
Insurance premium Y14.36
Net pav: Y199.88
* This does not include bonus payments linked to the 
worker's productivity.
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The city of Guangzhou is close to Hong Kong. Its 
economic progress since reforms is one of the fastest among 
coastal cities.5 It is therefore not a typical Chinese 
city. But because it is ahead of many other cities in 
market transition, in it one can also see much more clearly 
than in other cities the impact of economic reforms on its 
state-sector enterprises.
This is therefore a case study in the style of 
participant observation of occupational welfare in a state- 
owned enterprise within a socialist economy undergoing 
market transition.
There have been two traditional criticisms of the 
method of case study: 'first, that it is incapable of
generalization and therefore not a true science and, 
second, that it is inherently "micro" and ahistorical and 
therefore not true sociology' (Burawoy 1991:271). These 
criticisms are not all fair and valid. Geertz's (1973) 
classic study of Balinese cockfight, for example, is one 
beautiful example of how the method of case study is 
capable of producing general statements about the wider 
society in which the case is embedded. In studying kinship 
relations among the Lakeside Tonga of Malawi, Van Velsen 
(1967) was truck by the extent to which actual marriage
5 In terms of population size, Guangzhou is China's 
twenth largest city. In terms of gross output value of 
industry, it ranks fourth, after Shanghai, Beijing, and 
Tianjin (State Statistical Bureau 1995:312).
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patterns deviated from the normative ideal. This directed 
his attention to the broader economic and political forces 
impinging on the Tonga and led him to question and re-think 
existing theories on migration. 'By reconstructing existing 
theories of migration in this way, Van Velsen was able to 
generalize from his case study' (Burawoy Ibid: 279) . As
these examples show and as Burawoy (Ibid) convincingly 
argues, case studies can also reflect on the 'macro' and 
yield generalizations.
This case study of Chinese occupational welfare is 
intended not only to show what it is like in one particular 
work unit and what it might be like in similar work units, 
but also, through the case, to reflect on the wider 
society. It tries to find out how the 'micro' experience of 
occupational welfare in one particular danwei has been 
shaped by 'macro' forces. From changes observed in such 
experience it asks questions on social change and relates 
changes experienced by one danwei to changes occurring to 
the society as a whole.
The advantage of case study is that it does allow the 
researcher to pore over the case being studied to gain an 
in-depth understanding of the 'inside story': people,
institutions and environment in interaction; perceptions 
and experiences; memories; meanings and values; relations 
and networks; processes at work;' and the interplay of 
subjective experiences and objective forces.
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As in other participant-observation studies, I did not 
go into the field with pre-conceived concepts and ready-to- 
test hypotheses. I went into the field mainly oriented by 
three general questions: 1. How does this danwei organise 
its occupational welfare? 2. Much must have happened since 
reforms. What specifically has happened to this danwei? 
What has happened to occupational welfare? 3. How do 
members of the danwei perceive and experience the changes 
that have happened to their danwei and to danwei welfare? 
I asked these questions and from answers given 
conceptualized what struck me as interesting and important. 
These 'concepts' than led me to ask more specific 
questions, to re-conceptualise, and to formulate the 
'hypotheses' to be 'tested' by further field data. In 
short, I allowed concepts and hypothese to 'emerge' from 
the process.
The Subjective Perspective
Two important insights have been gained in this 
process. The first is the understanding that welfare 
consists not only of what is 'dictated' by policies and 
distributed through formal, institutional arrangements. It 
consists also of what is 'rooted in the experience of 
everyday life', in the 'informal, transient, self- 
organizing networks of relationships' and in 'voluntary 
association and mutual aid' (Ward 1982:5). Danwei members 
and their families do not just depend on what is given.
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They also fend for themselves and 'depend' on their own 
acts and resources, on their families and on self-organized 
networks and mutual aid. In other words, there is, besides 
'organized welfare', 'self-organized welfare'. In studying 
occupational welfare, therefore, it is not enough to focus 
only on the formal and the institutional, on what the 
danwei does to its members. It should also look at what its 
members are doing for themselves in addition to what the 
danwei is doing for them.
It is important, in other words, not to lose sight of 
the subjective perspective. This perspective directs one's 
attention to firstly, the subjective experience of
'organized welfare', i.e. how people experience the welfare 
provided through policies and institutions, and secondly, 
the experience of 'self-organized welfare', i.e. how they 
support and provide security for themselves through 
arrangements and resources based on everyday life
experience.
The second insight is that these subjective 
experiences do interact with and impinge on 'objective' 
welfare policies and institutions and, as a result, help 
reshape these policies and institutions. Let me give an
example. Allocation of danwei housing was based largely on
worker seniority. Once it was allocated, the occupants 
could keep it for the rest of their life. And, when tingti 
(replacement) was practised, danwei housing became
71
virtually inheritable. Economic reforms since 1979 and the 
rise of a mixed economy had broken down barriers against 
mobility and created many new job opportunities in the non­
state economy. Many workers, and particularly young 
workers, were leaving their state-sector jobs for jobs in 
the non-state sector. These jobs were usually much more 
well paid but were usually without the many benefits made 
available to jobs in the state-sector. DFMW, the state- 
enterprise where we did fieldwork, was, just like other 
state enterprises, losing many skilled workers-. To try to 
stop the outflow of skilled workers and also to make jobs 
with the enterprise more attractive, DFMW introduced a 
number of changes to its housing policy. These changes 
required quitters to give up their quarters, allowed 
skilled workers without the required seniority to jump 
queue, and required workers allocated ownership flats to 
sign an agreement commiting themselves to working for the 
enterprise until they retired. The danwei had reshaped its 
housing policy to make it more flexible and more 
instrumental.
In this perspective, therefore, policies and 
institutions change over time not only in response to new 
socioeconomic conditions and 'on the basis of--or in 
reaction to--previous policy accomplishments' (Weir et al 
1988:17), but also as a result of their interaction with 
subjective experiences.
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This study is therefore very much about the interplay 
of the 'objective' and the 'subjective' and about how in 
the process it re-shapes dependence and the nature of 
occupational welfare in a socialist state ungoing market 
transition.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Origins of Chinese Occupational Welfare
Introduction
Chinese occupational welfare was unique in that the 
socialist state provided comprehensive welfare to city 
workers in employment in the state sector. Why had the 
state to do this? and why this degree of responsibility? 
why urban workers? and why not also rural workers?1
Explaining the origins of this unique system purely in 
terms of the ideological traditions of Confucianism, which 
teaches the values of benevolence and care, and Marxism, 
which is committed to ending class inequality and 
exploitation, does not give entirely satisfactory answers. 
The late Imperial State was steeped in the Confucian 
traditions.2 Yet its involvement in welfare was very
1 These questions have also intrigued Susan Shirk 
(1993), who could not understand why China had created 
'unitisrrT , the system in which work units assumed wide- 
ranging responsibilities towards their members: 'Why
unitism was created in China in the early 1960s remains 
something of a mystery because it was economically 
irrational in the context of China's abundant supply of 
labor. In fact, it would have been more economically 
logical for Soviet industry, facing a labor shortage, to 
extend generous welfare and security privileges to its 
permanent workers than it was for ■ Chinese industry, with 
its plentiful supply of labor' (Shirk 1993:31).
2 On this see the authoritative study of Wright (1957) .
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limited.3 The state relied very much on community 
initiatives--charitable halls and guilds, among others--to 
provide welfare and services to its urban population. The 
former East European communist states had systems of 
occupational welfare (Deacon 1992:1-30) reminiscent of the 
Chinese system, but the welfare which they provided was 
less comprehensive and their workers were not as dependent 
on workplace-distributed goods and services as in the 
Chinese system. 'The greater scarcity of food and consumer 
goods in China and the administrative role of enterprises 
in past decades in rationing and distributing a wide array 
of daily necessities and consumer items have broadened the 
range of needs met by the enterprises and restricted the 
alternatives' (Walder 1986:81). In the Soviet Union, 
rationing had not been commonly practiced since World War
II. The steady developments of consumer markets since the 
1950s had also provided an alternative to direct workplace 
distributions.
In seeking to explain the origins of Chinese 
occupational welfare, we have found three perspectives 
useful. The first is the perspective shared among 'new 
institutionalists' (for example Stark and Nee 1989), the 
perspective which takes the view that state socialism 
represents a distinct social formation that has its own 
institutional logic and dynamics of development. In the 
light of this perspective, Chinese occupational welfare
3 This will be discussed in the next section.
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must be studied in its national and historical contexts, 
and as part of an institutional configuration 
characteristic of state socialism.
The second is a 'state centred7 perspective, the 
perspective which 'brings the state back in7 (Skocpol 1985) 
to explain politics and governmental activities. Conceived 
as organizations claiming control over territories and the 
people within them,4 states may formulate and pursue goals 
that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests 
of social groups. In this perspective, it will be useful 
when explaining policies to find out how these have to do 
with the nature of the state, how these may have followed 
from the activities of autonomous state actions, and how 
these may relate to the ways the state structures its 
relations with society.
There are two salient reasons to bring the state in to 
explain the origins of Chinese occupational welfare. 
Firstly, until only recently, the Chinese socialist state 
was a very 'powerful7 state: the extension of state
functions was almost unlimited and the state bureaucracy 
was everywhere, displacing or eliminating the market,
4 Skocpol defines in the Weberian tradition a state as 
'any set of relatively differentiated organs that claims 
sovereignty and coercive controlk over a territory and its 
population, defending and perhaps extending that claim in 
competition with other states7 (Skocpol 1992:43). In the 
Weberian perspective, states are compulsory associations 
claiming control over territories and the people within 
them. For Max Weber7s principal writings on states, see 
Roth and Wittich (1968).
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replacing or pre-empting voluntary associations and 
secondary groups, and imposing on and intruding into many 
areas of people's everyday life (Whyte 1991). The Chinese 
socialist state was more than a 'weighty actor' (Skocpol 
1985:3). It was a heavy-weight one.
Secondly, even more importantly, it was a state whose 
leaders shared a 'totalist vision' (Tsou 1991; Whyte 1991), 
the view that the state should totally dominate social life 
and that there should be no limit to state power. It was a 
state whose leaders believed that the scale and the 
seriousness of the problems besetting their country 
required nothing less than an all-out approach and the 
total effort of their people, or, in other words, a total 
if therefore also revolutionary solution. From this vision 
followed the belief that the state should have all the 
powers to do all that it needed to do to bring about the 
desired outcomes and that there should be no limit to the 
extension of state power.
These two reasons--the state had both the 'might' and 
the 'will' to rule--together explained the high degree of 
the state's autonomy. It makes good sense in explaining the 
origins of Chinese occupational welfare, therefore, to find 
out how it had to do with the nature of the Chinese 
socialist state and with the ways it pursued its goals and 
actions.
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The third perspective which we have found useful is 
essentially that of the historical perspective. To explain 
the 'origins' of Chinese occupational welfare, we believe 
it is important to find out how it came about 
'historically', i.e. how it followed from antecedent events 
and policies and from pre-existing conditions and 
institutions. As Skocpol made the case as she explained the 
origins of civil war pensions in the United States: 
'Analysts typically look for synchronic determinants of 
policies--for example, in current social interests or in 
existing political alliances. In addition, however, we must 
examine patterns unfolding over time (and not only long­
term macroscopic processes of social change and polity 
reorganization)' (Skocpol 1992:50).
In this study of the origins of Chinese occupational 
welfare, we submit that the most significant 'patterns 
unfolding over time' had to do with the formation of the 
Chinese socialist state:5 the guerrila war experiences of 
its revolutionary leaders, their experiences with a war- 
devastated economy and their quest for equality and 
security, the socialist strategy of industrialization, and, 
in general, what occurred in the early years of the 
Republic. We intend to argue that the unique experience in
5 Skocpol and Weir suggested that, in the cases of 
capitalist-industrializing countries, '"state formation" 
includes constitution-making, involvements in wars, 
electoral democratization, and bureaucratization-- 
macropolitical processes, in short, whose forms and timing 
have varied significantly in capitalist-industrializing 
countries' (Weir et al.: 1988:17 )
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the formation of the Chinese socialist state largely 
explains the unique nature of Chinese occupational welfare.
The Welfare Role of the Imperial State
The involvement of the socialist state in welfare was 
unprecedented and exceptional in Chinese history: it was 
not in the tradition of the Chinese state to be directly 
involved in the provision of welfare services to its urban 
population.
The late Imperial state, for example, had but a very 
limited role in public welfare. The state's welfare role 
was largely limited to regulating the supply of grain and 
disaster relief.
The government regulated grain supply through a system 
of government granaries. There was an 'ever-normal granary'
(changping cang) in each province or county, under the 
charge of the magistrate:
These granaries were so called because part of the 
grain stored in them could be sold to local residents 
at a price lower than the market price in the spring 
when the market price was high; in the autumn the 
granaries could replenish their supplies with the 
funds obtained from the spring sale. In time of famine 
the poor families could borrow grain from these 
granaries and pay it back after the harvest without 
interest. Such loans had to be reported to the 
magistrate's superior officials and approved by them. 
(Ch'u 1962:156-7)
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Although the system of the ever-normal granary was 
devised to benefit the poor, it did not always work out to 
their advantage. Taking advantage of the lower price of the 
government grain, speculators and profiteers, with the 
cooperation of the granary clerks, often bought large 
quantities by using false names, although this was 
forbidden by law. Moreover, there was frequently a shortage 
of grain in many of the granaries, largely because of mis­
management and, in some cases, embezzlement.
In addition to the ever-normal granaries, many 
provinces or counties had 'community granaries' (she cang) 
and/or 'public granaries' (yi cang) from which local 
residents could borrow grain, with or without interest, 
depending upon the local harvest condition. These granaries 
were established in the villages or towns by the local 
residents, through voluntary donations. But, as in 
government granaries, there was frequently a shortage of 
grain in these granaries and 'in general, the directors 
were indifferent and the management poor; in many areas the 
community granaries operated ineffectively or even ceased 
to operate' (Ch'u 1962:159).
Disaster relief involved, when calamity happened, 
besides sending in of troops to keep order, 'emergency 
disbursement of grain from official granaries and, in the 
most severe cases, with the issurance of daily cash 
subsidies to the homeless.' If the calamity happened in
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mid-winter, local officials sometimes commissioned the 
manufacturing of winter garments for free distribution to 
the needy, and, when lingering floodwaters spawned 
epidemics, they distribute free medical supplies' (Rowe 
1989:93) .
But, even as it carried out disaster relief, the role 
of the administration had tended to be essentially to 
'prompt and endorse' quan yu'), leaving the tasks of 
actually 'financing and implementing' ('juan ban') relief 
efforts to 'merchants and people'. Hence even in disaster 
relief, the private sector appeared to have always played 
the larger role in both emergency and routine efforts to 
prevent starvation among urban residents.
Beyond its limited role in regulating grain prices and 
dispensing relief, the Qing administration had sponsored a 
number of other agencies involved in the direct provision 
of welfare services to members of the urban population. Of 
these the 'poor houses' (puji tang) and the orphanges 
(yuying tang) were most important. In every district there 
was a poor house where the aged, disabled, and poor were 
housed and given rations, clothing, and medical care. The 
'poor houses' were established by local officials. An item 
in the Qing code charged county magistrates with providing 
'sufficient maintenance and protection' to all 'poor 
destitute widowers and widows, fatherless children, and the 
helpless and infirm'. But, originally out of official
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funds, 'poor houses' had gradually 'shifted out of official 
into local societal hands'. As the poor houses usually had 
limited funds, only a small number of poor people could be 
admitted. 'For this reason, conscientious magistrates found 
it necessary to raise funds to meet the need, often through 
contributions from the magistrates themselves and from the 
gentray and well-to-do commoners' (Ch'u 1962: 161). The
orphanges were established in early Qing as a formal 
government agency under the direct supervision of the 
magistrate. With a few exceptions no official funds were 
provided and, as in the case of the poor houses, 'it was 
left to the magistrates and/or the gentry to raise money' 
for the orphanges. Both the poor houses and the orphanges 
had become by and large financed and managed by local 
elites.
The shift from official to private responsibility had 
in part to do with the state's continued maintenance of 
outdated concepts of public welfare needs in the face of 
population growth and increasing social complexity. Local 
officials continued to see their own responsibilities for 
public welfare as limited to ad-hoc disaster relief, and to 
prompting and encouraging local elites to come forward to 
give support. In part this had to do with a rise in 
community initiatives. The rise of community initiatives 
was partly in response to the need for increased services, 
'when the range of collective services demanded by the 
community had radically outstripped the growth of state
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organization' , partly to do with the fact that the Qing 
examinations produced far more degree-holdes than the 
government could absorb into official posts, hence
community responsibilities 'provided an outlet for the 
energy of an elite that could not be wholly employed in the 
bureaucracy' (Fairbank 1992:238), and partly inspired by 
the Confucian moral of benevolence and public mindedness.
Of these community initiatives, the 'benevolent halls'
(sha.nta.ng) and the guilds (huiguan) were most important and 
successful. The benevolent halls were basically
neighbourhood self-help institutions initiated, financially 
supported and managed by merchants. Most served as 
multifaceted relief agencies providing a wide range of 
services including public burial of deceased persons who 
were either unidentified or whose kin were financially 
unable to provide coffins or burial plots, disbursement of 
winter clothing, tea, grain, and rice gruel and,
increasingly, provision of medical services. By late 
nineteenth century, the benevolent halls were everywhere. 
They had become a 'key (perhaps the key) institution of 
late nineteenth century urban community' (Rowe 1984:126). 
In most cases, the officials had no voice in over-seeing 
their affairs.
The guild was a fraternal association whose members 
usually engaged in a single economic activity; often, but 
not necessarily sharing a common geographic origin that was
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not the city in which the guild was located (Golas 
1977:559). Besides economic and cultural functions (e.g. 
settling commercial disputes among members and celebrating 
festivals), the guilds also performed welfare and 
charitable works for its members (e.g. giving coffins and 
burial sites, providing food and clothing for destitute 
members) and, increasingly, for the wider community within 
which the guild was located. One benevolent hall founded in 
Guangzhou (Canton) in 1871 jointly by the leading guilds in 
the city, for example, 'provided free outpatient care to 
the indigent sick, financial support for destitute widows, 
and free coffins for the poor; it also supported several 
free primary schools for the children of the poor' (Skinner 
1977:549). In another case, a federation of ten guilds 
'operated an orphanage and granary, maintained a militia, 
and was responsible for fire fighting, the maintenance of 
roads and bridges, and disaster relief7 (Skinner 1977:550) . 
As these and other examples show, the guilds were playing 
an active role in local philanthropy and community services 
in China7s cities.
The conclusion was quite clearly that, in late 
Imperial China, many if not most urban services, and most 
if not all welfare and charitable works were provided by 
non-governmental corporate groups. The Qing 'minimalist 
form of government7 (Rankin 1986) relied on local elites to 
deal with public matters that lay in between the official 
and the private levels. 'Caring for the ill and for widows
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and foundlings, maintaining temples, bridges, and ferries, 
fighting fires, and burying dead were all customary gentry- 
aided services. They were now coordinated in many 
localities under omnicompetent welfare agencies headed by 
prominent local figures and often backed by native-place 
guilds' (Fairbank 1992:239). State agents had assumed a 
less than direct and active role, their parts overshadowed 
by non-governmental agencies and largely limited to 
'selectively extending patronage to projects initiated by 
local forces, orchestrating these initiatives, . and 
balancing the interests of various social groups' (Rowe 
1989:184). The state's role in welfare was minimal and 
increasingly in decline, consistent with a 'long-term 
secular trend from official to private responsibility' 
(Shiba Yoshinobu, cited in Rowe 1989:131) throughout the 
nineteenth century.
Guerrila War Experience
The communist ascendancy to power in 1949 was preceded 
by nearly a decade (1937-1945) of guerrila warfare fought 
at and from base areas in the remote, backward and poverty- 
stricken region in the north-western border provinces of 
Shansi-Gansu-Ningxia6 against the armies of Japanese 
invasion and the Guomindang Nationalist government. Except
6 In 1941, the Border Region consisted of 29 counties, 
266 districts and 1,549 townships, with a population of 
around 1,500,000. Yan'an was the administrative and 
political centre of the Border Region (Watson 1980:13).
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during brief and intermittent periods of truce with the 
Nationalist Government the communists were most of the time 
besieged and blockaded by enemy military forces. There was 
severe shortage of supplies and great economic hardship for 
the 'institutional households' (Schran 1976:96) of armies, 
cadres and their dependents. During the most difficult 
moments, they had hardly any supplies on 'clothes, cooking 
oil, paper, vegetable, shoes and sockings, and blankets' 
(Mao 1976: 184).
The situation was particularly serious after 193 9, 
when the 'united front' with the Guomindang broke down and 
when an economic blockade on the Region was tightened. The 
shortage of goods and the growing costs of the expanding 
army and bureaucracy forced the government to increase its 
demands on the economy. Besides a heavier grain tax which 
brought even the poor peasants within the tax threshold, a 
number of revenue-raising measures were introduced, 
'including a hay tax to provide fodder for government 
animals, taxes on wool and cattle, lotteries, levies to 
support the self-defense army and the sale of government 
bonds' (Watson 1980:18). This rapid increase of taxation 
had led to a dampening of peasant enthusiasm to increase 
production. As the then Chairman of the Party , Mao Zedong, 
put it:
When the government is in great difficulty, the people 
have to bear a heavier burden. This is inevitable, and 
we must have their understanding... But even in these 
difficult periods of time, we must not go too far. The
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burden on the people must not be so heavy as to break 
their backs. We must find ways to reduce that burden 
and let people rest... Only when they have good rest 
can they regain the enthusiasm to work hard and 
increase production. (Mao 1976:185-87)
Mao also recognized that 'taxation and taxation alone 
was far from enough to meet the needs of fighting the war 
and building the country' (Mao 1976:189).
The government had to find ways other than just 
collecting taxes from the people to overcome its financial 
difficulties. The most important of these and which had 
profound implications for the Border Region economy was the 
involvement of troops and public-sector organizations, 
including organs and schools, in self-supporting production 
both to supplement the operating and living costs of their 
units and also to provide for their own subsistence. The 
practice began with trying to make up for shortages and 
improve the living conditions of the troops. But its 
potential was soon recognised and the Party began to 
consider the possibility of achieving self-sufficiency and 
of supplying some of the needs of the war. The system was 
then extended to all organizations and schools. Thereafter 
self-supporting production became a major feature of the 
Border Region economy both in terms of its contribution to 
the government's budget and in terms of its agricultural 
and industrial importance. By 1943, all military units, 
government organs and schools were engaged in production. 
They concentrated primarily on agriculture, but in most
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cases they were also operating and managing commercial and 
small-scale industrial enterprises. As a result of self- 
supporting production, the schools, for example, became 
self-sufficient in meat and vegetable; they produced from 
one quarter to one-seventh of their grain; produced their 
own uniform, shoes, wooden furniture, procelain ware and 
other necessities; the revenue from commercial activities 
also contributed to 48 percent of their running cost (Mao 
1976: 317-330) .
Emerging from these activities was increasingly a 
'mixed economy' with a growing public sector. In 1942, the 
public sector was generating more revenue for the 
government than were various kinds of taxes (Mao 1976:260). 
Even more importantly, as Mao said, 'We have gained 
experience in running economic enterprises. This is a 
priceless treasure that cannot be reckoned in figures' (Mao 
1976:331) . The experience proved to be of immense relevance 
and importance when in less than twenty years' time the 
socialist state began its ambitious programme to 
nationalise the Chinese economy.
But what was even more important from the point of 
view of this study was the genesis in the process of the 
prototype of what was later to become the predominant 
organizational form in socialist China, the work unit. The 
'institutional households' of the army, organs and schools 
were not just military, administrative and educational
- 88 -
organizations. They were 'multi-functional' structures, 
having taken on the additional economic funtions of 
production and collective consumption. They were also to 
some extent self-sufficient. Their members depended on them 
for not just their jobs but supplies of daily necessities 
of various kinds.
An important feature of the public sector economy was 
the practice of a 'supply system' (gongji zhi), i.e. the 
payment of most salaries in kind rather than in cash. The 
'supply system' assured soldiers and cadres supplies of 
basic necessities and protected them from war-time 
inflation which was drastically cutting into the purchasing 
power and destroying the morale of officials in Guomindang 
China. The supply system was in the main egalitarian. 
Closely pegged to subsistence needs, it provided more or 
less the same for everyone with only slight variations on 
the basis of rank or office:
The major component of cadre income was a food 
allotment usually provided directly in grain. The 
daily grain allowance for all government cadres, 
regardless of rank, as well as for students on 
government subsidy, was one and two-thirds pounds of 
millet or the equivalent. All soldiers regardless of 
rank received one and three-quarters pounds of grain, 
and men in combat were alloted two pounds. Clothing 
and a small cash allowance for vegetables and oil 
completed the subsistence income for all cadres. 
(Selden 1971:173)
Supplies to cadres and soldiers were pegged at levels 
comparable to those of factory workers. The government
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insisted on the egalitarian principle that 'cadre and 
military salaries would never exceed those of ordinary 
workers in the border region' (Selden 1976:153). This was 
important because 'rations of food, clothing and housing 
which are comparable to those of the people not only serve 
to support surprisingly large numbers of them but also tend 
to assoicate them with the people' (Schran 1976:7-8).
The 'supply system' applied not only to soldiers and 
cadres but also to their dependents. 'The government 
assumed the additional burden of feeding and clothing cadre 
and soldier families' (Selden 1971: 154). But its
responsibility was not just limited to providing for their 
basic needs. Besides basic necessities, 'institutional 
households' also provided many cultural, educational,
health care and other services collectively for their
members (Schran 1976:215). In other words, they were 
assuming a wider range of responsibilities than just 
catering to the physical needs of their members.
The policy, however, was to be concerned with the 
needs and well being of not only members of the
'institutional households'. The 'mass line'--the Party's 
political methodology--required the government and its 
cadres to build close relations with the people, to listen 
to them, and be concerned with their problems and needs. As 
Chairman Mao put it:
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If we can only mobilise the people to carry on the war 
and do nothing else, can we succeed in defeating the 
enemy? Of course not. If we want to win, we must do a 
great deal more. We must lead the peasants' struggle 
for land and distribute land to them, heighten their 
enthusiasm and increase agriculture production, 
safeguard the interests of the workers, establish co­
operatives, develop trade with outside areas, and 
solve the problems facing the masses--food, shelter 
and clothing, fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt, 
sickness and hygiene, and marriage. In short, all the 
practical problems in the masses' everyday life should 
claim our attention. If we attend to these problems, 
solve them and satisfy the needs of the masses, we 
shall really become organisers of the well-being of 
the masses, and they will truly rally round us and 
give us their warm support. (Mao 1953:147-148)
The mass line was reflected by greater concern for the 
people's economic welfare and by involving their active 
participation in production movement. 'Their labor was 
channeled into rationalized and cooperative ventures. Much 
of the initial impetus and direction in the production 
movement were provided by the party and government, but the 
financing, adaptation to diverse conditions, and subsequent 
development depended heavily upon local resources, above 
all on the active participation of the entire population' 
(Selden 1976:265). This approach was, in essence, Mao's 
model of economic development, one which grew out of the 
unique historical conditions and experiences of guerrila 
warfare. This unique approach saw government and party 
cadres playing active leadership and organizational roles 
in economic development, mobilizing the people and 
involving them in an active way in economic activities.
If the cooperative movement started modestly with the
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aim of increasing agriculture production, in time it became 
an integral part of the revolutionary struggle. Peasants 
were recruited into the armies; work and battle teams 
composed of young peasants were organized; young village 
leaders were taken into the Party and made new cadres; and, 
as war progressed, 'villages were turned into military 
bastions, and, accordingly, the various social forms of 
cooperation were linked with military forms of 
organization7 (Schurmann 1968:427). As a result, war, 
organization, and work were linked and the village became 
militarized. The communists had created a form of 
organization that enabled the Party to penetrate into the 
village and mobilized its members to fight in war and 
engage in production activities.
Mao7s experience in running the guerrila economy had 
continued to influence and shape his approach to economic 
development and political leadership years after the 
guerrila war was over. The Great Leap Forward (1958-9) and 
the Cultural Revolution (1967-76) were archetypal examples 
of the approach applied to the country nation-wide. There 
are, however, five important points in this experience 
which are of particular interest to this study. First, the 
Border Region had seen the genesis of the prototype of what 
was later to become the predominant organizational form in 
urban China, the work units. The 'institutional households7 
of army, organs and schools possessed features which had 
much in common with the socialist work units. They were
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multi-functional structures performing a wide range of 
functions and assuming a wide range of responsibilities. 
They 'looked after' not just public-sector employees but 
also their dependents, and not only their physical but also 
other needs. Secondly, largely because there were severe 
shortages of basic necessities and in order to protect 
soldiers and their families from war-time inflation, the 
public sector practised a 'supply system' which paid 
salaries in kind rather than in dollars. Thirdly, there was 
a high degree of egalitarianism both between cadres and 
ordinary workers and between cadres and soldiers. Fourthly, 
the 'political methodology' of the 'mass line' required 
that the party and government care for the people and 
consider their problems and needs. Fifthly, the Party found 
an effective method to organize peasants for war and 
production, by militarizing and mobilizing the areas under 
its control.
Wartime experience, in this case that of a guerrila 
war fought in the unique context of revolutionary China, 
had had some lasting impact on subsequent policy and 
institutional developments. The spirit of egalitarianism 
and the welfare value implied in the 'mass line' had become 
integral parts of the ideology of the socialist state. 
Various modified forms of the 'supply system' had continued 
ever since although, as a formal wage policy, the 'supply 
system' was discontinued in 1955. The danwei was the 
'institutional household' writ large, the 'institutional
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household' within the bureaucracy of the re-distributive 
state. The experience of mobilizing and organizing peasants 
for war and production taught the communists the way to 
organize a socialist economy.
Rehabilitation of the Economy
There were two most difficult economic problems facing 
China's revolutionary government on achieving state power 
in 1949. These were the problem of a chronic hyperinflation 
and the problem of widespread urban unemployment.
Inflation started with the Japanese seizure of the 
most productive areas of the country and the chief sources 
of the Nationalist government's revenue. It continued with 
the failure of the government to generate public revenue 
and its resorting to printing more money to finance war 
expenditures. It finally culminated in huperinflation. By 
the beginning of August 1948, Shanghai wholesale prices had 
reached a level 4.7 million times that of early 1937 
(Riskin 1987:33).
The government brought hyperinflation under control by 
a combination of administrative, monetary, fiscal and 
economic measures. These included taking over all the 
banking system to gain control of credit; requiring all 
enterprises, public offices, and military units to deposit 
their holdings of all but petty cash in the People's Bank
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of China; and enforcing stringent economies in government 
spending. Two measures were, from the point of view of this 
study, particularly significant. One, the government paid 
public employees in subsistence goods with a small money 
supplement, a system which had been practised in guerrila 
base areas and which was to continue well unto the 1970s in 
the form of a system of urban rationing. Two, the 
government set up nationwide trading associations in each 
major commodity to gain control of goods. By ealy 1950 the 
inflationary spiral was broken and inflation was reduced to 
about 15 percent a year (Fairbank 1992:348).
What was significant beyond the immediate issue of 
inflation, however, was that, as a result of these 
measures, the state had gained near-complete control over 
foreign trade and banking, control of over half of total 
industrial product, and control of about one-sixth to one- 
quarter of wholesale and retail trade (Riskin 1987:43). In 
nationalizing the economy the state had got more than a 
foot in the door.
Urban unemployment was the next difficult problem 
which was to take the new regime many years to try to solve 
with no real success. Between 4 to 12.5 million urban 
residents were estimated to be in unemployment in 1950. The 
amount was periodically swelled by state pressures on the 
private sector, such as during the 'five-antis' (wufan) 
campaign, which resulted in the closing down of many
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businesses and their employees losing their jobs.
The first step taken to limit unemployment was to re­
engage en bloc Guomindang officials. These government 
personnel, totalling some two millions (Fairbank 1992:348), 
were allowed to keep their jobs and salaries and continue 
to perform their functions. Besides these government 
officials, there were also about one million (Zhou 1993) 
Guomindang soldiers. They were also allowed to stay. The 
concept underlying the policy was 'bao7 or 'bao xia lai' , 
or 'take all and be responsible for all7 of them. Premier 
Zhou En-lai explained in a speech given in December 1949 
why the government had to assume this responsibility:
As you know, since last year but especially this 
year, we have taken the large majority of the 
Guomindang soldiers captured by us. After we 
liberated Beijing, we sent several hundreds of 
the captured soldiers home. When we liberated 
Suiyuan, we ran into them again. This time there 
was no where else to send them. If we did not 
keep them, there could be social problems. We had 
to 'bao xia lai7. Besides the soldiers, we have 
also 'bao7 all government personnel. Not too long 
ago we tried to stream-line the Shanghai 
government. This has caused a great deal of 
anxieties. We reckon that it is important for 
people to be employed. What we have tried to do 
is to 'share the rice for three among five 
persons7 (san ge ren di fan wu ge ren chi) . And 
then we must explain it very clearly to the 
people that the several million officials and 
soldiers so taken on by the government are not 
useless. They will become a useful force in 
production. (Zhou 1993:23)
What was significant beyond the immediate issue of re­
engaging officials and soldiers of the ousted government
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was that the government had taken on the responsibility of 
providing jobs to people who would otherswise be jobless. 
It was a significant step in the direction of the state 
assuming the responsibility of providing jobs for all in 
the population.
The next step taken to limit unemployment was directed 
at private enterprises. The aim was to stop these 
enterprises from adding new numbers to unemployment by 
discharging their workers. The government required private 
enterprises to apply for permission to either hire or 
discharge any workers on regular payroll or a significantly 
large number of temporary workers (Yuan 1991:78) .
In 1952, government regulations further stipulated 
that all public and private enterprises had to assume 'bao 
xia lai' responsibilities for employees displaced from 
their jobs by new production technologies. They had to give 
these employees retraining and, while on retraining, their 
old salaries. In 1957, this requirement, that surplus 
labour should not be out of their jobs, was extended to 
cover also government personnel and public sector 
employees.
At the same time as steps were taken to limit 
unemployment, measures were also introduced to help 
unemployed workers get back to work. 'Job-introduction 
Offices' (laodong jieshao suo) under government Labour
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Bureaus were set up in 1950 to register and introduce jobs 
to unemployed workers. The government soon made it 
compulsory for all public and private sector enterprises to 
apply to the Labour Bureaus for the workers they wanted and 
for these offices to coordinate job placement. In 1955, it 
further stipulated that 'recruitment of new workers must be 
approved by state labor agencies according to a unified 
plan' and that 'no workplaces should recruit workers 
without approval' (He et al. 1990:7). In other words, there 
was to be centralized allocation of jobs. What started off 
as a system for job introduction had grown into a system 
for centrally planned placement (Bian 1994:52). In his 
memoir written forty years later, Bo Yi-bo, one of China's 
leading economic officials at the time, commented on what 
had happened:
The economy was in a very bad shape and many 
people were unemployed. The Party and the 
government took this very seriously. They 
regarded helping these people and putting them 
back to work a big task. Chairman Mao, President 
Liu Shao-qi and Premier Zhou En-lai were all 
personally involved. The Party Central issued 
directives in April, June and November 1950 on 
how to provide help and assistance to unemployed 
workers. In restrospect, there were both positive 
and negative aspects in what we had done. On the 
positive side, we did help the unemployed and as 
a result gain their support and trust in the new 
government. The negative side of this was that 
from then on the government took on the heavy 
responsibility of providing jobs and looking 
after the livelihood of all unemployed people. 
This had evolved into a system in which the state 
assumed 'bao xia lai' responsibility for 
allocating people to jobs. (Bo 1991:107)
By 1957, the policy of 'bao xia lai' had also been
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extended to cover all graduates from universities, 
technical colleges and vocational schools. The government 
assumed the responsibility to place each and every one of 
them in jobs.
As a result of these and related measures, by 1957, 
16.7 million jobs were created and the unemployment rate 
was reduced to 5.9 percent (Bian 1994:52-3). But what were 
even more important than these figures were the far- 
reaching implications of the various measures that had been 
put in place to bring about these results. The first and 
most important implication was that as a result of these 
measures the state had come to assume an all-important role 
and responsibility in urban employment. Urban residents 
looked to and depended on the state instead of the market 
for their jobs. The second important implication was that 
jobs became more or less permanent. There was no such thing 
as 'dismissal' or 'firing', and, once assigned to a work 
unit, and unless there were job transfers, which happened 
only very rarely, a worker could expect to stay in the same 
work unit basically for the rest of his or her working 
life. The third important implication was that the system 
that had been set up gave both enterprises and individual 
workers little autonomy and choice. It was a system that 
allowed neither enterprises to choose their workers nor 
workers to choose their jobs and their employers.
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Socialist Industrialization Strategy
On the eve of the communists' victory over the 
Nationalist Government, Mao outlined in a speech delivered 
at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Party Central 
Committee the overall strategy to build the country as soon 
as the guerrila war was over. He said:
From 1927 to the present the center of gravity of our 
work has been in the villages... The period for this 
method of work has now ended. The period of 'from the 
city to the village' and of the city leading the 
village has now begun. The center of gravity of the 
Party's work has shifted from the village to the city. 
We must revive and develop production in the cities. 
And we must turn the cities around, changing them from 
'consumer' to 'producer' cities. Only then can we 
consolidate the power of the people. All our work must 
now focus on and serve this very central objective: 
develop production in the cities (Mao 1967:364-5).
This emphasis on the cities and on industrialization 
was to dominate the agenda of the Party's work in the early 
years of the socialist state.
According to official ideology, rural-urban relations 
in the period of socialist transition would have two main 
characteristics: first, the cities would lead the
countryside, with 'industry leading agriculture' 
economically and 'workers leading peasants' politically; 
secondly, rural-urban relations would change from 
exploitative to mutually supportive as the cities changed 
from centers of consumption and extraction to centers of 
production. In the words of Premier Zhou En-lai:
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In China, rural-urban relations are very- 
important. On one hand, China's revolution has to 
be led by the working class. On the other hand, 
to gain revolutionary victory, we must rely on 
the support on the peasant and the countryside. . . 
On the question of who is to lead whom, we have 
now decided on the policy of the cities leading 
the countryside and of industry leading 
agriculture... Urban demand for food and raw 
materials will stimulate agricultural production. 
The supply of consumption and producer goods by 
the cities will help to develop agricultural 
production (Zhou En-lai 1993:28).
The stress on the cities on the one hand and the 
decision to make cities centers of production rather than 
centers of consumption on the other reflected the co­
existence of both an 'urban bias' and an 'anti-urban bias' 
in the Chinese approach to the cities.
The 'urban bias' was, first of all, ideological. The 
Chinese communist Weltanschauung was, in effect, the 
Marxist materialist conception of history and historical 
change. In this conception, the driving force both of world 
and national history was class conflict; the inevitable 
resolutions of class conflict propelled history in a 
unilinear direction. The proletariat, according to this 
view, was the revolutionary class, the class to lead the 
struggle for socialism. The Chinese Communist Party saw 
itself as representing China's proletariat and in this 
capacity the revolutionary force leading China's socialist 
transformation. The cities were the home of the 
proletariat.
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As Marxist-Leninists, the leaders of the Chinese 
Communist Party looked to China's cities as potential 
revolutionary centres. Shanghai, for example, had a 
glorious revolutionary history which 'dated from the May 
Fourth Movement and included not only the ill-fated labour 
movement of the 1930s and 1940s. Underground organizations 
loyal to the CCP were active in many spheres of Shanghai 
society' (Gaulton 1981:39).
There was also an economic reason in the 'bias' . In 
Mao's words, the 'center of gravity of the Party's work has 
shifted from the village to the city'. Now that it had won 
the war, the goal was to achieve industrialization on a 
nationwide scale. In achieving this goal the roles of 
cities and their industrial workers were strategic. 
Shanghai, in particular, was expected to play a strategic 
part in leading China's industrialization. As China's 
largest and wealthiest city, with nearly half the country's 
modern industry, Shanghai was a major potential source of 
strength for the economic reconstruction and modernization 
of China. The goal of the communist leaders was to raise 
industrial production from 10 percent to 30 percent or 4 0 
percent of total production within ten to fifteen years 
(Gaulton 1981:3 9) . They had to rely heavily on Shanghai and 
cities like Shanghai to achieve this goal.
As for the 'anti-urban bias'-, this was not just a 
Chinese proclivity. The neglect of the cities was common
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among socialist countries. 'Industrialization strategy in 
almost all socialist countries has included the desire to 
achieve industrialization with minimum urbanization cost' 
(Naughton 1995:62). Urbanization was viewed primarily as a 
cost incurred in the process of industrialization; cities 
were costly because urban infrastructures and services-- 
housing, hospitals, schools, sewage and streets--were 
expensive. While the cost of providing for these facilities 
and services was unavoidable, the objective was 
nevertheless to try to keep it to the minimum.
In China, anti-urban attitudes might have been readily 
accepted because her large cities (e.g. Shanghai and 
Tientsin) were usually also treaty ports that had grown up 
under foreign aegis. They were 'accompanied by the aura of 
corruption that came from excessive foreign influence and 
cooperation with the imperialists' (Naughton 1995:64). 
Anti-urban attitudes were readily accepted also because the 
communist revolution was based in the countryside on 
peasant support. Its leaders disliked the 'vicious and 
lavish' life styles of city living and had a 'peasant- 
inspired and Puritanical distrust of the cities' (Steiner 
1950:62), the center of capitalist avarice and 
exploitation, arsenals producing 'sugar-coated bullets' 
which could destroy unwary comrades, and the power base of 
the ousted Nationalist Government. Politically banished to 
the countryside, the triumphant revolutionaries returned to 
the cities with anti-urban attitudes.
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In an important way these two antithetical tendencies- 
-'urban bias' and 'anti-urban bias'--shaped and underpinned 
China's industrialization strategy, which on the one hand 
recognized the strategic roles and importance of cities and 
urban workers in industrialization, but which on the other 
hand was prepared to achieve 'industrialization without 
urbanization' (Kirby 1985; Naughton 1995) i.e. stressing 
the contributions that cities had to make to 
industrialization yet reluctant to pay for the cost of 
urbanization. The cities were to be 'producer' rather than 
'consumer' cities. From these two 'dialectical' tendencies 
had followed several important policy emphases in China's 
industrialization strategy.
1. Emphasis on Labour Welfare
It meant, first of all, a commitment to providing for 
the basic needs and security of the industrial workers.
This included, most importantly, the promulgation in 
1951 of the 'Labour Insurance Regulations of the People's 
Republic of China'7. The social security system covered all
7 Though promulgated in 1951, its history went back to 
the early days of the Chinese Communist Party, which at 
various times during its struggle for power with the 
Nationalist Government advocated labour welfare and the 
provision of labour insurance. In 1948, when the CCP gained 
control over the Manchurian provinces, then China's most 
important industrial provinces, it introduced some form of 
labour insurance on a trial basis in state enterprises in 
railways, mining, arsenal, military supplies, post office 
and telecommunications, electricity and textiles' (Kallgren 
1969: 544) . But it was not until 1951 that a labour
insurance scheme in its present-day form was introduced.
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employees in state-owned enterprises and their dependents, 
giving them maternity and birth benefits and support in old 
age, accidents, illness, and death of bread-winners. By 
1958, this system covered 13.7 million workers and staff.
(State Statistical Bureau 1960:218)
Insurance funds were borne in full by the employers. 
Enterprises participating in the programme each contributed 
a sum equivalent to 3 percent of its payroll to a labour 
insurance fund. 'The fund, set up within individual 
enterprises, was partly managed by the enterprises and 
partly by the trade unions, which would transfer about 3 0 
percent of the contributions to a higher level of trade 
union organization so that a certain degree of 
redistribution could be effected between enterprises of 
varying financial commitments' (Chow 1988:40).
Though 'comprehensive in coverage, generous in the 
level of benefits, non-contributory in finance' (Leung 
1992:3), the system was highly exclusive: it covered but a 
very small fraction of China's economically active 
population. Peasants were excluded altogether. The 
criterion of coverage was basically to include those 
enterprises wherein the majority of China's industrial 
workers were employed and those industrial fields central
For a brief description of this part of the history of 
labour insurance, see Chow (1988). An English translation 
of the full text of the Regulations can be found in an 
appendix to Hoffmann (1974).
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to the industrialization efforts of the Party. In other 
words, it mainly covered workers in large-scale and state- 
owned enterprises in transport, construction and heavy 
industry. 'Between the announcement and the effective date 
of enforcement of the 1951 regulations, banks were dropped 
from coverage on the ground that their employees did not 
face as difficult economic conditions as others. Cadres and 
soldiers who were being paid by the "fixed supply" system 
were not initially included, and the majority of state 
employees (for example, teachers) did not receive labor 
insurance benefits at this time' (Kallgren 1969:546).
It was clear that the coverage of the social security 
system was strategic and meant to induce productivity and 
discipline from workers expected to be making strategic 
contributions to China's industrialization: the urban,
heavy industrial, and elite sectors of the society.8
Besides social security, the government had also 
introduced a range of welfare and benefits aimed at, in the 
words of the then President Liu Shao-qi, 'gradually 
improving workers' livelihood so as to promote their 
production enthusiasm'. The 'People's Republic of China
8 Perceived inequalities in the treatment received by 
the industrial workers and the peasants had understandably 
evoked the latter's dis-satisfaction, as expressed in a 
letter to the editors of Nan fang Jihbao (Southern Daily), 
which wrote: 'The industrial workers don't do much work and 
get a lot to eat, while the peasants do a lot of work and 
don't get much to eat. The Party takes care of the 
industrial workers and doesn't take care of the peasants' 
{Nanfang Jihbao, 25 October, 1957) .
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Trade Union Ordinance7 promulgated in 1950 committed the 
government to providing trade unions at various levels with 
premises and facilities for welfare functions and 
activities. In 1952, workers began to receive winter 
heating subsidies and hardship allowances. The 'Amended 
Draft Operation Guidelines for Labour Insurance7 
promulgated in 1953 required enterprises to set up, 
independently or together with other enterprises, dining 
halls and nurseries for their workers. The 'Instructions 
on Certain Questions Relating to Workers7 Livelihood7 
issued by the State Council in 1957 gave specific 
guidelines on how to provide benefits and subsidies to 
workers in housing, transport to and back from work, 
medical care, basic necessities, and hardships. In 1962, 
the State Council required enterprises to pay for the home 
leave passages of their workers.
Funds in support of these benefits and subsidies were 
to come from five sources: one, for the construction of 
housing, from 'non-production-related construction and 
investment7 (fei shengchanxing jianshe touji) funds 
directly allocated by the government; two, as supplements 
to the above, from an enterprise 'bonus fund7 (jiangli 
jijin); three, for paying hardship subsidies and for 
covering the recurrent expenses of such facilities as 
dinning halls, nurseries, bathing facilities, and barber­
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shops, from an enterprise 'welfare fund' (fuli jijin);9 
four, for various kinds of subsidies and allowances, from 
the 'management expenditure' (guanli fei) of the enterprise; 
and five, for supporting the welfare activities undertaken 
by trade unions, from their 'employee welfare' (jigong 
fuli) expenditures.
Because the enterprise in fact did not retain any 
profits--all profits were returned to the state--and 
because expenditures on benefits and welfare were all part 
of its production cost and covered by allocations from the 
state, it was the state which was actually and eventually 
paying for all these expenses.
2. Emphasis on Industry
It meant, secondly, an emphasis on industry, 
particularly heavy industry, at the expense of agriculture 
and light industry.10 The development of heavy industry was
9 'Welfare funds' were equivalent to 2.5 percent of an 
enterprise's total payroll. In 1969, this percentage was 
increased to 11 percent.
10 Schurmann (1968) drew attention to the meanings of 
heavy and light industry in the Chinese context. In 
contrast to the Russians, the Chinese have defined heavy 
industry as a "general term for all industrial production 
which has a decisive function for realizing
industrialization and modernization and which supplies all 
branches all the national economy with modernized material 
and technical equipment." Light industry is defined as a 
"general term for all industrial production that, in the 
process of industrialization and modernization, only 
supplies all branches of the national economy with general 
producer and consumer goods". According to Schurmann, the 
distinction is not economic but political. 'What the
Chinese call heavy industry consists of industries
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strategic both because this would lay the industrial base 
for the technological transformation of agriculture and for 
the development of light industry, and also because the 
Chinese leaders wanted to build up its military power as 
rapidly as possible and wanted to be economically 
independent of the rest of the world, including the Soviet 
Union (Perkins 1966:205-6).
The emphasis on heavy industry had several important 
implications. The stress on 'massive, capital-intensive 
projects called for highly centralized control, an exalted 
role for scarce experts and technicians, and unambiguous 
lines of managerial authority' (Riskin 1987:59). The 
result, as in the Soviet Union which China was turning to 
for models, assistance, and advice in the early 1950s, was 
a highly centralized mode of command planning and a highly 
bureaucratized system of management.
One aspect of this bureaucratized system of management 
was a nationally unified wage system copied from the Soviet 
central planning system. The traditional principle of this 
system was the socialist orthodoxy of 'distribution to each 
according to one's work'(anlau fenpei). Based on this 
principle, enterprises paid urban workers according to wage 
grades defined in a state-designed set of wage grade tables 
in which wage levels and differentials were stipulated for
strategically important for the developmental goals of the 
regime; whatever remains falls into the category of light 
industry' (Schurmann 1968:80).
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different regions, sectors, enterprises and occupations 
(Takahara 1992:2). There were two important points about 
this wage system. First, unlike in a capitalist economy, 
where distribution is largely determined by market 
mechanisms, the Chinese system of distribution--not only in 
wage levels and the structure of wage differentials but 
also the distributional principle itself and specific 
criteria for wage allocation--was determined by government 
policies. Secondly, it followed from a system of 're­
distribution' : state enterprises turned all profits to the 
state and paid their workers with wages re-distributed by 
the state (Bian 1994:148). How much an enterprise paid to 
its workers was unrelated to its profitability and 
performance. Enterprises had no incentives to produce for 
the state and the workers had no incentives to produce for 
the profits of their enterprises. This had two important 
implications: it could not but result in low productivity, 
and, increasingly, enterprises had to resort to various 
non-wage means to induce labor productivity and discipline. 
Non-wage benefits and subsidies assumed increasing 
importance as work incentives.
Emphasis on heavy industry at the expense of 
agriculture and light industry had also caused the supply 
of grain and consumer goods to fall short of the demands 
for them. There was critical shortage of grain, meat and 
most kinds of consumer goods. To make sure that there was 
equitable distribution of items in short supply, the
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government had resorted to bureaucratic allocation 
procedures. The most important of these was rationing and 
bureaucratized distribution.
Rationing and bureaucratized distribution had also 
been made necessary by the implementation since 1953 of a 
wage restriction policy. To maintain a high level of 
capital formation, labor cost had to be kept to a minimum. 
Practically all of society's incremental output had to be 
reinvested to sustain economic growth, leaving little or 
nothing to increase personal incomes. 'Because an 
increasing share of national income was going into 
accumulation to sustain this growth (an average rate of 4-6 
percent in real terms or 2-4 percent per capita) , real 
wages and peasant incomes languished from the late fifties' 
(Howe 1981:153) . Wages were kept low and effectively frozen 
for two decades after 1957. The real wage index (1952=100) 
fell from 126.5 to 106.7 during the period from 1956 to 
1976 (Table 3.1). Within the state sector, the general 
freeze of wages after 1957 and the entry of new workers 
into the lowest rungs of the wage ladder thereafter caused 
the average wage in real terms to fall 17 percent between 
that year and 1977 (Riskin 1988:263). Increasingly workers 
had to be given direct provision of basic necessities to 
tide over difficulties.
Since the 1950s, therefore, a system of socialized 
distribution had been applied which at various points had
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encompassed grain, various basic necessities, and consumer 
durables. Grain, pork, and cooking oil were essential 
staple food items rationed in most cities since the 1950s. 
Major consumer durables like sewing machines and bicycles, 
and daily necessities such as cloth and coal were also 
rationed.
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Table 3.1 Average Annual Wage for Employees in State 
and Collective Enterprises, 1952-1988
Year Average 
Nominal Wage 
(Yuan)
Money Wage 
(1952=100)
Real
(1952
1952 445 100.0 100.0
1956 601 135.1 126.5
1960 511 114.8 102 . 9
1966 583 131.0 110.1
1970 561 126.1 105.6
1976 575 129.2 106.7
1977 576 129.4 104 . 0
1978 615 138.2 110.3
1979 665 150.1 117.8
1980 762 171.2 124 . 7
1981 772 173 .5 123 .4
1982 798 179 .3 124 . 9
1983 826 185.6 126.7
1984 974 218.9 145.6
1985 1148 258.0 153 .5
1986 1329 298 .7 166.1
1987 1459 327.9 167.7
1988 1747 392.6 182.8
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1989:21).
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The system of socialized distribution had both 
positive and negative features. On the positive side, 
rationing assured equality in the distribution of consumer 
goods. 'Except at the very highest levels of the 
administrative hierarchy, everyone shared the same rations 
of these controlled-price goods'(Parish 1981:45). The 
negative side of it was that the system was plagued by 
problems which also 'plague socialist distribution systems 
everywhere--rigidity, low quality goods, poor service, 
frustrated consumer demands, red tape' (Whyte and Parish 
1984:106).
The workplace was a central point in the urban 
distribution system. Workplaces were points of distribution 
for ration coupons not only for highly sought after 
industrial goods--sewing machines, bicycles, radios, 
watches, and furniture--but also for additional coupons for 
grain and other foodstuffs above the basic rationed 
amounts. 'By law, state enterprises obtain rationed coupons 
for these items from state commercial agencies and 
distribute them to employees according to a method of their 
own determination. But in practice, enterprises regularly 
engage in "outside the plan" deals with these same agencies 
or with other enterprises in which they traded products and 
spare parts in return for goods, which may include ration 
coupons for, or actual deliveries of, television sets, 
furniture, or watches' (Walder ' 1986:63). These were 
distributed to workers.
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State enterprises also regularly engaged in similar 
exercises to procure for their workers supplies of cured 
meat, vegetables, and fresh fruits. These came in addition 
to rationed amounts and made available to workers either 
free, as at major festivals, or at subsidized prices.
Besides rations, workers in state enterprises were 
also given, in cash or in kind, various kinds of 
supplements and allowances which in actual fact added to 
their real incomes, improving their living standards in no 
small way. These included, for instance, a winter heating 
supplement, 'cool drink fees7 in summer, transportation 
fees to compensate workers for tram or bus fare or for the 
physical energy expended in bicycling the extra distance to 
work, travel supplements to cover train fares and living 
expenses enroute while on annual leave, wage supplements 
for working in hazarous or difficult lines of work, and so 
on.
It is obvious the living standards of state workers 
depended importantly on direct distributions and subsidies. 
Walder (1986:61) estimated that these were responsible for 
more than one-half of the state workers7 living standards.
3. De-emphasizing Services and Consumption
Anti-urbanism disposed the Party against first, 'the 
demand for ever-greater non-productive urban expenditures 
(in housing, roads, recreation, public transport
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facilities, drains, electricity supply, shops, and so on) 
occasioned by industrial growth' (Kirby 1985:15); secondly, 
'consumerism' and high life-styles; and thirdly, 
occupations associated with consumption and 'bourgeois' 
life-styles perceived as not contributing significantly to 
production.
Soon after it was in power, the Party took actions 
against 'unbecoming' business activities and occupations. 
Targeted businesses had to wind up and their employees 
change occupations. Prostitutes, fortune-tellers, Buddist 
monks and nuns and Taoist priests had to give up their 
'trades'. 'Transportation, food and drink, retailing, and 
other activities with the taint of bourgeois production for 
exchange rather than material production for use were 
sharply reduced relative to other occupations. Work as 
maids, barbers, and other service type jobs were reduced to 
a small fraction of former levels' (Whyte and Parish 
1984:34). The 'five-antis' (wufan) campaign between 1951 
and 1952 dealt service-related activities and businesses 
another heavy blow. The campaign was directed at the 
capitalist class. Under charges of 'bribery, tax evasion, 
theft of state assets, cheating in labor or materials, and 
stealing of state economic intelligence', nearly every 
employer could be brought to trial. In atmosphere of terror 
many businessmen and their businesses were eliminated. As 
a result of the campaign, service-type businesses were 
reduced to an even lower level and 'the greater part of the
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capitalist sector was directed into the orbit of the state 
plan under the leadership of the state sector7 (Xue et al. 
1960:53). Between 1956, the 'high tide of socialist 
transformation7 and 1980, the some-time lenient but more 
often harsh policies (Solinger 1984) of the government had 
also led to a sharp decline of retail trade and private 
self-employment. Small family businesses were effectively 
eliminated, and, along with the disappearance of these 
small businesses, a variety of small but important goods 
and services. The urban economy was becoming increasingly 
one without a service sector of a scale and diversity which 
matched the needs of its fast growing population. Living in 
the cities became, for the average Chinese, a very 
inconvenient matter. 'It became almost impossible to find 
someone to fix a bicycle or repair a pair a shoes7 (Shirk 
1993:42) and:
Residents in many large and medium-size cities find it 
difficult to get clothing made, have their hair cut or 
styled, eat out in restaurants, buy nonstaple 
foodstuffs, buy furniture, or get repairs done. But 
the state and collective enterprises are unable to 
solve these problems for the time being. (Fang 
1982:179)
Because cities were centres of industrial production 
and because the government maintained low prices for 
agricultural products and high prices for manufactured 
goods, Chinese cities were also the primary collection 
points of state revenues. They became 'cash cows7 for the 
government. 'Cities were milked for revenues and ouput,
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while the minimum possible investment went into them' 
(Naughton 1995:70). As a result, urban infrastructure was 
allowed to deteriorate. The consequence was the neglect, 
atrophy and under-provision of various urban services and 
facilities. Investment in 'non-productive' services (e.g. 
construction of residential housing, hospitals, schools, 
and office buildings) made up one-third of total capital 
construction investment between 1950-2, but fell to between 
12 and 15 percent during 1958-62 and remained at that level 
through 1976. The largest item in this category was
residential housing. The annual average rate of investment 
in housing construction fell steadily from Y1 billion 
between 1953-7 to Y740 million between 1966-70. (Riskin 
1988:273). Already cramped housing space of 4.3 square 
metres per urban inhabitant in 1952 fell to 3.6 square 
metres in 1977 (Walder 1984:24).
To help 'solve real problems in the daily life of
urban workers' and in order also to 'reduce tardiness,
absences, and poor performance, and to promote labor
discipline' (Kallgren 1969:564), various facilities and 
services which were in short supply and which workers had 
difficulty obtaining for themselves from either the public 
or the market, like housing, schooling, nurseries, barber 
shops, dining facilities, bathing facilities, were 
increasingly made available to workers at their workplaces.
The result, increasingly, was that workplaces became
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centres of collective consumption. They became 'small 
societies' each equipped with a wide range of facilities 
and services. Giant industrial enterprises, in particular, 
became 'large and comprehensive', complete with facilities 
and services of all kinds. The scale and comprehensiveness 
of these facilities and services was particularly 
extraordinary among huge factories built between 1965 and 
1971, when Mao's Third Front industrialization strategy 
sent industry into the far hinterland in massive 
proportions. 'Industrial projects were dispersed in 
mountainous terrain, and workers' dormitories were built 
alongside the factories' (Naughton 1995:67). In geographic 
isolation these huge establishments could not but turn 
themselves into self-contained communities.
4. Restricting rural-urban migration
The government had to strictly control the growth of 
population in the cities because population increases in 
the cities necessitated provision by the government of not 
just jobs but also welfare and heavily subsidized 
provisions of basic goods and services to urban workers. An 
important measure to achieve this was by way of strict 
migration controls.
This was done through a system of household 
registration implemented since 1958. Each household had a 
'residence booklet' (hukou bu) and the head of household 
had to register the number of people residing with him with
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the public security office in his district. When he or any 
member of the household planned to move, before moving he 
had to apply at the household registration office for a 
change-of-residence permit and cancel his residence 
registration. A would-be migrant to the cities could only 
depart from the village with a police permit. However, the 
possibility of obtaining permission for such move was very 
low. Moving from the countryside to a large city was near 
impossible.
To the ordinary residents, household registration was 
the single most important registration. It defined their 
identity and in many ways shaped their life chances. The 
residence booklet was needed for food ration, purchase of 
tickets, job hunting, and change of domicile. A 'black 
household' (hei hu) , one without proper registration, would 
be left to languish in the city. Its members would have 
little chance getting into school, getting jobs, obtaining 
access to various publicly provided services and obtaining 
rationed food and basic necessities.
The registration system divided the entire population 
between those with 'urban residence' (chengshi hukou) and 
those having 'rural residence' (nongcun hukou) , anchoring 
people to where they were and limiting their movements in 
either directions. The trouble of having to go through an 
irksome process to obtain permission to change one's 
domicile also discouraged intra-city mobility.
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The system reinforced the tendency of socialist firms 
to 'hoard labour', discouraged job mobility and encouraged 
workers to stay in their jobs. Workers became permanent 
members of their work units upon which they were dependent 
for social services, rationed food, and a wide range of 
distributed goods and necessities. These dependencies 
further enhanced their immobility and kept them where they 
were.
Changes and Developments Through the Sixties and Seventies
By mid-1950s, China had in place a system of
occupational welfare which had all the essential features 
of what was known in the 1970s. In a nutshell, these 
features were: one, a comprehensive labour insurance system 
that provided old-age pension and a range of benefits 
covering maternity and birth, illness, accidents and death 
of the breadwinner of a family; two, a system of
distribution through the workplaces of various daily 
necessities, food, consumer durables, both by ration 
coupons and in kind, and various kinds of supplements and 
allowances both in cash and in kind; and three, the 
provision by the workplaces of a comprehensive range of 
facilities and services which cater to the many daily needs 
of their members.
This system of occupational welfare was part and
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parcel of an urban political economy in which one, the 
state assumed an all-important role and responsibility in 
providing employment and allocating people to jobs; two, 
jobs were more or less permanent; and three, wages were 
kept low. It was an integral part of a 'low wage, high 
employment, high welfare' (di gongzi, gao jiuyie, gao fuli) 
package.
The basic features of this system had remained 
unchanged since then. There had been, however, some 
modifications and developments in some of its more specific 
features. The most important of these had to do with the 
administration and financing of the labour insurance 
scheme. This happened during the Great Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976). The Great Cultural Revolution threw the entire 
country into chaos and disorder. The labour insurance 
scheme, as were many social and political institutions and 
policies, was also upset. Trade unions, which had been 
under political criticism since the 1950's, were disbanded 
in 1967. 'As a result, the enterprises were left to decide 
for themselves whether or not to provide the necessary 
benefits as stipulated in the Labour Insurance Regulations; 
only those less affected by the Revolution observed the 
practice' (Chow 1988:24). In 1969, the Ministry of Finance 
issued an order which, in effect, stopped the labour 
insurance funds, formally put an end to the involvement of 
trade unions in the administration of the scheme, and made 
enterprises responsible for both the administration and
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financing of labor insurance. In other words, labour 
insurance became, from then on, the responsibility of the 
enterprises.
Conclusion
Chinese occupational welfare was unique in that the 
state provided through the workplaces comprehensive welfare 
and benefits to urban workers in employment in the state 
sector.
We explain in this chapter that the origins of such a 
system of welfare had to do with the unique 'state 
formation' experience of the Chinese socialist state. The 
chapter discusses the impact and implications of three 
important historical experiences in the formation of the 
Chinese socialist state, one, guerrila war experience, two, 
experience in rehabilitating a war-devastated economy, and 
three, China's socialist industrialization strategy. It 
shows that these experiences had in important ways shaped 
the formation of policies and institutions which made up 
Chinese occupational welfare.
More specifically, the chapter shows that first, the 
'institutional households' of armies, government organs and 
schools in the guerrila base areas could have been the 
organizational prototype of the dariwei, the socialist work 
unit which became more or less a gemeinschaftlich community
123
looking after many aspects of the life of its members. 
Secondly, it shows that the distribution of basic 
necessities and goods through the workplace can be traced 
back to firstly, the 'supply system' among soldiers and 
government personnel in the guerrila base areas and, 
secondly, to the system of rationing and bureaucraized 
distribuition introduced in China's cities since the 1950s. 
Thirdly, it shows that measures used to bring hyper­
inflation under control in the early years of the socialist 
regime had extended the state's control over the economy in 
general and over the distribution of goods in particular. 
Fourthly, it shows that measures to limit urban 
unemployment had committed the state to 'taking all and be 
responsible for all' (bao xia lai) employment and paved the 
way for permanent employment. Fifthly, it shows that the 
industrialization strategy of the socialist regime 
explained its emphasis on (urban) labour welfare. Sixthly, 
it shows that the emphasis of this strategy on heavy 
industry at the expense of agriculture and light industry 
had led to low wage and severe shortages and under-supplies 
of basic necessities, food and all kinds of consumer goods. 
A system of socialized distribution had to be introduced to 
close the gap between supply and demand. The work-unit 
became the centre-point for the rationing and distribution 
of a wide range of goods and benefits. Seventhly, it shows 
that the neglect of 'unproductive' trade and services and 
the continuous decline in the quantity and quality of urban 
facilities and services had greatly inconvenienced average
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city dwellers. To convenient their members, workplaces 
equipped themselves with a wide range of these facilities 
and services. Eighthly, it shows that measures against 
rural-urban migration also discouraged intra-city and job 
mobility, enhancing immobility and reinforcing workers' 
dependency on their workplaces.
In short, the chapter has shown how it can be useful 
to explain the origins of Chinese occupational welfare in 
terms of the unique historical experiences of the Chinese 
socialist state and, more specifically, in terms of its 
experience in state formation: war experience, the
experience of re-building a war-devastated economy, and the 
experience of socialist industrialization.
The chapter highlights three important themes in these 
experiences: first, the extension of the state's power over 
an increasing range of activities and functions (e.g. 
distribution of goods, allocation of jobs); secondly, the 
assumption by the state of an increasing range of
responsibilities (e.g. 'taking on all and becoming 
responsibile for all' employment); and thirdly, following 
from these two themes, the individuals coming increasingly 
under the control of and becoming increasingly dependent on 
the state. The history of Chinese occupational welfare is
very much a history of extending state power and
responsibility and declining individual autonomy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Changing Contexts of Chinese Occupational Welfare
Introduction
Chinese occupational welfare was part and parcel of a 
distinct 'low wage, high employment, high welfare7 (di 
gongzi, gao jiuyie, gao fuli) package given to urban 
workers in employment in the state sector. The package was 
made up of three inter-related parts: (1) an 'iron rice
bowl7 employment system with lifetime employment in one 
work unit; (2) low wage; and (3) a wide range of benefits 
and services provided through the workplace.
This distinct pattern of wage, employment and welfare 
was embedded in a socialist 're-distributive7 (Szelenyi 
1983; Kornai 1984; Nee 1989, 1990) economy characterized by 
the allocation of resources and distribution of goods 
through central planning and bureaucracy. In this kind of 
economy, state-owned enterprises receive their plan quotas 
from and remit their profits to the government. The 
government exercises control over labour, setting 
enterprise labour quotas and assigning workers to 
enterprises. Enterprises have neither choice over what and 
how much to produce nor how many and which workers to hire 
(and fire) and how much and what to pay them.
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The shortcomings of such an economy are now common 
knowledge (Kornai 1984, 1986, 1989) . First, plans once made 
and commands once given are hard to change. Any significant 
change in one part of the plan would have spillover effects 
on other parts of the plan and many adjustments would have 
to be made. 'Planners understandably are not fond of such 
extra work. As a consequence, response to unexpected shifts 
in supply, demand, or technology is slow and incomplete7 
(Kornai 1989:38). The system is inherently rigid.
Secondly, enterprises do not produce for profits and 
are not held responsible for losses. Working under 'soft 
budget constraints7 conditions, they are not required to be 
sensitive to cost and price considerations and there is 
little incentive to use resources and investment 
efficiently. Rewarded for physical output and size, the 
incentive is rather in the opposite diection: to use these 
resources inefficiently and, in practice, to hoard and hide 
reserves so as to cushion themselves against unanticipated 
changes in the bureaucratic environment, and so as also to 
ask the state for more allocations. This results in chronic 
'shortage7, wastage, and inefficiency.
Thirdly, workers, similarly, have no incentive to work 
hard because their pay is unrelated to their performance 
and to the performance of their enterprises and their jobs 
are secure. 'The income of a worker...did not increase if 
he worked harder than others. Nor would he lose his job if
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he worked less hard' (Yeh 1993:15).
All these problems had impinged adversely on the 
Chinese economy. By 1978, the economy was plagued by 
institutional rigidities, economic inefficiencies, slow 
growth, massive unemployment and shortages of food and 
consumer goods and all kinds of basic necessities and 
services. After three decades of socialism, China remained 
a low-income economy by World Bank standard and its per 
capita GNP was the lowest among the centrally planned 
economies (Yeh 1993:13).
The opportunity to reform the economy came with the 
downfall of the Gang of Four and the official end of the 
Cultural Revolution. The Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee, which met in December 1978, officially 
declared a change in direction of China's economic policy 
and the launching of the 'Four Modernizations' - in 
industry, agriculture, science and technology - Program. 
Reform, though 'open-ended' (Lin 1989) and approached 
pragmatically and incrementally, began to steadily move 
China in the direction of market transition.
The main objective of the reform was to modernize the 
economy by bringing the market back in: by increasing the 
role of market forces in influencing allocation and 
distribution decisions. This implied, on the one hand, 
reducing the role of the state and of central planning and
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bureaucracy and, on the other hand, attaching more 
importance to competition, profit and wage incentives, 
price signals and the forces of supply and demand.
The first stage of China's reform programme began in 
the countryside, home to some 80 percent of China's one 
billion inhabitants. The centerpiece of rural reforms 
involved the daring measures of doing away with 
collectivized agriculture and the introduction of a 
'household responsibility system' which 'contracted out' 
production responsibilities to individual peasant 
households. After fulfilling their quota and tax 
obligations and paying local organizations for collective 
services, farm households were free to dispose of their 
output as they saw fit. The contract period was later 
extended from a few years to fifteen years to give farm 
producers more incentive to increase output and invest in 
capital improvements (Koo et al. 1993:34).
The introduction of the 'household responsibility 
system' radically altered the organization of production 
and the distribution of output in the countryside. 
Essentially the 'functional equivalent of family farming' 
(Davis and Vogel 1990:4) , it proved so popular that by 1983 
98 percent of farmland had been contracted to households 
(Cheng 1986:91).
Alongside this radical policy the government had also
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introduced a number of other agrarian policies to reduce 
the degree of central control and provide more incentives 
to producers. The most important of these included raising 
quota procurement prices for major agricultural products 
and liberalizing sideline production and rural marketing.
These policies were very successful. From 1978 to 1982 
grain output grew by 2.4 percent per annum and output of 
key commercial crops such as cotton and edible oil grew by 
13.5 percent and 22.7 percent pespectively. The state's 
grain procurement increased from 46.5 million tons in 1978 
to 54.55 tons in 1981. And, from 1978 to 1981, real per 
capita rural income grew at an annual rate of 11.4 percent 
(Davis and Vogel 1990:10-11).
The second stage of the reform was directed at the 
urban economy and had therefore direct impact on and many 
implications for occupational welfare. It is to these urban 
reforms that we must now turn.
Ownership Reform
Urban reforms were at once more difficult because they 
involved very complex and sensitive issues of public and 
private ownership, of property rights, of defining the 
claims different parties have on the income generated from 
state-owned and collectively-owned enterprises, of control 
and autonomy, and of ideological and material incentives.
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The urban reform programme consisted of two main 
parts. The first part aimed at reforming the existing 
ownership structure to bring about a mixed ownership system 
in which alternate forms of nonstate ownership were allowed 
to operate alongside the state sector. The second part of 
the programme was directed at the state-sector itself. The 
aim here was to reinvigorate state-owned enterprises by 
increasing their managerial autonomy and making them 
responsible for their own profits and losses. Let us take 
these in turn.
Instead of privatizing state-owned enterprises, the 
reform in ownership opted to legalize and expand the 
nonstate, or 'second', economy by a combination of 
strategies. These included, first, encouraging collective 
enterprises, 'individual firms' (geti hu) and 'private 
firms' (siying qiye) to develop;1 secondly, accepting 
foreign investment and the setting up of Chinese-foreign 
joint ventures and joint ventures with overseas, including 
Hong Kong and Macao, Chinese capital;2 and thirdly, giving 
state managers the right to diversify ownership forms 
within state firms, by channeling some of their retained 
funds into collectively or privately owned subsidiaries, 
merging with collective or private firms, or leasing
1 'Individual firms' had fewer than eight employees 
and 'private firms' had eight or more employees.
2 The Joint Venture Law and the creation of Special 
Economic Zones were formally approved in 1979. For one 
insightful account of China's open policy, see (Vogel 
1989) .
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existing facilities to groups or individuals (Shirk 
1993:44). The government supported these nonstate 
enterprises with various preferential measures, including, 
for urban collectives and private enterprises, low tax 
rates, the retention of all their profits, and no 
restrictions on employees' salaries, and, for joint 
ventures, concessionary customs and tax treatment. These 
preferential measures gave nonstate enterprises advantages 
over their state-sector competitors.
By 1994 the number of employees in urban collective 
enterprises had grown to 32 million (from 20 million in 
1978) and those in private businesses to 6.4 million (from 
150,000 in 1978). An additional 7 million were employed by 
Chinese-foreign joint ventures, state-collective joint 
enterprises, or state-private joint enterprises (China 
Statistical Yearbook 1995:94-98). From 1978 to 1994 the 
share of total industrial output produced by nonstate firms 
trebled, from 22 percent to 66 percent. In 1994, only 34 
percent of China's total industrial output was produced by 
the state sector (China Statistical Yearbook 1995:377).
Without dismantling the state-sector, ownership reform 
had ushered in a mixed economy with a still dominant but 
declining state sector co-existing with a fast growing 
nonstate, second economy characterised by a mixture of 
ownership forms.
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The rise of the mixed economy had meant, for state 
enterprises, a whole new ball game. Protected from 
competition in the past, they were now forced for the first 
time to compete with private and collective enterprises. 
They suffered from several serious disadvantages in this 
competition. First, their competitors enjoyed generous 
profit retention ratios and concessionary tax rates. 
Secondly, moreover, their competitors were a different and 
more dynamic kind of firms: producing for profits,
financially independent, and enjoying managerial autonomy. 
Thirdly, state enterprises were usually 'older7 and stuck 
with ageing facilities and outdated technology. Fourthly, 
their workers were usually also 'older7, which had meant, 
in many cases, a growing retiree population and a hefty 
budget for retirement benefits and medical care. Fifthly, 
their competitors, in general, were not as generous with 
occupational welfare.3 They could produce at lower 
production costs. State enterprises were therefore losing 
out to nonstate enterprises in the competition. They were 
losing not just business, but also skilled workers.
For workers in the state sector, the emergence of the 
nonstate sector was a mixed blessing. The positive side was 
that the second economy had created many openings for both
3 Bian7s (1994:184-5) study in Tianjin found that the 
private-sector firms there had none of the following 
benefits: health insurance for- employees and their
dependents, pension, injury, disability and death benefits, 
benefits for women workers, holiday, sick leave, and leave 
of absence benefits, and other benefits.
133
full-time and part-time jobs. Workers, particularly those 
who were young and skilled, had now the opportunities to 
either quit their jobs for jobs in the nonstate sector, 
which usually paid two to three times more, or take on 
second jobs in the second economy to supplement their 
incomes. There was a growing labour market and mobility, 
undreamed of in the past, was now possible. Workers were no 
longer as tied to and as dependent on their work units as 
before.
The negative side was that they discovered much to 
their frustration that their jobs were no longer the 'good' 
jobs which they had been for the last thirty years. They 
were earning several times less than their counterparts in 
the nonstate sector and the prospect of their jobs did not 
look good when state enterprises were losing their business 
to private and collective enterprises and suffering heavy 
losses.
At their workplaces, reforms were also underway 
changing the ways state enterprises were managed and the 
ways they hired, managed and paid their workers. It is to 
these changes that we now turn.
Enterprise Reform
I. The Con trac t Responsibi lity Sys tern
At the enterprise three sets of inter-related changes
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were underway: (1) enterprise reform, (2) wage reform, and
(3) employment reform. The main aim of enterprise reform 
was to make state enterprises more independent and to 
enable them to become responsible for their management, 
profits, and losses. The instruments used to achieve this 
aim involved the application of some variant of the 
'contract responsibility system' (Koo et al. 1993:34)
whereby an enterprise director entered into a contract with 
the state which held him responsible for a specified level 
of performance, gave him a freer hand to run the 
enterprise, and rewarded him and his staff for above-level 
performance. The purpose of the contract was to link profit 
to enterprise performance and to give directors and workers 
the incentives to work hard for their enterprises.
The 'contract responsibility system' had evolved and 
changed over time. Briefly, what happened was as follows. 
In 1978, state enterprises were allowed to set aside, on 
top of a fixed percentage, an additional 5 percent of their 
wage bills to fund bonus payments. As long as enterprises 
completed specified targets set by the state plan, they 
could distribute the bonus funds as they saw fit. The 
scheme was, however, rather rigid. It did not allow 
enterprises to withdraw additional bonus funds even if they 
had over-fulfilled specified targets. The break-through 
came in 1979. In that year, all state enterprises were 
permitted to retain a 'normal' profit equivalent to 10-12 
percent of basic wages to fund basic bonus payments. They
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were allowed to keep additional earnings if they made extra 
profits; out of their retained earnings they could fund 
additional bonus payments and welfare expenses. By 1983, 
most industrial state enterprises had adopted some form of 
a payment scheme that linked the increases in wages, 
bonuses, and welfare expenditures with increases in 
enterprise profits.
From the end of 1983 to the end of 1985, the 
government gradually replaced this 'profit retention' 
scheme by a 'Substitution of Tax for Profits Program'. 
Under this new program, state enterprises were to pay taxes 
instead of remitting profits to the state. All state 
enterprises had to pay a basic corporate tax rate of 55 
percent and, in addition to this, a number of other taxes. 
After paying these taxes, state managers could allocate up 
to 3 0 percent of retained earnings for increases in wages 
and bonus payments, and up to 20 percent for increases in 
welfare spending.
By linking profits to performance and allowing
enterprises to pay additional bonus and welfare
expenditures out of retained or after-tax profits, the
profit retention scheme and the Substitution of Tax for 
Profit Program that replaced it had made it much easier for 
enterprises to increase bonus payments and welfare
spending. This had the unintended•consequence of raising 
the expectations - and demands - of workers in not only
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high-profit enterprises but also enterprises that were 
making little profits or making no profits at all. When 
high-profit enterprises increased their bonus payments and 
welfare spending, there was pressure on enterprises which 
were performing less well to also increase their bonus 
payments and welfare spending. 'As a result workers
employed in state enterprises that earned little or no
profits demanded and received increases in bonuses
comparable to that of workers employed in high-profit 
enterprises' (Hu and Li 1993:156). In no time it became a 
common practice for enterprises to regularly increase their 
bonus payments irrespective of whether or not and how much 
profits they had.4
Between 1977 and 1984, the average money wage for
state enterprise employees increased by 69 percent (Y576 in 
1977 vs. Y974 in 1984); bonuses also increased from 2.3 
percent of the total wage bill in 1978 to 14.4 percent in 
1984 (Koo 1993:41). However, even as wages and bonuses in 
state enterprises were rising, they were not rising as 
rapidly as those in the nonstate sector. In 1985, for 
example, the average state worker earned Yl,213; his 
nonstate counterpart earned 1.18 times as much (Yl,436). In 
1994, the average state worker earned Y4,797; his nonstate 
counterpart earned 1.3 times as much (Y6,303) (Table 4.1). 
Workers' demand to close the nonstate-state sector income
4 It was not uncommon for loss-making enterprises to 
be doing what their profit-making counterparts were doing. 
In so doing they even borrowed from the bank (Liu 1993:61) .
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gap put pressure on state enterprises, forcing them to look 
for ways to improve the income of their workers. They could 
do this rather conveniently by increasing what they gave 
their workers via bonus payments and welfare spending. The 
former was, however, relatively 'costly' because there was 
a 30 percent bonus tax on bonus payments that exceeded four 
months of basic wage. The bonus tax rate increased 
progressively to 300 percent when the average bonus payment 
exceeded nine months of enterprise basic wage. To avoid 
paying this tax, many enterprises simply gave their workers 
more benefits and subsidies instead of giving them bonuses 
(Guo et al. 1990:17).
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Table 4.1 Average Annual Wage of Employees, 1985-1994, 
in Yuan
1985 1991 1992 1993 1994
State-owned
Enterprises
1213 2477 2878 3532 4797
Urban
Collectively
Owned
Enterprises
Other
Ownership
Types
Jointly
owned
Share­
holding
Foreign-
funded
Overseas
Chinese
Others
967 1866 2109
1435 3468 3966
1269 1789 3336
2692 3245
1847 3918 4347
2143 4071 4740
1000 2622 3371
4966
3741
5171
5315
5147
3279
6303
4982
6383
6533
6476
4954
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1995:118-122)
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The pay package of the average state sector worker had 
always consisted of a wage component made up of basic wage 
and bonus, and a non-wage component made up of various in­
cash and in-kind benefits and subsidies. As a result of 
what was often done to enable workers to earn more, bonus 
was becoming an increasingly important part of wage income 
and non-wage income was becoming an increasingly important 
part of a worker's total pay package5 (Table 4.2).
5 In 1978, the average bonus and cost-of-living 
allowance comprised 10 percent of an individual's total 
wage; this share increased to 40 percent in 1988 (Hu and Li 
1993:165). In 1984, non-wage income comprised 17.4 percent 
of a state-worker's pay; in 1990, this share increased to 
23 percent (Di and Sun 1993:184).
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Table 4.2 Composition of Aggregate Wage Bill in State Enterprises 1978 - 1988 (Percentage 
of total)
Year Total Basic
Wacre
Piece
Rate
Bonuses Subsidies Overtime Oth<
1978 100 85.0 0.8 2.3 6.5 2.0 3.4
1979 100 75.0 2.5 7.5 8.8 2.0 3 . 7
1980 100 69.8 3.2 9.1 14 .1 1.6 2.2
1981 100 67.2 5.5 10.2 14 .0 1.6 1.5
1982 100 64.4 7.6 10.9 14.1 1.5 1.5
1983 100 63 .5 8.5 11.1 14.1 1.3 1.5
1984 100 58.5 9.5 14.4 14.5 1.5 1.6
1985 100 57.2 9.5 12.4 18.5 1.6 0.8
1986 100 56.3 8.7 12.8 18.8 1.8 1.6
1987 100 54.3 9.2 14.7 18.9 1.9 1.0
1988 100 49.0 9.4 17.2 21.2 1.9 1.1
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1988:179); State Statistical Bureau (1989:217)
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2. Internal Sub-contracting
The 'contract responsibility system7 had also been a 
popular intra-enterprise practice. Many enterprises, 
especially large-scale ones, signed responsibility 
contracts with their sub-units which, in ways similar to 
enterprise contracts with the state, required these sub­
units to perform economic obligations for the enterprises 
and, in return, gave them the autonomy to run their own 
business and the right to dispose of retainable profits. In 
many cases, these sub-units also signed contracts with 
their own sub-units.
The implication, as this happened, was that an 
enterprise became cut up into many sub-units each with its 
own distinct interest and identity. The whole became dis- 
segregated into many smaller parts. For the average worker 
in an enterprise with many internal sub-contracts, what 
mattered for him or her as a result was no longer the 
performance of the enterprise as a whole but rather the 
performance of the particular sub-unit to which he or she 
belonged. In an unintended way the practice of internal 
sub-contracting was reshaping workers7 organizational 
identity.
3. Bankruptcy Law and Enterprise Law
Bolder measures to make enterprises more independent 
and to make them responsible for their own profits and
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losses came in the forms of the Bankcruptcy Law (1986) , the 
Enterprise Law (1988) , and, on the basis of these two laws, 
Regulations Governing State Industrial Enterprises Changing 
Their Management Structures (1992) .
According to these laws and regulations, state 
enterprises were to become 'self-managing (ziwo jingying) , 
self-responsible for profits and losses (zifu yingkui), 
self-developing (ziwo fa zhan), and self-regulating (ziwo 
yaoshu)' firms. They were to have the rights and powers to 
decide on employment and wage policies, including the power 
to hire and fire and the power to decide on how and what to 
pay their workers. For the first time, it was also made 
clear that firms unable to pay their debts had to go 
bankrupt.
By 1992, therefore, state enterprises had largely 
become firms which, though owned by the state, were allowed 
to conduct themselves more or less like capitalist firms. 
Unlike their capitalist counterparts, however, they had 
inherited from their earlier history what had been the 
responsibility of the socialist state to urban workers in 
employment in the state sector, the responsibility of 
having to provide their employees with a wide range of non­
wage benefits and services through the workplaces. This was 
a responsibility that had now turned out to be a heavy 
burden, a burden that had become increasingly difficult to 
bear when state enterprises were losing out in market
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competition and when financing welfare was becoming 
increasingly costly.
Wage Reform
Prior to 1978, state enterprises paid their workers 
according to a centrally determined wage scale. They could 
grant wage increases to their employees only when the 
central government approved and set aside additional funds 
to finance these increases. Between 1959 and 1976, there 
had only been three rounds of such increases". The rigidity 
of the wage system coupled with low wage and the de facto 
freeze on wage increases for nearly twenty years had been 
an important reason for the lack of work incentives.
Wage reforms began with the restoration of piece rates 
and bonus payments that had been banned during the Cultural 
Revolution. More radical reforms followed between 1984 and 
1986. Following pilot experiments carried out between 1981 
and 1984, the government encouraged state enterprises to 
adopt either a fully floating or a semi-floating wage 
system linking the size of their wage bill and other 
components of labour compensation (bonuses and benefits) to 
an index of performance such as increases in average labour 
productivity, remitted profits and taxes, or retained 
earnings. By 1989, most large industrial enterprises had 
adopted some form of a fully floating wage system.
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Following the adoption of the fully floating wage 
system, an increasing number of state enterprises also 
began experimenting with changes in their internal wage 
systems, changes like adding additional levels or points to 
the wage scales. Some enterprises also assigned internal 
'responsibility contracts' to sub-sets of employees linking 
labour compensations to required levels of performance.
As a result of these reforms, state enterprises were 
no longer stuck with a centrally determined and 
standardized wage system. They had a much freer hand to 
decide on how and how much to pay their workers. This had 
a number of important implications. First, it had made it 
much easier for enterprises to increase their wage bills. 
Secondly, this had also given rise to a great diversity in 
the ways different enterprises paid their workers. Thirdly, 
there were increasing inter- and intra-enterprise wage 
differences, hence income disparity, among enterprise 
workers.
Employment Reforms
Prior to reform, China had a nationally unified labor 
allocation system. Prospective employees were assigned to 
different industries by the labour bureaus according to the 
needs of the state plans. Neither the enterprises nor the 
workers were given much choice in- the matching. For the 
workers, there was little if any mobility at all: most of
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them practically worked for the same unit until they 
retired. Their jobs were more or less for life.
In 1980, the government proposed an end to the system 
of unilateral, top down, job assignment. In its place the 
government recommended a system of 'bi-lateral choice'
(shuangxian xuanze) in which local labor bureaus continued 
to recommend candidates to state enterprises but 
enterprises could decide whether or not to take these 
candidates. They could also recruit on their own.
The next step was more radical: to put an end to
permanent employment. In 1983, the Ministry of Labor 
announced the implementation of a 'contract employment 
system' (laodong hetung zhi) and required all state 
enterprises to offer fixed-term contracts to their 
employees after 1986.
In 1986, the government passed four provisional 
regulations6 aimed both to consolidate these changes and to 
introduce related changes. These regulations (1) required 
all new recruits to be employed on fixed term contracts; 
(2) allowed open recruitment and competitive examinations
6 These were: 'Temporary Regulations on the
Implementation of Labour Contracts in State-owned
Enterprises', 'Temporary Regulations on the Recruitment of 
Workers in State-owned Enterprises' , 'Temporary Regulations 
on the Dismissal of Workers in State-owned Enterprises Who 
Violate Discipline', and 'Temporary Regulations on
Unemployment Insurance for Workers in State-owned
Enterprises'.
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for posts and put an end to the practice of ding ti which 
allowed an adult child to inherit the job of his or her 
retiring parent; (3) gave enterprises the right to dismiss 
employees repeatedly disobeying orders; and (4) announced 
the setting up of unemployment insurance. During the period 
of redundancy, an allowance equivalent to 50-75 percent of 
the workers' previous basic wage would be paid, up to a 
maximum of two years (Renmin Ribao, 10 September 1986).
These regulations were to have profound implications. 
First, they were to marketize wage and employment 
arrangements in the state sector. Increasingly an 
employment relation in the state sector was to be like a 
market one, 'a specific contractual exchange of efforts and 
skills for money and other compensations' (Walder 1986:16). 
Secondly, they were doing away with the 'iron rice bowl'. 
As a result of these regulations, state-sector jobs were no 
longer permanent. Employees on contract could lose their 
jobs afterall and they could be dismissed. Thirdly, they 
were to induce mobility into and out of state sector jobs 
and in the process foster the growth of an urban labour 
market. Fourthly, the growth of this labour market would be 
putting pressure on state enterprises. To be competitive in 
this labour market, they would have to make their jobs more 
attractive or they could lose out in the competition to 
other state enterprises and to nonstate sector firms. 
Perforce they had to create their own internal labour 
markets and, among others, make strategic use of
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occupational welfare as means to attract and retain labour. 
Fifthly, as wage and employment arrangements became 
marketized and urban labour mobilized, benefits and 
services hitherto available only to state workers would 
need to be 'universalized7, to be provided also to workers 
in other sectors of the mixed economy. A 'particularistic7 
system of benefits and services inhibited labour mobility: 
state workers who otherwise could have left the state 
sector for 'better7 jobs in the nonstate sector might have 
stayed because they could not take these benefits and 
services with them. It was also unfair to workers in the 
nonstate sector. Employment reforms 'must be acompanied by 
housing, social insurance, and unemployment insurance 
reform, throughout every level of the economy and society7 
(Hu and Li 1993:173) .
Although all state enterprises were supposed to offer 
fixed-term employment contracts to their employees after
1986, these regulations were not strictly enforced. In
1987, for example, only 5 percent (5.2 million) and, as 
late as 1994, only 26 percent (28 million) of state-sector 
employees were on fixed-term contracts (Table 4.3). There 
were reports of cases in which these contracts became life 
employment in disguise. Although the central government 
regulations recommended a contract term of five to ten 
years, some enterprises offered their workers contracts of 
thirty to fifty years (Hu and Li 1993:175) . Many 
enterprises adopted the so-called 'new workers new method,
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old workers old method' (xin ren xin banfa, jiu ren jiu ban 
fa) (Di and Li 1991:95) policy and managed to give fixed- 
term contracts to just the newly hired (Hu and Li 
1993:158).
This slow progress was understandable. Employment 
reforms had not been accompanied by (1) the extension of 
occupational welfare to cover also nonstate-sector workers, 
and (2) the development of unemployment insurance to cover 
all urban workers. State workers were reluctant to go 
contract because in going contract they could be giving up 
job security and a wide range of benefits and services most 
of which were beyond the reach of contract and nonstate 
workers. Moreover, if they were to lose their jobs, there 
was no guarantee of unemployment insurance. In 1995, half 
of all urban employees had not been covered by unemployment 
insurance (Feng 1996:277).
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Table 4.3 State-sector Employees on Fixed-term Contracts
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Number on 
Contracts 
(in 10.000)
174
332
524
735
1008
1190
1372
1589
2058
2396
2853
Percentage of All 
State-sector 
Employees (%)
2.0
3.7
5.6
7.6 
10.1 
11.8 
13 .3
14.9
18.9
21.9 
26 .2
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1995:99)
The Social Consequences of Reform
Economic reforms had changed not just economic 
institutions. They had also led to many social consequences 
and had some major impact on the cultural and social 
contexts of occupational welfare.
First, market reforms had led to shifts in popular 
attitudes from Maoist values of collectivism and asceticism 
to values sanctioning individual and materialistic 
aspirations (as vividly captured by the popular expression,
'xiang qian kan' or 'money-orientation') and 'massive 
cravings for personal possessions and strong preferences 
for privacy and individual choice' (Davis and Vogel 
1990:4). In the contexts of work and occupational welfare, 
these shifts in attitudes and values had several important 
implications: they undermined the appeals of normative and 
ideological incentives, encouraged workers' calculative 
involvement in work and defections from altruism, loyalty, 
and commitment, and they encouraged workers to 
calculatively regard their rights and entitlements to 
occupational welfare. Changing popular attitudes were 
reflected in changing values and relations in the 
workplace.
Secondly, economic reforms had produced a new and 
increasingly unequal distribution of wealth and income in 
favour of private entrepreneurs and workers in employment
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in the nonstate economy and against workers in employment 
in the state sector (Nee 1989, 1991; see also Szelenyi
1978) . In 1990, nonstate sector workers were earning 31 
percent more than their counterparts in the state sector. 
By 1995, they were leading by a difference of 33 percent 
(Li 1996:61) (See also Table 4.4). Entrepreneurs of 
'individual firms7 (geti hu) represented just 4 percent of 
the country's working population but owned 26 percent of 
the savings in the country's banks. The Gini coefficient of 
income distribution among urban residents increased from 
0.16 in 1978 to 0.23 in 1990 (Zheng and Zhang 1993:37). 
Private entrepreneurs were earning many times more than 
state-sector workers (Zhu 1996:152). Among urban 
households, in 1978 the top twenty percentile were earning
1.8 times as much as the bottom twenty percentile. In 1994, 
they were earning 3 times as much (Zhu 1995:197) .
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Table 4.4 Average Annual Wage of Employees in State 
and Non-state Units, 1978-1994, in Yuan
Employees in Employees in Non-
State-owned Units state Units*
1978 644 -
1980 803 -
1984 1034 1048
1985 1213 1436
1986 1414 1629
1987 1546 1879
1988 1853 2382
1989 2055 2707
1990 2284 2987
1991 2477 3468
1992 2878 3966
1993 3532 4966
1994 4797 6303
* These include 'jointly owned", 'share-holding', 'foreign- 
funded' , 'overseas Chinese from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
funded', and 'others' units.
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1995:113).
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Hence although in 1994 (¥4,797) state-sector workers
were earning seven times as much as what they earned in 
1978 (Y644) (China Statistical Yearbook 1995:113), there
was among them a widely felt sense of inequity and relative 
deprivation (Wang 1993:176). The frustration and anguish in 
these feelings was vividly expressed in the popular saying, 
'Duan qi wankuai chi rou. Fang xia kuaizi ma Hang' 
('Cursing between the mouthfuls7). This sense of 
frustration and anguish was accentuated by the fact that 
since mid-1980s, there had been a persistent two-digit 
level inflation.7
To improve their situations many state-sector workers 
had resorted to one or a combination of the following 
methods: one, seeking second jobs; two, demanding
increases in their pay; and three, quitting for nonstate 
jobs (Wang 1993:177).
These had negative impact of one kind or the other on 
state enterprises. Second jobs undermined workers' 
commitment to full-time jobs. Meeting workers' demands for 
increases in pay by increasing bonus payments and welfare 
expenses undermined wage incentives and reduced funds 
available for capital investment and development. Outflows 
of workers to jobs in the nonstate economy drained state
7 The consumer price index in cities (preceding 
year=100) was 120.7 in 1988, 116.3 in 1989, 116.1 in 1993, 
and 125.0 in 1994 (State Statistical Bureau 1995:233; Zhu 
1995:195).
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enterprises of skilled manpower. All these aggravated the 
already difficult situation of the state enterprises.
Thirdly, state enterprises were in a difficult 
situation. In 1995, about 40 percent of all state 
enterprises were in the red and over 40,000 enterprises 
with more than seven million employees were either 
'stopping or half-stopping production' (tingchan ban 
tingchan) (Feng 1996:271). In many of these enterprises 
workers had not been paid their wages and benefits, and 
retired workers their pensions, in full and on time (Feng 
1996:271). Many workers became 'surplus workers' (fu yu 
jigong) and asked to 'leave their posts' (xia gang) to 
either 'wait for a posting' (dai gang) or be retrained for 
other posts, or to find new jobs. In 1995, of the 30 
million 'surplus workers' in the country most were state- 
sector workers (Zhu 1996:153) . Most 'xia gang' workers lost 
their jobs and became unemployed.
Understandably there was increasing tension between 
management and workers in state enterprises. There were 
increasing instances of industrial disputes, strikes, and 
'shang fang' activities in which disgruntled workers and 
pensioners marched to government offices to express their 
grievances and demands (Feng 1996:276-9).
Economic reform had brought workers not just higher 
wages, better supplies of goods, and more opportunities and
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individual choice but also more inequality, insecurity, and 
industrial conflicts. Our focus in the next chapter will be 
on how workers in one state enterprise experienced change 
in their ordinary everyday life, how they coped with its 
many exigencies and how their dependence on occupational 
welfare was reshaped as a result.
The Changing Organizational Context
The Dong fang Heavy Machinery Works was by China's 
standard a large-scale industrial enterprise. In 1994 it 
had over 5,200 employees. Since the 1950s it had been under 
the various leaderships of the central First Ministry of 
Machine Building, the provincial Office of Industry and the 
city's Bureau of Machine and Electric Power and since 1984, 
its Economic Commission. Before reform, it was, as were all 
state enterprises, a cog in the machine of a state re­
distributive economy.
Like all state enterprises, DFMW had been through the 
various stages of enterprise reforms and had, by December 
1994, metamorphosed into a state-owned corporation 
consisting of a holding company with 42 subsidiary 
companies (zi gongsi) . The first important step in this 
process was taken in 1985 when the enterprise 'upgraded' 
its 15 'workshops' (chejian) into 'sub-units', or
'branches' (fenchang) , and arranged with each of them some 
form of the 'contract responsibility system' . It gave these
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sub-units a greater degree of autonomy and with each of 
them it signed a contract specifying expected performance 
targets. More radical steps were taken in 1987-88. In June 
1987, the manager of the enterprise signed a contract with 
the government agreeing to remit a specified level of 
profits to the state during the next four years.8 In 
December of the same year, the enterprise invited 
applications from its cadres and workers to bid for 
internal contracts for the plant's 15 sub-units. Successful 
bidders became sub-unit managers.9 Instead of their old 
salaries, they were paid new salaries linked to 
performance.10 The next step, after appointing sub-unit 
managers and their deputies, was to give contracts to units 
- sections or teams - further down. These 'sub-units' were 
allowed to 'prioritize their workforce composition' (youhua 
laodong zuhe), which basically enabled these 'subunits' to 
reshuffle their membership and, most importantly, to get
8 Among others, the contract committed the enterprise 
to : (1) produce an aggregate total of Y3 50 million of 
industrial output in the next four years and increase 
industrial output at an annual growth rate of 10.4 percent; 
(2) make Y40 million of profit in the next four years (Feng 
1990:29).
9 There were all together 50 bidders. Of these 29 were 
middle-ranking cadres, 19 were ordinary cadres and 2 were 
workers. Of the 15 successful bidders, there were 12 
middle-ranking cadres, 2 ordinary cadres and one worker 
(Feng 1990:31).
10 According to 'contract', they would be paid two 
times average wage if they fulfilled targets; be given 
additional increases in their wages if their performance 
exceeded targets; be paid only subsistence wages if their 
performance fell short of targets by 10 to 15 percent; and 
their suitability for their jobs be re-considered if their 
performance fell short of targets by more than 15 percent 
(Feng 1990:33).
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rid of slow and un-cooperative workers.11 These bold 
measures culminated in the introduction in 1988 of a 'fully 
floating piece rate' (quane jijian) wage system which 
linked the entire 'wage bundle' - consisting of a basic 
wage, bonus, and some subsidies - of a worker to his or her 
productivity.
Progress in employment reform was much slower. All 
state enterprises were supposed to give fixed-term 
employment contracts to their employees after 1986. At 
DFMW, however, as of 1994 only 10 percent of its 5,225 
employees were on these contracts. As in other state 
enterprises, the policy was to apply 'new method to new 
workers, old method to old workers' and limit contract 
employment to only the new recruits.
Enterprise reform had proceeded at a much faster pace. 
In December 1994, DFMW was incorporated as a holding 
company (Dongfang Qiye Jituan Gongsi) with 42 subsidiary 
companies. The organizational chart of the enterprise 
immediately before and after this change are as shown in 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.
11 Workers displaced from their jobs as a result of 
this 'youhua' process were transferred to new jobs within 
a newly created unit called Laodong Fuwu Gongsi (Labour 
Service Company) , which looked after various 'domestic' 
services like nursery, canteens, cleaning, and delivery of 
bottled gas (Feng 1990:32) .
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Figure 4.1 : Organizational Chart of Dongfang Heavy Machinery Works, 1993
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Figure 4.2 : Organizational Chart of the Holding Company and Its
Main Subsidiary Companies, December 1994
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By 1994, therefore, each former sub-unit or workshop 
of the enterprise was technically independent, a company 
responsible for its own profits and losses and enjoying a 
high degree of autonomy. This had several important 
implications. First, it meant that, for workers, their pay 
no longer had anything to do with either the performance of 
the holding company or the performance of subsidiary 
companies besides the very one they belonged to. Secondly, 
because of the differential performance of these subsidiary 
companies, it meant also that there were bound to be 
differences in the wages paid to workers in different 
subsidiary companies. Hence income inequality between 
workers who were paid more or less the same wages in the 
past.
The decentralization of economic responsibility had 
not been accompanied, however, by a corresponding 
decentralization of welfare responsibility. The hospital 
and the school remained the responsibility of the holding 
company, as did housing (See Figure 4.2). What had been 
passed to subsidiary companies were retirement benefits and 
'domestic7 ('houqin') services. Subsidiary companies were 
each responsisble for its share of the enterprise's 
contribution to a city-wide pool of pension funds. Each 
contributed a share equivalent to 24.5 percent of its total 
wage bill. 'Domestic' services consisted of such services 
as nursery, kindergarten, pest control, santitation, and 
the delivery of bottled gas. These used to be under the
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enterprise's 'general service unit' (xingzheng chu) . In 
1985, the economic responsibility for these services was 
'contracted out' to the unit. The 'contract' held the unit 
responsible for the wages and bonuses of its employees and 
allowed it to dispose of its profits in ways it saw fit. In 
1994, the unit was incorporated as a subsidiary company 
('Dongfang Laodong Fuwu Gongsi') of the holding company. It 
became responsible for its own profits and losses.
What had happened had, in other words, redistributed 
the welfare responsibility of the enterprise, reducing to 
some extent the overall responsibility of the holding 
company and giving some of the redistributed responsibility 
to subsidiary companies. As a result housing, hospital and 
the school had become largely the responsibility of the 
holding company, retirement benefits the responsibility of 
all subsidiary companies, and 'houqin' services, that of 
the Dongfang Laodong Fuwu Gongsi.
Conclusion
Economic reforms since 1978 had transformed the 
institutional and social contexts of occupational welfare. 
This chapter surveyed the changes that had occurred and 
discussed their implications for occupational welfare. The 
most important of these changes were: (1) the emergence of 
a mixed economy, (2) in the state-sector, the extension of 
marketized employment relations and systems of wages linked
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to productivity, (3) the growth of an urban labour market 
and increasing job mobility, (4) socialist firms becoming 
increasingly like their capitalist counterparts: they had 
to produce for profits and be responsible for their own 
profits and losses, (5) shifts in popular attitudes from 
Maoist values of collectivism and ascetcism to values 
sanctioning individualism and materialistic aspirations, 
and (6) increasing inequality in the distribution of wealth 
and income.
These changes exposed state enterprises and their 
employees to new problems and risks. State enterprises were 
outmatched in market competition. They were losing both 
business and skilled workers to nonstate competitors. Many 
of them were suffering heavy losses. That they were 
'independent' meant, however, that they could no longer 
turn to the state for help. Under the new Bankruptcy Law, 
they might have to go bankrupt.
State employees were exposed to the risks of their 
enterprises closing down and of losing their jobs amidst 
widespread unemployment. Job security was no longer to be 
taken for granted. What was also upsetting them was that 
their incomes were lagging far behind those earned by 
private entrepreneurs and nonstate workers. Both in terms 
of money income and occupational status they were becoming 
worse off. There was among them a widely shared sense of 
agony and frustration in reaction to what had happened to
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them.
The exigencies of these situations compelled state 
enterprises and their employees to re-shape their 
approaches to occupational welfare.
In the pre-reform days, occupational welfare was all 
paid for by the state. It hardly bothered the enterprises 
that it was run inefficiently or that it was costly. This 
no longer could be the case. Now that they had to be 
responsible for their own profits and losses, occupational 
welfare could not but enter into cost-efficiency 
considerations. Perforce they had to find ways to make it 
less a heavy financial burden. Based on a case study, 
Chapter 6 looks at how a state enterprise tried to reduce 
this burden without giving up its responsibility to its 
employees, how it acted on the dilemma between obligation 
and efficiency, and how the danwei welfare economy was 
reshaped as a result.
State employees, on the other hand, were keen not to 
lose what they already had. Welfare was what gave state 
sector jobs some edge over nonstate sector jobs. It was 
also what in no small way topped up their relatively low 
wage-income and closed the gap between their wages and the 
wages earned by nonstate sector workers. It was what made 
state-sector jobs still attractive: The question, however, 
was not just to hold on to what they already had:
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People have two diametrically opposite sets of 
attitudes. On one hand they want the freedom and 
autonomy of the new system. On the other hand 
they are not willing to give up the security of 
the old system. On one hand they criticize the 
'iron rice bowl' . On the other hand they are 
afraid of losing the 'iron rice bowl'. Some 
private entrepreneurs, for example, are on no-pay 
leave from their state-sector jobs. This 
arrangement allows them to return to the state- 
sector if things go wrong. People criticize the 
fact that there are 'too many people around for 
too little work' . Yet they cannot take it when 
there is unemployment. They want absolute 
economic security. They do not want to lose 'from 
cradle to grave' social security. They love yet 
hate what is happening. (Di and Li 1991:96)
Economic reform and the rise of the mixed economy had 
created opportunities and risks in both the old state- 
sector and the new non-state sector. The question was how 
to maximize gains and minimize risks: how to have the best 
of both worlds. Based on the case study of a danwei, 
Chapter 5 looks at how workers worked out ways which 
enabled them to gain from both the security and welfare of 
state-sector jobs and the flexibility and profit of 
nonstate sector jobs and how as a result this had given 
rise to a distinct pattern of dependence on occupational 
welfare. It is to this case study that we now turn.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Reshaping Dependence
Introduction
In the pre-reform days, Chinese workers were highly 
dependent on their work units for satisfying a wide range 
of their needs, from job security to all kinds of non-wage 
benefits and welfare services. Membership in the work unit 
guaranteed an 'iron rice bowl' and entitled one to a 'life­
long voucher giving access to different welfare packages' 
(Walker and Wong, 1994).
Economic reforms since 1978 and the rise of the mixed 
economy have created a radically different environment for 
occupational welfare, introducing new parameters and 
forcing work units and their members alike to re-order 
their commitments and attempt strategic responses.
Most importantly, for the workers, the mixed economy 
has created new structures of opportunities centred on the 
marketplace, eliminating the monopoly of the state sector 
and extending the range of personal choice and economic 
opportunities. It becomes possible to quit a state-sector 
job for a non-state-sector one, or seek income supplement 
from part-time jobs in the latter while holding on to a job 
in the former. It is now possible to 'build lives on two
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pillars: one in the formal, and another in the informal 
sector' (Szalai and Orosz, 1992) and for families to 
strategically involve their members in both to minimize 
risks and maximize opportunities and advantages.
There are now also many more alternatives to what used 
to be distributed through one's danwei. The increased 
supplies of food and consumer goods, the gradual easing of 
rationing, and the opening up of a private trade and 
services sector in cities have provided alternative sources 
for the satisfaction of many needs. Workers are no longer 
completely dependent on their enteprises for the direct 
delivery of many foodstuffs and consumer goods as in the 
pre-reform days.
The rise of the mixed economy has enabled workers to 
move away from their near-complete dependence on the 
danwei. But at the same time as it opens up opportunities 
and options, it has also created for the workers many new 
problems.
Layoff and bankruptcy, hitherto unimaginable, are now 
real possibilities. Danwei benefits are no longer free, as 
readily available, or as cheap as before (See Chapter 6). 
The 'iron rice bowl' and the practice of 'eating from the 
common pot' are becoming things of the past. In addition to 
these is the hard fact of a persistent two-digit-level 
inflation which reduces their real income and quality of
- 167 -
life. The widening gap between their income and the much 
higher income earned by workers in the non-state sector1 
has furthermore accentuated a sense of frustration, 
inequity and relative deprivation.
There is a growing income disparity not only between 
workers in the state and the non-state sector, but also 
among workers in the state sector, within the same 
industry, and even among workers in the same work-unit 
(Bian 1994). The danwei community has become increasingly 
differentiated and stratified by economic interests (Fung 
and Hsu 1992) . It is becoming less and less like the highly 
homogeneous and equalitarian community of the pre-reform 
days.
The danwei community is also becoming divided from 
within by new values that compete with what used to 
characterize the gemeinschaftlich community in the past. 
The rise of an ethos characteristic of the market, with 
values placed on profit, individual interest and 
competition instead of on egalitarianism, solidarity and 
altruism, upsets pre-existing values, reduces members' 
taken-for-granted commitment to their community, and 
induces conflict.
In summary, economic reforms have shifted the basis of
1 In 1995, the average wage of workers in the non-state sector was 
33 percent more than that of their counterparts in the state-sector 
(Huang 1996:11).
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state occupational welfare and transformed the ethos of the 
community. While opening up new opportunities and options, 
these changes have also exposed workers to new risks and 
problems and increased the financial burden on the familiy 
of sickness, disability, and other misfortunes in life. 
Based on field data, what follows describes how workers at 
one danwei, the Dongfang Heavy Machinery Works (DFMW) 
perceived and acted on these changes and in so doing re­
shaped their dependence on welfare.
Using the Mixed Economy
The rise of the mixed economy has created many new 
opportunities outside the state-sector. Opportunities of 
part-time jobs with private enterprises are particularly 
attractive ways to supplement income. 'Moonlighting', or 
chaogang, enables workers to gain from an arrangement 
straddling two economies and systems of opportunities, the 
state and the non-state, the public and the private, and 
the formal and the informal sectors. The strategy combines 
the benefits and security of the former and the flexibility 
and opportunities of the latter.
In China, 'moonlighting has become a way of life' (Han 
1990). It is particularly widespread in port cities. In 
Guangzhou, around 30 percent of workers have second jobs, 
the main reason for the upsurge in second jobs has in part 
to do with the rapid growth of industry in the market
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sector. This increased demands for technicians, engineers, 
and other skilled workers. 'In 1987, for example, China had 
1.5 million "township" enterprises and 1 million private 
enterprises. With fewer than 2.5 million technicians to 
serve them, these firms provided a vast market for "Sunday 
engineers"'(Han Ibid). People take up second jobs partly 
also because of rapid inflation. They have been forced to 
search for extra sources of income to maintain their
standard of living. Also, in many state-owned enterprises 
where there are not enough assignments for every one, 
workers prefer second jobs to sitting idle.
At DFMW, chaogang has been a popular practice
especially among young workers. Mr. Deng, the director of 
one of DFMW's twelve subsidiary companies, was tolerant 
towards chaogang:
In the past, chaogang was not allowed. This is 
now tacitly permitted. Workers, you see, can make 
more money from chaogang than from their wages 
and bonuses. So they really do not care too much
about how much they earn from the plant. What
they do care is its security and benefits. Young 
workers, in particular, are actively involved in 
chaogang. As director, I do not mind if workers 
are not here all the time, as long as they get 
their jobs done.
Why were young workers in particular so actively 
involved in moon-lighting? Mr. Tao, a twenty-four year old 
driver and formerly a skilled worker in one of the 
workshops, explained why:
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In my old workshop, business was so bad you just 
spent the day idling around. Every day you went 
in, got roll-called, and after that, there was 
nothing for you to do. And then, at the end of 
the month, you got so little pay you simply could 
not make ends meet. I had to ask my parents to 
send me money. I then got into chaogang, working 
from 4 p.m. till 10 p.m. It was very tough. Many 
workers like myself were engaged in chaogang. It 
was no secret. You did not let your chiefs know. 
But they knew of course and well, they just 
pretended that they didn't know. It was all right 
if you chaogang after work. But occasionally you 
also took a few days off to work on a well paid 
project. For example, it could be a project which 
paid two workers four to five thousand yuan for 
seven days' work. Each worker could make over two 
thousand yuan in just a week. Some workers would 
take leave from the plant to work on the project. 
For, you see, you could work so hard in the plant 
and be paid just around four to five hundred 
yuan. You make so much more in just seven days. 
So even if it means forfeiting some bonus, we 
don't mind. In short, every thing depends on how 
well you are paid. Old workers are generally less 
actively involved in part-time jobs. However, if 
the pay is attractive, they will still do it, but 
not for a long period, usually around two to 
three days. And, if you have the right guanxi, 
you can even be off on sick leave for outside 
practice.
The average wage at DFMW was around Y700. This amount 
included a 'basic wage', about Y200, some ten to twelve 
kinds of subsidies ('Jbutei) ('productivity wage', 
'seniority subsidy', plant's contribution to superannuable 
fund, water, electricity and vegetable subsidies, general 
subsidy, auxiliary food subsidy, transport subsidy, coal 
subsidy and single-child subsidy) adding up to around Y50, 
and a bonus. The exact amount of the bonus varied with 
one's productivity during the month. In some exceptional 
cases, the bonus could go up to between Yl,500 and Y2,000.
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But this was extremely rare. For the average worker the 
bonus was just around Y300 to Y400. There were also many 
cases in which the workers did not get any bonus at all, 
because their workshops did not have enough work for every 
one. They just had their basic wage and subsidies. When the 
iron-casting shop closed down not too long before this 
researcher visited DFMW, its workers were sent home to 
'rest and wait' (daigang) and paid a uniform da.iga.ng wage 
of Y250. Workers like Mr. Tao and those who earned not much 
more than their basic or daigang wage could not but take up 
additional jobs through chaogang to tide over their 
difficultis. As in other socialist societies undergoing 
economic reforms, they 'attempt(ed) to mitigate the 
uncertainty of earnings by taking their skills into an 
auxilliary market sector' (Stark 1986).
But it was not just daigang workers or workers like 
Mr. Tao who had second jobs. Workers who earned twice or 
even three times the daigang wage had found it difficult to 
catch up with inflation. Commodity prices had risen by 17 
percent in the first nine months of 1994 (Wen Hui Bao 19 
October, 1994). Ms. Feng, an unskilled worker married with 
a daughter, told the researcher how difficult it had been 
for her to make ends meet:
Workers like me are earning about Y500 to Y600. 
This includes everything: bonus, basic wage and 
all kinds of subsidiesBut prices have been 
going up. This month's water fee has gone up by 
as much as 20 cents. Sending the kid to school is 
also expensive. Just tuiton fee alone costs you
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over Y100 a month. On top of this you also have 
to pay for her lunch and all kinds of fees, 
including after-school tutorial fees and various 
miscellaneous fees. The school is always asking 
you to pay this and that kind of fees. But can 
you not pay? Prices are going up. Our pay, 
instead of going up, has gone down. That's why 
whenever fellow workers meet, their topic is on 
prices going up. It is very tough. Take for
example, my husband and myself together make
Yl,200. Nearly half of this amount is spent on 
the kid and her education. But this is not all. 
You have to buy her dresses too. And then all of 
a sudden the school asks you to pay several 
hundred yuan for her school uniform. It's hard. 
And then prices of all basic necessities are
going up at a fast speed. They are different
every month. That's why we have been eating very 
simple food. Nevertheless, the expenditure on 
food comes to over a thousand yuan a month. Pork, 
for example, is 9 to 10 yuan a catty. But you 
can't just have pork. That is why we workers find 
it very tough this year. Every one overspends 
every month. Every family manages to have some 
savings. We are kidding you if we tell you we do 
not have any savings. But it isn't really that 
much, and it won't last too long when you 
continuously dig into it. And to be frank with 
you, we rarely go out to eat, not even once a 
month. A very simple meal for three of us is 
easily over a hundred yuan. We cannot afford it. 
We can only occasionally have breakfast outside 
and spend around Y3 0. Eating out is very much 
beyond us.
Workers like Ms. Feng were obviously under pressure to 
seek second jobs to supplement their income. Mr. Wen, 
principal of the plant's school, explained that, in his 
school, young teachers took second jobs for an additional 
important reason: like most urban youth in the country,
they had to 'save their income to meet their own marital 
expenses' (Stacey 1983:236):
Getting married is now becoming very expensive. 
On the average, a young man has to spend aound 
Y20,000 to Y30,000 on wedding gifts and the
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wedding banquet. You cannot rely on kin and 
relatives to give much assistance. And in fact 
among this generation of young men there are not 
that many relatives whom they can turn to anyway. 
For they do not have brothers or sisters: they 
are single child.
Chaogang is apparently a common practice among 
workers, particularly young workers, and not just among 
workers, but also among professionals. But chaogang was not 
strictly an after-work activity. As reported by Ms. Ma, a 
'National Labour Model" in her forties, it was not uncommon 
for workers to take their part-time jobs back to work and, 
indeed, 'moonlight on the job":
It is not uncommon for workers to take home small 
tools and materials for private use. Also, it is 
common for people to be working on their private 
jobs while on duty. It is held that one advantage 
of working in a big plant is that it is possible 
for one to be doing one's private jobs: the tools 
and machinery are all there, very handy, and, 
moreover, no one knows whether you are working 
for the plant or doing your own private work. It 
is the view of some that when people do such a 
thing, it is because they feel that they have not 
been given the worth of their labour by the 
plant.
Chaogang on the job showed how pervasive and excessive 
part-time activities had become. But what was even more 
striking was that workers did not seem to disapprove of 
what was strictly speaking an illegitimate practice.2
2 Even more serious than this was dao-gong, or 
'robbing the public". An instance of dao gong occurred in 
1995 when the unemployed workers of a state-owned 
enterprise in the province of Hunan raided their work unit 
and went away with whatever was valuable. They did this 
because they were not paid their unemployment insurance six
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Pervasive though it was, not every one was engaged in 
it, and it seemed that the practice was more prevalent 
among male than among female workers. Ms. Cao, 43, Ms. 
Zhou, 41, and Ms. Feng, 42, all married, did not chaogang. 
They explained why:
You need to have the skill and the opportunity to 
get into chaogang. It is mostly men who do it. 
Women seldom do it. Also, it depends on the type 
of work that people do. Some workers chaogang 
after work. (Ms. Cao)
No I don't chaogang. I'm happy that I have been 
able to look after my family after work. For, you 
see, I have to go to the market and prepare 
dinner. I don't have much free time. (Ms. Zhou)
If you have the skill, you can go chaogang. But 
even if you don't, you can also do such things as 
hawking, mending bicycle tyres, or, among female 
workers, working on some take-home jobs. I would 
say two to three out of ten workers are involved. 
I myself am not. My husband used to do it before 
his recent posting to the production office, 
where he has to work all day, for full eight 
hours. He does not have any time for chaogang 
now. If you chaogang in the evening and go to 
work the next day, you'll get so tired. He used 
to earn around Y3 00 from his second job, serving 
as a hawking-stall attendant. That was not much 
really. (Ms. Feng)
There were then, it seems, gender differences in moon­
lighting. Female workers were less involved in the activity 
in part because of their 'double burden': in addition to 
their full-time jobs, they were also doing the bulk of the 
household chores. And because household electrical 
appliances and equipment which would ease that workload
months after it was due (Feng 1996:286).
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were not as readily available to the ordinary families as 
in other more industrialized countries, the double burden 
for women in China is probably more onerous than in many 
parts of the world (Whyte and Parish 1984:204). 'The toll 
this double burden of full-time work and full-time 
housework takes on women physically is serious'(Wolf 
1985:73). It leaves them little time and energy for yet 
another shift. Female workers were less active in chaogang 
secondly because, compared with male workers, they 
generally had fewer years of education (Chang 1995) and 
fewer of them had the kind of skills in demand in the 
market.3 Jobs which did not require these skills, jobs 
like, for example, shop and car-park attendants, were, 
however, not as well paid.
Ms Ma the Labour Model herself had not engaged herself 
in chaogang activities. At the age of 43, she was planning 
to retire in two years' time: 'If they want my service, I
can come back. Otherwise I will get a job elsewhere. It 
will pay better.' Ms. Ma obtained her danwei flat in 1992. 
If she retired, she would continue to live in her flat and, 
in addition, collect her monthly pension. She would also 
continue to enjoy medical care and other danwei-provided 
benefits. And if she did return to her job on a new
3 At DFMW, skilled jobs were dominated by male 
workers. Female workers mostly occupied jobs requiring low- 
level skills, unskilled jobs, and menial jobs. About 80 
percent of the plant's female workers were in these jobs. 
Male dominance in the sexual division of labour at the 
workplace was common among Chinese industrial enterprises.
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contract, she would be 'earning' almost twice as much. Like 
chaogang, her strategy was to optimize her advantages and 
opportunities by combining the security and benefits of the 
state sector with the flexibility of the non-state sector.
In 1994, DFMW had around 2,300 retired workers and 
around 700 who, like Ms. Ma, would be joining the retirees 
in the next five years. Male workers retired at the age of 
60 and female workers 50. Workers in high-temperature and 
hazardous working environment retired at an earlier age, 55 
for male and 45 for female workers. Upon retirement, they 
were entitled to a monthly pension of around Y250. Besides 
pensions, they were also given 'subsidies' (butei) in a 
number of areas, including rent, water and electricity 
charges, and 'seniority' {gongling), which together 
amounted to Y70. In 1994, following a directive from the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government, retirees were each paid an 
additional Y100 to help alleviate their 'hardship'. Adding 
all these together, the 'pension package' a retiree 
received came to around Y400 a month.
To survive on this amount was not easy. Many retirees 
had taken up jobs, therefore, in the non-state sector, jobs 
such as car-park attendants, shop attendants, and hawkers. 
According to Mr. Deng:
There are two retired workers in my workshop. One 
of them has got relatives and friends in Hong 
Kong and Macao. He has been receiving support 
from them and is living rather comfortably. The 
other has to get himself a job. The retirement
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pension, you see, is barely enough to keep one 
alive.
Ms. Feng described the situation of the retirees as 
follows:
Retired workers who have got several children are 
all right. They can depend on their children each 
to give them Y30 to Y40 a month. Very few 
children do not support their parents. There may 
of course be cases in which the children 
themselves are in financial difficulties, in 
which case they may even have to turn to their 
parents for assistance. Workers of my generation 
will face a rather different situation: we have 
got only one child to turn to in our old age. 
Either he or she has the means to support you, or 
he or she hasn't. In the latter case you may have 
to help him or her instead. I do hope my daughter 
can be good to me when I am old. That's why I've 
been telling her all the time how much I have 
done for her and hope that she takes this to 
heart.
Mr. Zhu, a thirty-seven-year-old skilled worker, lived 
with his retired parents. Had he not lived with them, he 
would still support them, he maintained:
Even if you do not live with your parents, you 
will still give them some money if you know they 
have difficulties. You try to spend less on other 
things. It won't be too difficult. Childless 
people are in a more difficult situation, you 
see, when in their old age they have this kind or 
that kind of illness and problem, and when they 
do not have that much pension. They are a pitiful 
lot.
Many families in the Pearl River Delta area have 
external linkages with friends and relatives in Hong Kong, 
Macao and other overseas Chinese communities with dense
- 178 -
Chinese immigrant settlements (Johnson 1993) . Some are even 
'Dependents of Overseas Chinese' (qiaojuan) . Among the 
qiaojuan households there are those whose kinsmen abroad 
are distant and others who have kinsmen with a direct 
relationship either through marriage or descent. The 
closeness of relationships will determine the kind and 
amount of support that the relatives abroad will provide. 
This can be regular remittances, as was the case with one 
of Mr. Leung's workers, or the 'likelihood of obtaining an 
immigration visa and the possibility of joining kinsmen 
abroad' (Johnson 1993:127).
Support from children is both more common and more 
important than support from external connections. The 
Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, in both its 
1950 and 1981 versions, requires children to support their 
elderly parents.4 In general, however, children support 
their parents not so much because this is required by law,5 
but more because of their commitment to the Confucian value 
of reciprocity: 'Children provide for elderly parents, and 
parents turn to adult children without guilt, because both 
generations believe that the creation of the children's
4 For example, Article 13 of 'The Marriage Law of the 
People's Republic of China' promulgated on May 1, 1950 
stipulates that 'Parents have the duty to rear and to 
educate their children; the children have the duty to look 
after and to assist their parents. Neither the parents nor 
the children shall maltreat or desert one another'(Yang 
1965:221-226).
5 There are occasional reports of abusive children who 
have been reprimanded and forced to provide support (Davis- 
Friedmann 1983:126).
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physical existence and the care given them in childhood 
require children to reciprocate in their parents' old age' 
(Davis-Friedmann 1983:53). Interdependence and reciprocal 
obligations characterize their close relationship. The 
urban elderly 'expect and receive support from all their 
children and are almost as likely to live with an adult 
daughter as with a son' (Stacey 1983:236). Because of 
housing shortages, young men cannot always establish a 
separate household even after marriage.6 In the periods of 
high unemployment that have prevailed since the mid-1960s, 
many men must also rely on their parents' connections to 
secure jobs.7 Their dependence on parents for housing and 
employment draws them closer to parents, further obliging 
them to give support to their parents in their old age.8 
What they commonly do includes 'caring for parents when 
they are sick; giving them money and, if there are brothers
6 A large scale survey of 10,959 elderly persons aged 
60 and above in 3 provinces (Hubei, Jilin, Liaoling) and 2 
cities (Beijing, Shanghai) found 20.8 percent of them 
living with their spouses, 48.9 percent with married 
children, 18.3 percent with unmarried children, 6.7 percent 
alone, and 5.3 percent in institutions and homes for 
elderly people (Zhang 1990:185). In the majority of the 
cases, elderly persons lived with their children.
7 One important way was to pass the father's job to a 
son or a daughter through 'replacement' {ting-ti).
8 The same three-province two-city survey found 31.2 
percent of the interviewed elderly respondents receiving 
their principal sources of income from children; 35.2 
percent relying mainly on their pensions; and 19.2 percent 
earning their own incomes from employment. Pertaining 
mainly to principal sources of income, these figures do not 
reflect supplementary or in-addition kinds of income. Had 
these latter kinds of incomes been taken into account, the 
actual extent of children financially supporting their 
parents could be of a level much higher than 31.2 percent 
(Zhang 1990:189) .
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and sisters, each giving a share; helping with some 
household chores; and talking to them and giving them 
psychological and emotional support' (Wei 1990:46).
Ms. Feng herself would be retiring in three years' 
time. Upon retirement, she planned to take up a job in the 
non-state sector. Her husband, a co-worker, would in a year 
or two quit his job too. She explained their plan: 'We can 
afford to do so because as a retiree I am entitled to 
keeping the flat and the benefits which we now have. My 
husband will spend the first year or two learning a new 
trade, then he will try to have his own business. And by 
the time when I retire, I can be his assistant.'
The plan was examplary: it strategically positioned
members of a family in both the state and the non-state 
sectors and enabled the family to optimize its 
opportunities and advantages through, in short, a 'one 
family, two systems' (yijia liangzhi) (Dai and Li 1991) 
arrangement. In many cases it was the wife who stayed on, 
maintaining the family's link with the danwei, and the 
husband who gave up danwei membership and ventured into the 
unknown and excitement of the non-state economy. Besides 
'husbands go, wives stay' (nancho nuliu) cases, there were 
also cases in which it was the son or the daughter who gave 
up his or her job and the parents who stayed on. Miss He, 
a young computer programmer, for example, quitted her job 
at DFMW and, in partnership with a friend, set up a private
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computer consultancy company. Miss He7s father, a worker, 
and her brother, an engineer, stayed on in their jobs. Miss 
He explained why she decided to quit:
I got a diploma in computer studies. After 
finishing the course, I received on-the-job 
training at DFMW and gained from the experience. 
Because I had some savings, I felt bold enough to 
leave the job at DFMW. You see, in the later 
period of my appointment at DFMW, we did not have 
much work to do. We were wasting our time. It was 
hard to give up welfare and danwei benefits. But 
if you didn't take the risk, at the end of the 
day you might lose everything.
In both two cases, it is clear that there was a 
'family strategy7 in action. Family members did not act 
individually but as members of a 'corporate entity79 
(Johnson 1993:103) and in line with some collective 
strategy designed to advance the interest of the group as 
a whole. The main point of the strategy was to 
strategically position family members in the mixed economy 
so that the family could minimize risk and maximize gains 
from the arrangement.
The risk would be too great were family members to 
collectively give up their state-sector jobs. Non-state- 
sector jobs generally paid higher wages. On the other hand 
there was no guarantee of job security. Employment was
9 Myron L. Cohen cogently described this as follows: 
'The arrangement of familial economic roles such as 
redistributor, manager or worker and the pooling and 
redistribution of resources are characteristics of 
[Chinese] family life adaptable to a great variety of 
eonomic activities7 (Cohen 1976)
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entirely on contract basis and workers, unlike in the 
state-sector, could be sacked. Furthermore, such jobs came 
with few benefits and welfare. Many of these jobs were also 
with 'village and township enterprises7 located in rural 
areas far away from the city. Were the whole family to move 
to where these jobs were located, they could lose their 
'home-base7 in the city and all the economic and cultural 
advantages of city living.
Foreign-owned enterprises paid better. The Government 
fixed the minimum wage of their employees at a level at 
least 12 0 percent above the average national wage. But the 
working conditions of these enterprises, especially those 
in small and medium-sized ones, were not always desirable. 
For example, there had been allegations of a lack of
facilities for basic hygiene in work and living places, 
frequent industrial accidents, forced overtime, extremely 
high output norms and even human rights abuses (Zhu
1995:46) .
And, were workers to move without the approval of 
their work units, they were 'penalized by loss of their 
seniority, and skilled workers are required to compensate 
the enterprises for on-the-job training if they attempt to
move before their contract term is up7 (Hu and Li
1993:173).
Quitters from state-sector jobs could also set
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themselves up as 'private entrepreneurs' if they had the 
capital and skills. This would be no less risky for, 
besides risk of a business and financial nature, they would 
also be running certain political risk. In an officially 
socialist society and 'after several decades both of 
intense criticism of private business as a "tail of 
capitalism" and of policies aimed at eliminating it and 
preventing its emergence' (Gold 1990:162-3), there was 
always the possibility that in the next swing of the 
political pendalum the regime might again reverse its 
present policies and crack down on private business.10
But if family members were to stay together and stick 
to their state-sector jobs, they would be running risk of 
yet another kind, the risk that they might all 'sink with 
the ship' and lose all that they had, welfare, security and 
permanent jobs, were their poorly performing state-owned 
enterprises to eventually give up and go bankrupt.
The risk was the greater when family members were all 
in the same danwei. According to Mr. Liao, the plant's 
office manager, there were many cases of both husband and 
wife and even their children working for the same plant:
Being a large-scale enterprise, it has got many 
guanxi among its employees and these guanxi are 
also highly complex. There are husband-wife
10 During 1983 there were many local efforts to crack 
down on private business. Again, in 1986, there was a 
crackdown on private business (Gold 1990:164-5) .
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guanxi. There are also father-son guanxi. In the 
days of planned economy, many lingdao (cadres and 
managers) got their children and relatives into 
the plant and create for them jobs which did not 
have much work to do. Since reforms, the plant 
has undertaken many exercises to streamline and 
cut unnessasary manpower, regardless of whether 
it is related to guanxi or not. This has caused 
many disputes and much unhappiness. Interpersonal 
relations have become very complex. They are very 
difficult to handle.
Dr. Mao, director of the plant's hospital, confirmed 
what Mr. Liao just described. The plant was densely 
overlayed with 'networks of kin' (qinshu wang) (Pan and Lin 
1992:80) :
The entire danwei is embedded in complex and 
inter-related networks of guanxi. People are all 
somehow linked directly or indirectly to one 
another. It is like a string of pumpkins. You 
pull one pumpkin and discover to your amazement 
that it is connected to a whole string of 
pumpkins. The guanxi network goes far beyond 
husband and wife. It includes also their brothers 
and sisters, the husbands and wives of their 
brothers and sisters, the in-laws of the husbands 
and wives of their brothers and sisters and their 
relatives and so on. The network goes on and on 
and sees no limit.
The strategy of the pre-reform days had turned against 
itself. What used to serve the interest of an extensive 
network of kin was now a big disadvantage when it exposed 
the entire group to the danger of 'sinking with the ship' .
To limit these various kinds of risks and also to 
maximize gains, the family strategy was to strategically 
engage family members in the state and the non-state
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sectors. In the case of Ms. Feng, the wife stayed, keeping 
the family's link with the state-sector; the husband
ventured into the unknown world of market competition, risk
and profit. In the case of Miss He, it was the elderly
parents who stayed and the unmarried daughter who gave up 
her job to try her luck in the world of private business. 
In both cases, it was the family member who had the best 
potential and the most to gain from a successful non-state- 
sector career who embarked on the adventurous journey to 
the alien land of market competition, the male bread-winner 
in one case and the unmarried child in the other case.
In the 'husbands go, wives stay' strategy, it was 
usually the wives who stayed firstly because female
workers, particularly female workers aged over 30, were 
less in demand in the non-state-sector job market than male 
workers (Tan 1994; Liu 1995:51; Beijing Federation of Women 
et al. 1990), hence it was more difficult for them to find 
jobs, and secondly because they were in fact enjoying more 
danwei benefits than male workers.11 For example, they were 
entitled to more leave.12 Health-care of female workers was 
on the whole more expensive than that of male workers. And
11 Per-worker welfare cost of female workers was 1.34 
times as much as that of male workers (Sha 1995:27).
12 Importantly, female workers were entitled to 
maternity leave with very favourable terms. On the whole, 
female workers did take more leave and for longer leave 
period than male workers. According, to one study, the leave 
taken by female workers in state-owned enterprises was 7.29 
times as long as the leave taken by male workers. Leave 
taken by female workers aged between 26 and 35 was 9.6 
times as long (Sha 1995:14).
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because female workers retired at 50 instead of at 60, they 
began pension much earlier than male workers. 'Husbands go, 
wives stay" was in many ways a 'least to lose, most to 
gain' arrangement.
Workers unconnected to any guanxi in the plant had 
fewer options than workers well connected to guanxi. Their 
options were either to give up every thing and quit, or 
stay. Young workers like Mr. Tao were prepared to stay. Mr. 
Tao was not yet married:
It depends on the conditions outside and your own 
ability. What can I do if I quit? I really do not 
want to go back to my old trade. I can work as a 
taxi driver, but it is not easy to make money. I 
have got many friends who are drivers. They are 
able to make a lot of money, but have to work 
really hard. That's why I do not fancy leaving my 
job. It's stable and secure here after all. In 
time I will be old enough and get married. With 
my marriage certificate I can apply for housing 
and wait for allocation. This is life. Honestly 
speaking, I do not want to return to my village. 
I have no choice.
Many others were not as patient as Mr. Tao. They 
simply gave up and left for jobs in the non-state sector. 
In the first six months of 1994, around a hundred of them 
had resigned.
To stay or not to stay? A key factor in the
consideration was housing. Workers would normally have to 
serve the danwei for over eight years and be occupying not 
more than 5 sq. meters of living space in their present
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accomodation to be qualified for danwei housing, for which, 
depending on size, they paid a rent between Y6 to Y15. 
There were, however, long queues for danwei housing. 
According to Mr. Tang, the work unit's senior accountant, 
around one-fifth of the plant's 4,842 employees were on the 
queue and at least 500 of the lot were 'hardship' cases 
deserving priority treatment. It took workers many years to 
get into the queue and many years after they were on the 
queue to be housed. According to Ms. Feng:
It very much depends on whether there are flats 
available. Many workers got their flats not until 
both husbands and wives were retired. In our 
workshop, there is one 'old young man' ('da 
qingnian') who is now in his forties. He wants to 
get married but cannot because he is still on the 
housing queue. And, without a flat, the couple 
would not be able to live together. They would 
be living in separate places. He is getting very 
desperate. He told us he was losing patience and 
would quit the danwei if he was not allocated a 
flat soon. We also have many cases in which young 
married couples live in separate places, the 
husbands in domitories for single men and the 
wives in domitories for single women.
For many young workers, the waiting time and the 
uncertainty of getting danwei housing was just too much for 
them.
There was also a second reason why young workers such 
as Mr. Tao were not eager to quit. Mr. Tao came from a 
village in a remote part of the countryside in the 
province. He joined the plant in 1987 as a student in its 
vocational school. To enable him to stay and work in
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Guangzhou, the plant had acquired for him a temporary city 
hukou, or urban residency-status certificate, by paying to 
the municipal government an 'additional population fee'
(zheng rong fei) . Were Mr. Tao to quit his job at DFMW, not 
only would he have to repay the vocational school his 
school fees, but he would also lose his residency status. 
Mr. Tao explained his decision to stay:
There would not be much for me to do back in the 
village. My parents have retired and all my 
brothers and sisters have gone elsewhere to work. 
There is not much point for me to go back. 
Because I have got this job here, it's better for 
me to be contented and carry on, and hope that in 
time I may be allocated housing and have my own 
family. And, you see, our hukou is in the hands 
of the plant. You are allowed to have it in your 
own name only when you are married: it is now a 
collective hukou. And if I quit this job, I will 
have to pay back my tuition fees and lose my city 
hukou too. Quitting is not really that difficult, 
but you have to think over it very carefully. It 
is all right if everything goes well. But if 
things do not work out, I will lose my hukou. To 
me, unless I am eighty per cent sure of the 
outcome, I will not take the risk.
Housing was less a problem to old workers and 
retirees. By the time when they were about to retire, their 
seniority would have qualified them for housing. The 
problem which many of them had was of a different kind, 
that of finding enough money to pay for the flats to be 
sold to them. Since 1989, danwei flats were also sold to 
workers. To qualify for these flats, they had to have 
worked in the plant for at least thirty years. As Mr. Wu 
and Ms. Feng described their problem:
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Most retired workers have now been housed. 
However, very few of them have got enough 
personal savings to buy the flats recently 
offered to them. They have to seek help from 
children, or borrow from friends and relatives. 
Also, they have been asking the plant to give 
them special treatment, for example, in allowing 
them to defer some payments, or giving them 
certain exemptions. (Mr. Wu)
Managerial staff who have been in the plant for 
more than five years can apply to buy these 
flats. Ordinary workers, like us, are not 
qualified unless we have been here for at least 
thirty years. Many retired workers have bought 
these flats. To pay for these flats they either 
have to borrow from friends and relatives or get 
their children to help. But you see these flats 
are getting more and more expensive. The first 
batch of these flats were sold at around Y5,000 
to Y6,000. The more expensive ones were only 
about Y9,000. The second batch were sold at 
almost four times these prices. They could be 
even more expensive by the time I become 
qualified. Saving Y20,000 is very very difficult 
for ordinary workers like us. Any amount more 
than that will simply be beyond us. And mind you, 
I have got only one child. (Ms. Feng)
As described by Mr. Wu and Ms. Feng, their problem was 
of an order different from that of young workers. And 
although there were those who, like Ms. Feng, found it 
difficult to raise the required amounts, there obviously 
were many others who successfully mobilized the required 
financial resources from their children and social 
networks.
Middle-aged workers were in a situation different from 
both old and young workers. They were not 'old' enough for 
retirement benefits. Yet, were they to quit, they would 
have more to give up than young workers. Mr. Peng, a
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skilled worker at 40, described his plight and dilemma:
Some co-workers of mine quitted the plant not too 
long ago to work in joint-venture companies. They 
are all doing very well, getting much better pay 
than what I am getting. They have moved into 
company flats much bigger than my present flat, 
around 60 sq. meters. Mine is just 24 sq. meters. 
I was so dumb not to have foreseen all these and 
quitted as they did. It is now too late. I am too 
old for these jobs: they want workers in their 
thirties. The quitters have sort of got out of 
water and landed on the shores already. As for 
workers like myself, we are stranded: in no way 
can we move, but see no future as we stay. The 
quitters have got everything in just a matter of 
a few years. We've been here for nearly twenty 
years and what have we got? Nothing. Also, 
compared to friends and relatives working in 
joint-venture and foreign-capital companies, I am 
behind. Even a shop-attendant makes over a 
thousand a month. Workers of my generation do not 
have a future. (Mr. Peng)
Mr. Deng's situation is not dissimilar with Mr. 
Peng's. Asked whether he had given any thought to leaving 
the danwei for a better job, he said, 'Well, you see, I am 
already fifty and no longer have the strength and energy of 
a young man. Also, when I bought my flat from the danwei 
last year, I have signed an agreement which requires that 
I stay on the job for ten more years, until I retire. I'll 
have to give up the flat if I quit.'
There were then, it seems, both gender and 
generational differences in workers' response to the rise 
of the mixed economy. Moonlighting in the second economy 
was more popular among young than'among old workers, and 
more preferred by male than by female workers. Many retired
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workers were economically active. In addition to the 
retirement benefits obtained through the danwei, and in 
addition to the financial support and care given them by 
their children and social networks, many retired workers 
had been working and earning incomes from paid jobs. They 
made innovative use of an arrangement that enabled them to 
draw upon support and resources from both the state and the 
non-state, the public and the private, and the formal and 
the informal sectors. Like their counterparts in Hungary, 
'The overwhelming majority of pensioners (both those who 
retired earlier, and those who did so at the "ordinary" 
retirement age) work hard either in various "branches" of 
the informal economy or in part-time employment in the 
formal economy to supplement their pensions, but usually... 
with much more flexibility and much better working 
conditions than they had before' (Szalai and Orosz 
1992:155) . Young workers were in a situation very different 
from that of the old workers. Because they were junior, 
they were not yet in line for such benefits as housing. 
Because they were less dependent on the danwei, they had 
fewer stakes and less to lose were they to give up their 
jobs. Middle-aged workers were caught in the middle. They 
were not yet in line for retirement benefits. Unlike young 
workers, however, they were enjoying more benefits, hence 
also more dependent on the danwei. They had more at stake 
and more to lose were they to quit their jobs. They were, 
as Mr. Peng described them, the 'stranded generation'. 
Gender and generational differences among workers shaped
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their differential dependence on danwei welfare and 
explained their differential response to change.
It is clear that the family was performing a very 
strategic role. It was important both in providing 
resources and support to its members and in co-ordinating 
strategic arrangements aimed at protecting and advancing 
the collective interest of the family as a whole. Workers 
without family support were less resourceful. They had 
fewer strategic options. Workers who had the support of 
their families were more resourceful and more adaptable to 
change. But, as point out by several informants, the family 
may become less able to give support to its members when in 
due course the 'one child policy' deprives parents of more 
than one child and their child his or her siblings. This 
policy 'flies in the face of a long tradition of values 
calling for many children (especially sons), a welfare 
program in which children form the major bulwark against 
the hazards of old age7 (Kallgren 1985:131).
Calculative Uses of Danwei Welfare
The life chances of workers were no longer entirely 
dependent on the danwei and its welfare. The mixed economy 
opened up exit and second job opportunities which many 
workers exploited to their advantages. In the course of 
fieldwork, the researcher discovered also that workers were 
making calculative and selective uses of danwei welfare
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instead of just receiving and consuming whatever was made 
available to them through the danwei bureaucracy.
The danwei's school, for example, was not as popular 
among workers as one might think, although it was 
conveniently located in the plant's residential areas. Few 
workers interviewed by the researcher were positive about 
the school. Ms. Cao and Ms. Ma explained why they did not 
think the school was good:
People outside do not have much regard for the 
school. They believe its teachers are not well 
qualified. I have doubts too about whether they 
have the right qualifications. Many colleagues 
also think that they may be all right as primary 
school teachers, but as secondary school teachers 
they cannot compare with teachers of other 
schools. (Ms. Cao)
Yes it is true that workers prefer schools 
outside the plant. You get an idea of what the 
school is up to by reading the public examination 
results of its students published in the Dongfang 
Bao (Note: the plant's monthly newsletters) and 
by following the performance of its students 
participating in competitions in the city. The 
standard of its primary school is all right. It 
is, however, not so good at its secondary school. 
Graduates from the secondary school do not stand 
much chance getting admission into the 
university. (Ms. Ma)
The plant's accountant, Mr. Tang, was even more 
critical. Bluntly, he said:
The standard of the school is rather low. Because 
it is not government-funded, the education 
department is not supervising it in the same way 
as it does with other schools. Parents who care 
and who can afford it send their children to
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schools in other parts of the city. To get their 
children into these schools they need only to 
give some donations in the form of sponsorship 
fees. Many parents did.
Mr. Zhu placed his six-year-old daughter in a private 
nursery outside the plant:
It's simple. You don't need to fill out different 
kinds of forms and go through troublesome 
procedures. You just pay and she's in. The 
nursery is good. Of course it is also more 
expensive.
Asked whether he would let her attend the plant's 
school when she was ready for it the next year, Mr. Zhu 
flatly said no:
I don't think I'd like her to go to the plant's 
school. There are two other schools in the 
neighborhood. I'd rather she go to either one of 
these instead. If this does not work out, I'll 
see what I can do. She may end up with the 
plant's school, but this is unlikely. You see, if 
only you are prepared to spend some money, you 
can sort things out. How much? It's not a small 
amount: around Y2,000 to Y3,000. (Mr. Zhu)
It was obvious that workers would rather put their 
children in some other schools if they could afford the 
cost. Mr. Wen the principal had a much more difficult 
decision to make. His daughter, 6, would be ready to go to 
school in a year's time.
It would be a boost to the morale of teachers if 
my daughter goes to the plant's school. However, 
this would not be without any problem. Teachers
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do not feel comfortable teaching the daughter of 
the school's principal. It could cause all sorts 
of problems. It is sensitive.
The hospital was in a situation similar to that of the 
school. Workers and their families could see doctors at the 
hospital's out-patient department and could also seek 
referrals to other hospitals in the city. In both cases, 
following a policy just introduced, workers had to pay 20 
per cent and their family members 50 per cent of the bills. 
The rest of the bills and any expense over Y350 were 
covered by the plant. Workers' opinion of the hospital and 
the quality of its service was, however, very negative. In 
the view of Mr. Tang the accountant, for example, the 
hospital was a 'sub-standard and filthy facility where 
patients hated to go' and where 'doctors and nurses 
outnumber their patients.' Ms. Feng and Ms. Cao explained 
their dis-satisfaction:
I am of course dissatisfied. The doctors there 
are not up to standard. Yet you have to pay the 
20 per cent. And the medicine that they give you 
is no good. Some has even passed the expiry 
dates. Some is so out-dated it's no longer sold 
at drugstores. Any way, they prescribe whatever 
medicine you ask for. They have such easy jobs. 
But then they just give you out-dated medicine. 
They won't let you have new drugs. That's why 
it's cheap and you need only to pay 4 to 5 yuan 
to take home a lot of medicine. Not so in other 
hospitals where they give you better drugs. Of 
course you pay many times more. They can of 
course refer you to outside hospitals. They'll 
ask you which hospital you like. If they agree, 
they can let you go. It is usually like that. For 
example, just last month I strained my leg. I 
told the doctor I liked to be treated by 
traditional Chinese medicine. He agreed and let 
me go. On that occasion I paid Y100 but claimed
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Y80 back from the plant. (Ms. Feng)
For minor problems it is all right. The doctors 
are not really that reliable. I seldom go to see 
doctors outside, for you'll need referral 
letters. Moreover, you also spend much more time, 
queuing for registration, waiting to see the 
doctor, queuing for drugs on one floor and 
queuing to pay your fees at another and so on. 
But if there are emergencies, or when you have a 
high temperature, they let you go. Otherwise 
you'll have to pay yourselves. In any case, if 
doctors here can't cure you, they won't kill you 
either. (Ms. Cao)
Dr. Mao became director of the plant's hospital in 
1993. She confirmed their descriptions:
It is true. This hospital is very unlike the 
public hospital where I used to work. There every 
one was so busy, working so hard, and the pace of 
work was so very fast. Here people have got so 
little work to do. I was bored to death. You see, 
the hospital looks after minor illnesses and cuts 
and wounds. Patients with more serious problems 
are referred to other hospitals. At first, I 
tried to be strict with referrals. This caused an 
uproar among workers. They complained to lingdao. 
Lingdao told me I should not be so strict. I had 
to give in. And it was like opening the flood­
gate. You lost all controls. Doctors, you see, 
don't care. After all, it is not their money. It 
is public money, the state's money. And why not, 
when they can use the power to sign referral 
letters exchanging favors with guanxi. I had such 
a tough time then, besieged and attacked from all 
sides. It is so very difficult to try to 
introduce change.
Workers like Ms. Cao abided by rules. They seldom went 
to see doctors at other hospitals. However, as described by 
Dr. Mao, there were apparently many others who were able to 
use their guanxi with doctors to obtain for themselves the 
advantage of using medical facilities and services external
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to the danwei.
Unlike the school and the hospital, danwei housing was 
highly treasured. Guangzhou was overcrowded. Amost no new 
housing was constructed between 194 9 and 1979, and most of 
the housing stock had badly deteriorated by the 1980s. 
'Since the population had doubled in the meantime, there 
was an acute shortage of space7 (Vogel 1989:197). Workers 
in state enterprises looked to their danwei to provide them 
with housing. Once allocated, it was for life and they had 
to pay only a tiny fraction of their monthly income for 
rents. In the late seventies and early eighties, when 
tingti--replacement of parents7 jobs by their children--was 
practiced, danwei housing became virtually inheritable. 
Since 1988, workers could also buy their flats from the 
danwei at well-below-market prices.
The market price is around several thousand yuan 
per sq. meter. With our meagre earnings, this is 
simply beyond us. The price of some housing 
estate flats of very average quality comes to 
Y3, 900 per sq. meter. For a mere 30 sq. meter 
flat, you have to pay Y120, 000! By the time we 
have this amount of saving, the price would have 
gone even higher up. There is no way we can catch 
up. Moreover, unlike in Hong Kong, there is no 
such financial facility as morgage: we can7t pay 
by instalment. There is little hope we can buy a 
property from the market. (Ms. Cao)
There were nevertheless cases in which workers turned 
down the danwei's offers because they did not like the 
flats allocated to them:
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I didn't apply for danwei housing. You see, being 
a worker, I am entitled to no more than 24 sq. 
metres. Managers and cadres are entitled to 
bigger and better flats. In my workshop, three 
colleagues have recently been offered danwei 
flats. None took up the offer. Why? Because the 
flats offered them were so very small. The 
kitchens were dark too. You couldn't believe how 
small these kitchens were. There was one flat in 
which the kitchen was located not within but 
outside the flat! Can you imagine this? Isn't 
this outrageous? I am living in a flat with two 
bedrooms and one sitting room. It is over 30 sq. 
metres and I paid not more than Y20 for the 
rentals. I have no intention to move. And, you 
see, the building is very old and is due for re­
development. We are expecting the government to 
give us compensation to move out of the building. 
So we are waiting. Let's see what will happen. 
(Ms. Cao)
From the examples of the school, the hospital and 
housing, it is clear that workers were no longer entirely 
dependent on the danwei for all its facilities and 
services. They were moving away from near-complete 
dependence and were no longer passive recipients who just 
took whatever was available. They had more individual 
choices and, exercising their preferences, were using 
danwei benefits more selectively and calculatively. They 
made greater use of, hence more dependent on, some danwei 
benefits, but more discreetly the use of, hence less 
dependent on, other benefits.
Reshaping Identity and Commitment
In 1983, DFMW had 6,421 employees. By 1995, the figure 
had dropped to 4,503. The plant lost 30 percent (1,918) of 
its employees in 13 years' time. During the three year
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period between 1993 and 1995 as many as 999 employees left 
the plant for jobs elsewhere. Many of those who left were 
young workers aged between 18 and 35 (Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1 Number of Permanent and Contract Workers,
and Number of Workers Who Quitted in 1993, 
1994, 1995
1993 1994 1995
Permanent and Contract 5,081 4,842 4,503
Workers+
Workers Aged between 1,799 1,518 1,23 9
18 and 35
Workers Aged 45 and 1,375 1,346 1,296
Above
Male workers 3,445 3,279 3,019
Female workers 1,636 1,563 1,484
Quitters 267 432 300
+Temporary workers not included.
Source: DFMW Annual Report on Labour Statistics 1995
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The 'exodus' of young workers highlighted the 
radically changed 'cultural landscape' of the danwei: it 
was no longer the community which it once was, the basis of 
one's identity and the subject of lifelong commitment. Ms. 
Feng remembered the days when in 1970 as a youngster at the 
age of 17 she joined DFMW:
You were so proud and happy to be a worker in 
such a big factory. You even wore your uniform 
when you went shopping and when you met friends 
from secondary school. Even if you were to die 
for work, it was worth it, you thought. At that 
time, you could work very long hours, until nine 
or ten o'clock at night, without over-time pay. 
All that they gave you was a rice dumpling for 
mid-night supper. But we did not have any 
complaint. People then earned more or less the 
same pay. There was a good deal of equality. It 
was like water in your bowl--we were all at the 
same level.
Mr. Chen, senior cadre in charge of DFMW's propaganda 
department, confirmed what Ms. Feng said:
In those days, workers did not just work for pay. 
They worked all day and night and got up at three 
or four o'clock in the morning to continue. It 
was like that in the early years after Liberation 
and through the sixties and seventies. There was 
no such thing as over-time pay. Since reforms, 
things have changed, because people do care about 
pay. Life was very tough, though, in the pre- 
reform days and all that the danwei could give to 
a worker at the end of a long day of work was a 
food-coupon for two taels (Note: around a quarter 
of a pound) of food from the canteen. Everybody 
was treated in the same way, be they managers or 
lingdao or workers.
While Ms. Feng and Mr. Chen missed the altruism, 
egalitarianism and commitment of the danwei in the past,
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Ms. Ma lamented the passing of the days when workers shared 
a much stronger sense of the 'whole7:
The spirit of co-operation is much weaker now. 
There is no longer a strong sense of the whole. 
People these days care much more about their own 
little units and much less the danwei as a whole. 
What they care most is getting their jobs done 
and getting good bonuses.
Mr. Zhu, a skilled worker in his late thirties, had 
been with the plant for over fifteen years. According to 
him, there was not a strong sense of belongingness among 
workers:
Well, the plant is for the time being still 
dependable. But you do not know what will happen 
to it in the future. It may of course change for 
the worse. And when that happens, I may leave. 
But for the moment you can still depend on it. 
You see, people are no longer as idealistic as in 
the past. They all talk about economic outcomes. 
In the past, people were proud of belonging to a 
big factory. They no longer are. There is no 
longer a sense of belongingness. They regard it 
as just a job.
What had made the difference? Ms. Feng suggested that 
it was the enlarging differences in earnings and life 
styles among people and the new values on material gain and 
economic achievement:
It is now a very different situation. While there 
are people who have not got enough to eat, there 
are those who have plenty of meat and fish for 
every meal. There are such big differences in 
people's incomes. Moreover, people now like to 
compare with each other: how much their husbands 
earn and so on. I do feel a sense of inferiority
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and try to avoid going to gatherings of old 
friends and alumni. There is not much you can 
share with them. And people look at you with 
rather complex sorts of eye-sights. Friends are 
now more difficult to make. They care much more 
about money and status. Also, in the plant, 
lingdao were not as approachable as in the past. 
They seldom come to see the workers and do not 
seem to care about their difficulties. I think 
Mao's times were better times.
Mr. Deng explained what he experienced in terms of, 
first of all, 'enterprise reforms' which turned the plant 
into a collection of companies each with its own profit 
targets and, secondly, market values that changed people's 
attitudes towards work and work relations:
In the past, the entire plant was just like one 
big assembly line: work flowed from one workshop 
to another and workshops could depend on each 
other to get their jobs done. This is no longer 
the case. Sister companies need to pay each other 
for what used to be taken-for-granted services. 
Because there are cheaper providers for such 
services from outside the plant, sister companies 
have turned to these instead of to each other. 
These are usually township enterprises which can 
afford much lower labour cost bacause they 
provide very little welfare and benefits to their 
workers. As a result, sister companies are not 
helping each other out. Some have got into 
difficulties and do not have enough jobs for 
their workers. The old co-operative spirit is 
gone. Sister companies are no different from 
heartless capitalist competitors. Some are on the 
verge of bankruptcy and have sent many of their 
workers home on daigan (rest and wait) . I have 
heard some of these workers wondering aloud, 'I 
love Dong fang (DFMW) , but does Dong fang (DFMW) 
love me too?'
Income differences have also grown bigger among 
workers in sister companies. Because not all 
sister companies are making the same profits, 
some are able to give ' more bonuses to their 
workers than the others. For example, it is quite 
possible that a cleaning woman in a profitable 
company takes home a fatter bonus than a senior
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engineer in a non-profitable company.
Just as sister companies have turned into 
competitors, so has the relationship between co­
workers. Co-workers are not as prepared to give 
a hand to each other. For example, they may hold 
an attitude such as the following when a fellow 
colleague runs into some technical problems: 
'Well, if he does not know how to do his job, it 
is just too bad for him. I am not going to teach 
him how to do it. After all, I must mind my own 
rice-bowl.'
My job as director is also getting more and more 
difficult. In the past, you could work on 
people's thought and make them understand the 
importance of their duties. And if this did not 
work, you could always resort to administrative 
power. These no longer work now. Few care to 
listen to high-sounding words. All that they want 
from you is an answer to the question, 'How 
much?' All they care are immediate gain. To get 
them to co-operate, you have to speak in a low 
voice, hold down your temper and ask them to give 
you some 'face'. You can of course curry-favour 
them from time to time also. The trouble is: you 
cannot do this all the time. There are side 
effects too. You are bound to make some unhappy 
if you do not curry-favour evenly.
As the danwei became increasingly differentiated in 
structure and interest, workers had also come to identify 
less with the enterprise as a whole than with its sub­
units. Ms. Cao and Mr. Tao described the change they saw, 
as follows:
Yes, in the past, Dongfang was big and you feel 
proud of being a member of a large-scale 
enterprise. People don't feel the same now. They 
look at the economic performance of the units. 
They feel proud of being members of units which 
make good profits. (Ms. Cao)
With the setting up of companies, things are now 
quite different. For instance, when some friend 
of mine told me it was not bad for me to have got 
the job in my present company, I really felt 
flattered. I think I feel a stronger sense of
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belongingness to my company than to Dong fang. 
(Mr. Tao)
Unlike in the past, workers were much more 
calculatively involved and, as Mr. Tao put it, 'most people 
nowadays are money oriented':
When I first came to Guangzhou seven years ago, 
I found a pair of shoes priced at Y200 to Y300 
very expensive. Today, I wouldn't mind paying 
Y1, 000 or even more for a pair of shoes that I 
like as long as I can afford it. You see, as the 
economy develops, people's values change too. If 
I like something, I will work hard for it. I do 
not care if they give me a promotion or get me 
into the Party, as long as I can make money. This 
is really the most important thing...Even 
friends, you see, are very instrumental. What 
they really care is their own interests and what 
you can do for them. Friends who are true to you 
are now so rare.
At 42, Ms. Feng was no longer the enthusiastic young 
worker ready to work 'until nine or ten o'clock at night, 
without over-time pay.' Calculative and resigned to the 
fact that hers was a low-pay job, she was not prepared to 
put too much effort into her job. She was also unhappy that 
other workers were earning more.
Why should we work so hard? They want us to work 
hard, of course. Our answer to them is to work 
less hard. There is little else that we can do. 
There is no better way to ventilate our feelings. 
Some piece-rate workers do work very hard because 
the more they get done, the more they earn. We 
try not to co-operate with them. We deliberately 
go slow to make them earn less. (Ms. Feng)
The Party and what it stood for had also fallen
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casualties to the changes transforming the ethos of the 
danwei community. Ms. Feng, in reply to whether she had to 
be a Party member to be involved in birth control 
activities, told the researcher:
No, you don't have to be a Party member to be 
involved in these activities. In fact, of the 
three managers in our company, only one is a 
Party member. Ability counts more than Party 
membership now. And it is entirely up to you to 
decide whether or not to join the Party. Very few 
workers care to join. Of the more than a hundred 
workers in my section, only two to three workers 
are Party members. No one wants to be a Party 
member. It is now rather easy to become one'. In 
the past, you had to go through a very strict 
process to get in. And Party members were good 
people. They were models whom you looked up to. 
They no longer are. Some Party members are more 
backward than myself. Among workers there is the 
view that one must be nuts to want to get into 
the Party. Moreover, it is not free: you have to 
pay membership fees. It is not a big amount, just 
around 1 to 2 yuan. Workers just wonder why one 
should want to join the Party.
This was a far cry from what things used to be: when 
the Chinese Communist Party was difficult to get in, when 
Party membership was a respected status, and when CCP 
members were admired as socialist role models. The status 
of being a CCCP member was once a 'political resource' 
(Bian 1994:47). It brought one closer to where power was 
and where decisions were made. In subtle ways it also 
advantaged one over non-Party members in job promotion and 
access to scarce resources (Walder 1986:148,163).
Ms. Feng 'used' the Party, nevertheless, to advance 
her familial interests. She so described her instrumental
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approach to the Party: 'I have been applying to switch to
a bigger flat. I asked the Party Secretary at my company 
for help. I explained to him why I needed a bigger flat and 
expected him to speak up on my behalf.' Mr. Deng, himself 
a Party member, bluntly explained why the Party was in 
decline in the danwei: 'Managers are in charge; the Party
is only supposed to oversee their work. There are bound to 
be differences in their views and approaches. Yes, there is 
still a formal position for the Party in the plant, but it 
is finding it increasingly difficult to wield influence. 
For, you see, all that people care now is whether they can 
make more money.'
Party secretaries used to be the most powerful persons 
in the enterprise. However, with the implementation since 
1984 of the 'factory director responsibility system'
(changzhang fuzezhi), giving factory directors the power to 
manage and holding them responsible for the economic 
performance of their enterprises, party secretaries had 
increasingly been sidelined (Chevrier 1990). Mr. Dong, 
DFMW's deputy party secretary, described what had happened:
Yes, our roles have changed. We are no longer 
directly involved in management. And, frankly, we 
are no longer in power. The power over money and 
people is not in our hands now. It is in the 
hands of the General Manager. The enterprise is 
still under the Party and if I've got some thing 
to say, he'll listen. He won't just ignore me. 
But, you see, I must take care not to say things 
which are within the range of his 
responsibilities. For, after all, there should 
only be one person who calls the shots. Otherwise 
there will be chaos.
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The rise of an ethos that placed values on profit, 
individual interest and material gain had upset pre­
existing values and relations in what used to be a highly 
stable, egalitarian and homogeneous community. It spelt 
differentiation and division, undermined identity and 
commitment, and weakened the hold of the Party and its 
ideological appeals.13
Most importantly, it had also changed the community's 
welfare ethos and encouraged workers to calculatively 
regard their welfare rights and entitlements: to bargain 
for welfare and make their commitment to the danwei 
conditional upon what they could get out of danwei benefits 
and welfare. Mr. Tao stated the case of housing:
Housing is what keeps people in their jobs. It is 
as simple as that. If you have got some one in 
your family working in the danwei, well, it's 
simple: you just quit and let this someone, your 
wife for example, hold on to the flat. If you 
haven't got this some one and if you quit, you 
will lose your flat. It's tough but you can't 
help it.
Housing was not only instrumental in obtaining the 
conditional commitment of workers to the danwei, it was 
also the cause of much dis-satisfaction among workers and
13 A survey conducted by the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions in 1997 found less than 30 percent of its 
respondens still believed in communism. This result was 40 
percent down from the result of a similar survey conducted 
in 1982. (Apple Daily May 6, 1997).
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many disputes both among workers and between workers and 
management. The annual housing allocation exercise was 
invariably tension-ridden, generating allegations of 
favoritism and inequity, and making many unhappy. As Mr. 
Deng described it, 'There was an earth-quake every time.' 
Mr. Dong, Duputy Party Secretary, reflected on the 
differences between the 'old days' and the present time:
The Party's job is now much more difficult. In 
the past, people did not know much about the 
market and ideological incentives could be 
effective. For example, if there was just one 
flat and if three workers wanted to have it, they 
were somehow more ready to give in and gracefully 
tell the other guys, 'You take it. I can wait.' 
They were more altruistic. And although the two 
workers who gave in did not get their flats, they 
nevertheless enjoyed some kind of spiritual 
satisfaction. The worker who got the flat also 
felt good. He felt the warmth of comradely care. 
This is no longer the case now. People just will 
not give in. They argue fiercely using all kinds 
of reasons. They care only their own interests.
The eight-year rule for young workers to get on to the 
housing queue as well as the even longer years-of-service 
requirement, i.e., thirty years, to qualify ordinary 
workers for purchased flats were also divisive, alienating 
many in the rank and file. Grudges against the policy were 
widely shared among workers. On their grudges Ms. Cao and 
Ms. Feng were outspoken:
Workers are of course very up-set. You see, the 
first lot of the purchased flats were sold at 
just six to seven thousand yuan per flat. If we 
had been allowed to buy these flats, we would 
have bought them, borrowing from friends and 
relatives. But these flats were exclusively for
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managers and cadres. We were not allowed to buy 
these flats just because we were workers. Just 
think of this: for the lingdao, a family of three 
have a flat with three rooms and one sitting room 
all to themselves. And we workers have to crowd 
our families into tiny cubicles between 18 and 21 
sq. metres instead. Some even have to put up with 
cubicles not larger than 14 sq. metres. Is this 
fair? (Ms. Cao)
Yes, we do have many grudges. Take myself as an 
example. I have been a worker for many years. Yet 
I do not have a flat of my own. Managers and 
cadres have advantages over us. They are allowed 
to 'jump queue' even though their length of 
serice is as short as just five years. You see, 
we workers are working very hard. Yet we do not 
have a decent place to rest after work. They 
cadres and managers do not work as hard. Yet they 
can have comfortable places to live in. (Ms. 
Feng)
Workers clearly perceived inequities in the allocation 
of housing. Cadres and managers had advantages over 
ordinary workers. But it was not just ordinary workers who 
were unhappy. More recently, the plant introduced a policy 
which gave preferential treatment to capable administrative 
personnel and young graduates as a measure to attract and 
retain skilled manpower. As it advantaged these young 
executives and professionals, it disadvantaged old cadres 
and managers many of whom would wish to switch to bigger 
flats. Mr. Chen, senior cadre in charge of DFMW's 
propaganda department, was outraged by the policy: 'I have 
been with this plant for over thirty years. Why should 
workers like myself not be entitled to a flat, at the least 
a flat with one bedroom and sitting room or two bedrooms 
and one sitting room? We deserve it after all these years 
of service for the danwei.'
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Mr. Chen's remarks carried an important 'moral' 
message: that old workers had a just and rightful claim for 
their entitlements and that it would be wrong for the 
danwei to deprive them of what they deserved. Old workers 
believed they had a legitimate claim to what should be 
their entitlements, a claim based on the assumption that 
there should be fair exchange. Exchange was not fair if 
what one party gave to the other party was not eventually 
balanced by what the other party gave back in return. The 
'legitimacy' issue was not just confined to housing, 
however. Mr. Deng also raised the issue when he discussed 
the impact of the danwei's recent policy to re-engage all 
permanent workers on contract:
From government documents we have learnt that all 
permanent workers are to become re-engaged as 
contract workers next year. Workers in their 
forties and fifties have a lot of anxiety over 
this. They have, you see, given their best years 
to the plant. What they have given to the plant 
far exceeds what the plant has given back to them 
in return. And in their old age, the plant is 
going to abandon them. Also, you see, the planned 
economy has not been able to really put into 
practice the principle of 'from each according to 
his ability and to each according to his work' . 
The rewards to workers have not been in 
accordance with their contributions.
Mr. Tao also made reference to the issue when he 
discussed workers' reaction to a recent policy which 
required patients to pay twenty percent of their medical 
bills:
Old workers were particularly unhappy. They had 
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worked so hard for the plant for so many years 
and yet they have to pay the twenty percent. I do 
not know the view of lingdao on this. But I do 
know that many people were very dissatisfied. I 
am all right because I am young and seldom get 
sick. I see the doctor not even once a year.
The issue raised by Mr. Chen, Mr. Deng and Mr. Tao was 
not just the issue of one danwei. It had a much wider and 
far-reaching significance. In the context of state 
socialist occupational welfare, this was at once an issue 
about the reciprocal responsibilities and obligations 
between the socialist state and its urban citizenry. The 
workers had 'worked so hard for' and given their 'best 
years' to not just their work-unit, but to the state in the 
cause of socialism. And it was in terms of the state's 
reciprocal obligations that the workers were justifying 
their claim to security in their old age. Any attempt by 
the danwei to perform less than what workers regard as its 
obligations was at once a legitimacy issue of a much wider 
import and it raised questions about whether or not the 
socialist state was abdicating its responsibilities.
In the new mode of orientation towards welfare, 
workers had become much more conscious of and calculative 
about their welfare rights and entitlements and much more 
ready to address these as their legitimate claims. This had 
made the danwei's tasks of re-shaping its welfare 
obligations much more complex and difficult, complex 
because what to one group was their legitimate claim might 
not be similarly regarded by another group, and difficult
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because what to the danwei was right and justified might to 
its members be wrong and illegitimate. The danwei had a 
very difficult balancing act to do, and it was left with 
not much room to manoever.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the impact of social and 
economic change on the danwei community and observed that 
the rise of the mixed economy had re-shaped workers' 
dependence by opening up to them new opportunities and 
options. Using a combination of strategies that often 
strategically involved their families in both the state and 
the non-state economies and drawing upon the support of 
family and social networks, workers had shifted away from 
the kind of near-complete dependence of the pre-reform days 
toward a new pattern of dependence which was at once more 
diverse and pluralistic, combining the state and the non­
state sectors, the public and the private, the formal and 
the informal, and integrating at once both market and 
traditional values. The resulting pattern of dependence was 
a 'mixed economy of welfare' of a very unique kind, one 
grown out of a 'mixed economy' dominated by a state-sector 
inherited from a socialist command economy co-existing with 
an expanding non-state economy.
The chapter observed also that market reforms and the 
rise of an ethos characteristic of the market had upset
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pre-existing relations and values in what used to be a 
highly stable, homogeneous and egalitarian community, 
undermined identity and commitment, changed workers' values 
and attitudes towards welfare, and encouraged them to 
calculatively regard their rights and entitlements and 
addressing these as their legitimate claims.
In short, what social change and economic reforms had 
ushered in was a 'mixed economy of welfare7 which, while 
offering more diversity and choice, was also more tension- 
ridden and more conducive to conflict.
The next chapter zooms in on a state-owned enterprise 
and examines how, in response to the challenge of the 
market, it tried to resolve the difficult dilemma between 
efficiency and obligation.
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CHAPTER SIX
Reshaping the Danwei Welfare Economy
Introduction
In the pre-reform days, the danwei welfare economy was 
essentially a monolithic and closed system.1 Benefits and 
services were provided by and distributed through the 
bureaucracy to its members. These were all paid for by the 
state, 'passed directly to the state budget and (did) not 
represent a cost to enterprise management' (Walder 
1986:43). There was little pressure on the enterprise to 
run these services efficiently and cost-effectively. 
Quality was generally poor and choice by users and 
consumers very limited. 'It was a very inefficient system. 
There was a lot of waste. It was in a mess' (Liu 1995:135) .
Economic reforms since 1979 have brought these 
problems to the fore. The enterprise has to be profit 
oriented and 'be responsible for its own profits and 
losses' ('zifu yingqui'). Welfare cannot but enter into 
cost-efficiency consideration. For many enterprises for 
which welfare has become a growing burden it is only too
1 'It was characterized by its 'fiili xing' (free or 
heavily subsidized benefits and services), its 'fengbi 
xing' (its being a closed system) , and its 'ziwo fuwu xing' 
(self-serving)' (Gu 1996:41).
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clear that things must change.
Change has been mainly in the direction of 
'dissociating the enterprise from its welfare functions' 
('fenli qiyie ban shehui zhineng'). 'Dissociation' has 
occurred mainly through either 'socializing' ('shehui hua') 
the functions, i.e. returning the functions to 'society', 
or, more specifically, the government,2 or through either 
contracting the responsibility of managing the services to 
be dissociated to sub-units concerned,3 or setting up these 
sub-units as subsidiary companies responsible for their own 
profits and losses.4
In the cases of either contracting the welfare 
responsibility to a sub-unit or devolving the 
responsibility to a subsidiary company, 'dissociation' 
entails either fully or partially 'commodifying' ('shangpin 
hua') welfare (Liu 1995:136), i.e. pricing welfare and 
'selling' it for profit to consumers at markets either
2 The Tai Yuan Steels Works, a huge state-owned 
enterprise established in the 1930's, had 30 schools, 7 
hospitals, 12 nurseries and a large number of other 
services and facilities for workers. It successfully 
'dissociated' itself from its schools and hospitals through 
'returning' these to the Tai Yuan City Government (Zhang 
1996:2) .
3 Usually, the contract would specify the minimum 
amount of profits the sub-unit must remit to the 
enterprise. The contract could also lay down other terms. 
For a brief introduction to the evolution of the Contract 
Responsibility System, see Koo et al (1993:33-80).
4 For example, Baogang Steel Works, a huge steel 
manufacturing plant in Shanghai, tried this approach in 
recent years (Zhang 1996:3).
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internal or external to the enterprise. Housing, for 
example, is increasingly sold as a commodity to danwei 
members at below (external) market prices.
There is no single model or unified approach for the 
change. The government made it clear that 'enterprises 
should be free to take their own steps and do it their own 
ways' (Zhang 1995:6). 'Dissociation' has ocurred therefore 
in many different ways. There are variations not only 
between enterprises but often also within the same 
enterprise between its various services. Within one 
enterprise, therefore, it is not uncommon for there to be 
services still operated according to pre-reform principles, 
for some services to have been hived off and taken over by 
financially independent subsidiary companies, and for still 
others to be on responsibility contracts. The typical 
danwei welfare economy becomes a hybrid, a mixture of 
different ways of running welfare.
While the government encouraged enterprises to try out 
different ways of 'dissociating' themselves from welfare, 
it also warned that as they do this they 'must protect the 
proper rights of their employees', and 'must try not to 
dampen their enthusiasm' (Zhang 1995:5). They were told 
that 'social stability should be the uppermost concern' 
(Liu 1995:34) and that they should try to avoid upsetting 
that stability. In other words, in reforming welfare, they 
had to be careful not to create 'social problems'. Workers
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should not suffer and it would still be their 
responsibility to look after their welfare. 'Dissociation' 
applies, therefore, more to 'functions' than to 
'responsibility' and enterprises are not supposed to 
abdicate that responsibility.
In other words, for the enterprises, the challenge was 
how to reduce their welfare burden without giving up their 
welfare responsibilities.
In this chapter, based on the case study of DFMW, we 
look at how this state-owned enterprise faced this
challenge amidst its many problems and difficulties.
What the enterprise had done was, strategically, to
combine welfare with business and to link the bureaucracy 
to market. The strategy, in other words, was to 'go quasi­
market' . The strategy enabled the enterprise to provide 
welfare and do business at the same time. Hence at the same 
time as it provided 'free' benefits and services, it also 
tried to 'market' these benefits and services to make 
profit.
The danwei economy of welfare emerging from the
changes introduced was increasingly a mixed economy of 
welfare, a hybrid system, one characterized by greater 
openness, diversity and, for users- and consumers, a wider 
range of choice.
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The Cost of Welfare
The term 'xiaoyi' , meaning profitability or the 
ability to realise economic gain, was frequently referred 
to when workers and managers talked about their danwei. 
DFMW was reckoned to be an enterprise with poor or low 
'xiaoyi' . In 1993, DFMW earned Y372.9 million from the 
sales of its machines but made an after-tax profit of only 
Y500,000. For the first eight months of 1994, its sales 
amounted to Y327 million and its net profit only Y380,000.
Mr. Dong, deputy secretary of the Party, explained why 
the danwei had such poor performance:
For several decades under the planned economy, we 
had made a lot of contributions. We used to be 
very profitable. In one of our best years in the 
seventies, our profit was over Y20 million. 
During all these years we have also trained and 
produced a large number of skilled workers, 
management personnel and cadres. However, since 
reforms, we have run into many difficulties. 
There are three important reasons why we are 
doing not so well now. First, we have not 
developed new products. Our products are not in 
demand in the market. Secondly, our technology is 
out-dated. Although we have over a thousand 
pieces of machine tools, very few of these are 
really modern and advanced. And thirdly, we have 
been over-burdened by welfare. The burden of 
welfare is getting heavier and heavier and 
becoming impossible to bear. We are spending so 
much on welfare there is very little left for 
development and re-investment.
Mr. Wu, deputy director of the plant's political work 
department, explained how welfare had become the plant's 
economic burden:
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It is no small achievement that we have been able 
to feed so many mouths and keep our machines 
running. Mind you, we have to look after the
welfare of our people too. What a heavy burden 
this is! We shouldn't have this burden in the 
first place. Township enterprises and joint 
venture companies do not have this burden. This
explains why we have higher production costs and
why our products are not as competitive as
theirs.
The plant did have a hefty welfare budget. In 1994, 
the plant budgeted Y70 million for wage and bonus and one-
third as much, Y23 million, for welfare. About one-quarter
of the plant's recurrent cost expenditure of the year was 
spent on the wage and bonus and welfare of its workers
Before 1 July 1993, state enterprises were allowed to 
retain 75 per cent of their after-tax profit for two 
purposes, 're-investment and development' and 'welfare and 
bonus', 60 per cent for the former and 40 per cent for the
latter. However, very few enterprises stuck to the sixty-
forty rule. Instead of keeping the larger part of after-tax 
profit for 'reinvestment and development', many enterprises 
simply siphoned it into the 'welfare and bonus fund'. In 
other words, much of the 'retained profit' of an enterprise 
had been used to supplement the income and provide for the 
welfare of its workers.
Since July 1993, the government lowered profit tax 
rate from 55 per cent to 33 per cent, abolished the sixty- 
forty rule and allowed state enterprises to make welfare 
and bonus part of recurrent cost expenditures. The new
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policy enabled enterprises to 'normalize7 bonus, making it 
a regular part of a worker's pay package. Because how much 
an enterprise spent on bonus and welfare was no longer 
capped by the size of its profit, the policy actually 
encouraged the enterprise to spend more on bonus and 
welfare and discouraged spending less on these so as to 
increase the size of profit. And because there was no 
longer the 60 per cent requirement, it became even less 
certain that an enterprise would reinvest its profit in 
capital and development.
Retirement pensions were given a large slice of DFMW's 
hefty welfare budget. DFMW participated in a pooling scheme 
which required it to devote 24.5 per cent of its wage bill 
to pensions. Since it was not the pool but enterprises 
which disbursed pensions, the pooling arrangement worked by 
ex post redistribution. Enterprises spending more than the 
percentage claimed the difference and, conversely, those 
spending less paid the difference into the pool. In the 
case of DFMW, because it was spending less than the 
percentage, on top of the pensions for 2,107 retirees it 
also had to pay the difference of Y1.56 million into the 
pool. In 1994, its net expenditure on pensions amounted to 
Y12 million. 'Retirement pensions,7 said Mr. Li, director 
of personnel department, 'have become our heaviest welfare 
burden.7
The cost of pensions was expected to increase steeply
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in the next five years as more workers became pensioners. 
According to Mr. Dong:
The number of retired workers increases by around 
150 each year. About 2,000 workers joined the 
plant in 1958. Most of them are now in their 
fifties and sixties. In five years' time, there 
will be more than 3,000 retired workers. We will 
be in big trouble if the government does not do 
something about it.
Mr. Liao, head of generl affairs office, described the 
problem:
We have taken over what should have been the 
responsibility of society. This is affecting our 
'xiaoyi' . You see, retirement benefits are eating 
away funds for the maintenance and upkeep of 
machines and building. The interest of workers 
has also been affected when they have to share 
what they have with the retirees.
The plant had an after-tax profit of Y2.13 million for 
the first eight months of 1994. This was reduced to just 
Y380,000 after it back-paid retired workers Y1.75 million 
to cover their cost-of-living adjustment and 'hardship' 
allowance.
Financing the plant's soaring health-care costs was no 
less tricky.
Employees and retired employees in state-owned 
enterprises are covered by Labour Insurance (laobao 
yiliao). Labour Insurance provides comprehenive insurance
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benefits, including primary health care and hospital 
treatment, surgery, maternity services and also drugs. 
Benefits also include pay during sickness and maternity 
leave on full pay for 100 days. Medical benefits can also 
extend to the immediate dependents of the employees, if 
they are not already covered by health insurance. Unlike 
with old-age pensions, health care costs are not pooled and 
each unit is responsible for the cost of its employees. At 
DFMW, this consisted of firstly, the cost involved in the 
provision of direct medical services through its in-house 
hospital, and secondly, the cost of reimbursing workers on 
their referral visits to doctors or hospitals outside the 
unit.
In 1994, the budget for health care amounted to 7 per 
cent of the plant's wage bill, or Y4 .9 million. Users bore 
a small part of the cost. User charges took the form of 
cost-sharing and a small registration fee for visits to the 
hospital. Cost-sharing applied to both medical care and 
drugs. The cost-sharing formula required employees to 
contribute to 20 per cent of their medical bills but only 
as long as their total contributions during the year were 
not more than Y500.5 In other words, the formula limited 
their contributions to within a 'protection point' ('baohu 
xian'). Beyond the 'baohu xian', the plant took over.
5 In the case of retirees, the formula required them 
to contribute to only 10 percent of their medical bills. 
Their 'baohu xian' was fixed at Y350.
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Actual expenditure in the year amounted to Y6.4 
million, over-shooting the budget by 30 per cent. Dr. Mao, 
Director of the Hospital, explained what had happened:
Rising costs largely explains. Drugs are becoming 
more and more expensive. The fact that we have an 
ageing labour force and an increasing number of 
pensioners also explains. Elderly people are more 
likely to be more seriously ill and hospitalized. 
Last year, for example, we spent Yl,057 on each 
retiree but only Y407 on each worker. But most 
importantly, it has to do with the 'protection 
point7 policy. I was against the policy from the 
very beginning. But management was too cautious; 
they cared too much about workers' reactions. 
They just wouldn't listen to me. The 'protection 
point', you see, was so easy to over-shoot. 
Workers all want to see doctors in other 
hospitals. And these hospitals all want to make 
money. For, the more money they make, the more 
bonus they can give their staff. Unlike 
government departments, we have not entered into 
any contract with any hospitals. So there isn't 
any control at all on how much they charge our 
workers. They just perform all kinds of medical 
checks on them and prescribe many drugs. Our 
workers, of course, don't mind, for, you see, 
once their contributions go over the 'safe 
limit', they don't have to pay any further 
amount. Bills for hospitalization are rarely less 
than seven to eight thousand yuan and easily 
between ten to twenty thousand yuan in each case. 
Maternity used to cost just forty to fifty yuan. 
It is now seven to eight hundred yuan. It was the 
management who decided on the policy. But when 
things went wrong, they all blamed it on me.
Dr. Mao's account revealed the deep-rooted nature of 
the problem. There was serious under-utilization of the 
plant's in-house hospital and heavy use of outside 
services. Workers turned away from the plant's hospital 
because of its poor facilities and services. Outside 
services were much more expensive than in-house services. 
Heavy use of outside services over-spent the plant's
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health-care budget. An over-spent budget left little for 
medical equipment and for up-grading the hospital's 
facilities and services. Dr. Mao's problem was therefore 
much more serious than that of a management that 'wouldn't 
listen' to her, but a vicious circle with negative impacts 
on not just the financial health of health care but also 
the quality of the hospital's service. The financial 
implication of the vicious circle was serious. According to 
Dr. Mao, expenditure on health-care would very likely 
exceed Y8 million in 1995 and Y9 million in 1996.
Housing was the next big problem area. The plant had 
already built 160,000 sq. metres of housing for 3,700 
families. But there was still a long queue of eligible 
applicants waiting for allocation. One-fifth of the plant's 
5,225 employees were queueing and many others waiting to 
get into the queue.
Varying in sizes from around 25 to around 60 sq. 
metres and rented at between Y0.2 and Y0.5 per sq. metre, 
danwei flats were heavily subsidized. Since 1989, new flats 
were also sold to workers. The first batch of such flats 
were sold at the much-below-market and below-cost price of 
Y150 per sq. metre. At such a price, recovering cost was 
out of the question. Mr. Dong explained how the plant's 
building programme had run into financial difficulty and 
upset its production plans:
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We are housing not just the employees but also 
their families. This is not a small thing. In 
1991, we began a programme to build six multi­
storey buildings for 480 families. The cost was 
originally estimated to be Y9.8 million. But it 
quickly shot past this figure. At the completion 
of the programme, it had reached Y20 million. The 
plant, to be honest with you, was not making much 
profit. We had to lay our hands on working 
capital. This was not right but there was no 
better way. You see, housing has got in the way 
of production.
In 1994, the plant had only a budget of Y1.2 million 
for housing. Lamented Mr. Tang, the plant's accountant, 
'This amount is not even enough for building a six-storey 
apartment building. You need at least Y3 million to build 
one. '
Retirement pensions, health-care and housing had got 
the lion's share of the plant's welfare budget. The rest of 
the budget was shared among various welfare services and 
facilities, including the school, nursery, canteens, 
recreation centre for retired workers, and hardship 
subsidies. In 1994, these facilities and services together 
claimed one-fifth of ’ the plant's Y23 million welfare 
budget.
The Dilemma of Efficiency and Obligation
The plant was on the horns of a dilemma. The choice 
was between efficiency and obligation. Should the choice be 
obligation, it would have to bear with inefficiency. If the 
choice was efficiency, it would have to reduce its welfare
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responsibilities and cut welfare. There were, however, 
four main reasons against cutting welfare.
There was first of all a moral consideration. Plant 
management reckoned it had a moral obligation to its old 
workers and that they had a legitimate claim to what they 
deserved after many years of 'toil' and 'under-paid' 
service:
Old workers have gone through many ups and downs 
and much hardship: the Great Leap Forward, the 
difficulties in the sixties, the Great Cultural 
Revolution and so on. Their toil, if not their 
contributions, should be recognized. (Mr. Shi, 
bureau chief of corporate management)
Retired workers expect the plant to look after 
them in their old age because, for many years 
before retirement, they had been paid much less 
than what they deserved. Their pay was not 
commensurate with their contributions. (Mr. Dong, 
deputy party secretary)
Old workers have been with us for many years. 
They have witnessed the growth and development of 
the plant. The plant is like home to them and 
they feel they belong to it. In their view, the 
plant owes it to them to look after them and 
provide for their security in old age. Younger 
workers have a different view on this. In their 
view, it is up to workers to earn their own 
security through their own efforts and skills. 
(Mr. Liao, head of general affairs office)
But could it not leave the responsibility of looking 
after old workers to the family? While accepting that 
there was a role for the family, plant management believed 
the unit should not shirk its responsibility, as Mr. Li, 
deputy head of personnel, argued:
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It is difficult for retired workers to live on a 
pension of merely three to four hundred yuan. 
It's all right if their children are filial. 
Otherwise they will have a difficult time. But 
you cannot entirely depend on the children. The 
children themselves may be earning so little they 
themselves may have difficulty making ends meet. 
They may be filial children, but they may not 
have the means to support their parents. Retired 
workers have to depend on the danwei.
Compared to the average in the city, our pension 
is on the low side. But we have tried our very 
best and done all that we can. Retired workers 
appreciate what we have done for them. 'Money' 
and 'morals' are equally important and it is 
important to have both. We are just doing what is 
right in terms of traditional Chinese values.
Old workers had experienced not only 'toil' and 
'hardship'. As living witness to the socialism of the pre­
reform days, they had been through times when they enjoyed 
the prestige and status accorded 'proletariat' and 'state 
employees'. They believed they had a legitimate claim for 
the state's continuing obligation based on their 
traditional right as proletariat employees of the socialist 
state. To ignore such a claim was tantamount to denying the 
state's socialist past. Mr. Chen, director of propaganda, 
and Ms. Ma, worker, explained why the plant had to honour 
its obligation to old workers:
The working class is after all the leading class. 
In the past, workers in large-scale state 
enterprises enjoyed not only prestigious status. 
They were also provided with benefits and welfare 
commensurate with their status. Old workers who 
have been with us for many years still see it 
this way. They believe they deserve what they 
should have. (Mr. Chen)
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Old workers have all along been paid very low 
wages. How can we be convinced of the superiority 
of socialism if we can't even compensate old 
workers for what they have done for the plant? 
(Ms. Ma)
There was also a political reason against cutting 
welfare. The plant could not just give up its welfare role 
because government was not for it. Cutting welfare could 
have wider social and political ramifications, as Mr. Dong 
explained:
We did consider cutting welfare. The government, 
however, stressed stability. What would happen if 
our workers take to the street or stage sit-ins 
at government offices? We would be in big 
trouble. Our problem could turn into a social 
problem. That's why we hesitate to cut welfare.
The plant, for example, could not simply lay off its 
surplus workers. According to Mr. Xu, general manager, 
about one third of the plant's labour force was redundant.
However, it could not just lay off its surplus workers
because of its traditional responsibilities and because 
there were no alternative institutions providing income 
maintenance, housing services, medical care, and other 
basic social services to unemployed workers. Laid-off 
workers would be losing not just their income but all the 
benefits and essential services provided through the
danwei. 'If too many workers lose their jobs,' said Mr, 
Han, bureau chief of the office, 'they may become a cause 
of social instability.' Instead of laying off its surplus 
workers, the plant let them stay. Old workers were sent to
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its general service unit (xingzheng chu) where they took up 
such jobs as canteen assistants, cleaners, salesmen, shop 
attendants and so on. Those not assigned jobs at the 
'xingzheng chu' were given a ' daigan' (waiting) wage of 
Y250 and sent home to 'rest and wait' for job offers. 
'While on 'daigan', they can look for jobs. If they want to 
quit, we let them go,' said Mr. Han. Young workers were 
more fortunate. They were given the opportunity to go 
through a three-month course of retraining at the plant's 
vocational school. The school's principal, Mr. Wang, 
explained:
We just closed our iron-casting workshop because 
its 'xiaoyi' was poor. Among those who lost their 
jobs some were young graduates from this 
vocational school. They would have wasted all 
these years of training if they could not get 
back to work. That we could not employ them for 
the time being did not mean that we would not be 
able to employ them forever. So we gave them 
retraining and prepared them for other jobs in 
the plant. Retraining should be good for them 
too. From retraining they acquired additional 
skills. During retraining, they were paid the 
same wage as 'daigan' workers, Y250 a month.
A third major reason against cutting welfare was that 
welfare had become an indispensable means for motivating 
workers and inducing their commitment. Housing, in 
particular, had been instrumental in arresting the outflow 
of skilled manpower and attracting new recruits (Dai 
1995:96). Cutting welfare would affect the plant's 
competitiveness in the labour market. Mr. Chen, senior 
cadre in charge of propaganda, compared situations before
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and since reforms, and Mr. Liao, head of general affiars 
office, explained the problem facing the plant:
In the old days, a worker was very much dependent 
on his danwei: his fortune and the danwei's
fortune rose and fell together. He rarely if at 
all thought of changing his job. Not only was 
policy not for it, but there also was not much 
point going to a new job which paid more or less 
the same. For a second-grade worker, for example, 
no matter where he went, he was paid Y46.20. It 
is of course a very different story now. To win 
their loyalty, you must satisfy workers with 
welfare, not just wage. (Mr. Chen)
Because our performance is not as good as joint- 
venture companies, we cannot offer comparable 
terms. Hence we have difficulty recruiting new 
employees. There is also a good deal of mobility. 
Many are prepared to go. Many professionals and 
skilled workers use their jobs here as 
springboards to other jobs. They leave us as soon 
as they secure 'hukou' (residency status) and get 
better offers. (Mr. Liao)
On the average, workers in the country's state-owned 
enterprises earned 50 per cent less than workers in private 
and joint-venture enterprises. However, what they gained 
from welfare both in cash and in kind enabled them to 
almost bridge the gap. In other words, welfare was an 
important source of non-wage income. It helped to bring 
their incomes to a level almost on a par with the incomes 
earned by workers in private and joint-venture enterprises. 
Cutting welfare would in practice reduce what they earned. 
Mr. Liao and Mr. Dong, deputy party secretary, explained 
the plant's instrumental use of welfare:
In general, workers in non-state enterprises are 
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paid around one to two thousand yuan a month. But 
that's all. They don't have allowances or 
subsidies for such things as housing and health 
care. Old enterprises like ours are different. 
Workers are paid only several hundred yuan, but 
they have housing, laobao yiliao, and so on. For 
old enterprises like us, welfare is an important 
means to retain workers, especially skilled 
workers and experienced administrative personnel. 
You see, the market price of a flat is easily 
between one hundred to two hundred thousand yuan. 
We sell our danwei flats to workers at less than 
fifty thousand yuan. The difference is very big. 
(Mr. Liao)
Our workers earned on the average Y730 a month 
last year. This level of income was not bad among 
factory workers. It was, however, on the lower 
side if you compare it to the average level of 
wage in Guangzhou. We are in a difficult 
dilemma. If we can have our way, we will rid 
ourselves of the welfare burden as soon as we 
can. But in reality we can't. In fact, we have 
to rely on welfare to integrate and stablize the 
workforce. It would be nice, for example, for a 
young worker to share a two-bed-room one-sitting- 
room flat with another worker. But this is very 
ideal. In actual fact, he has to share a flat 
with three to seven others. So, recently, we have 
decided that we must do something about it. We 
decided to build a hostel for single workers. We 
hope that by providing better housing to young 
graduates, technicians and professionals, we can 
make them stay. You see, not every one has a 
ready offer or a better place to go. There is a 
good chance that he may stay because of the 
welfare that he has from us. Let me give you 
another example. Two senior workers, a husband 
and wife couple, recently left us. The husband 
was fifty four. A township enterprise offered 
them a three-bed-room apartment, a bank-deposit 
of Y50,000, and a chauffeured car. They wouldn't 
have left us had we been able to provide a 
comparable package. Enterprises like ours are 
facing this dilemma: we cannot afford welfare, 
but we cannot afford not to have it. (Mr. Dong)
The fourth important reason why the plant could not 
give up welfare was that the government was not prepared to 
take over from the plant what it might want to give up. Mr.
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Dong explained the plant's misgivings:
Welfare can be useful in integrating and 
motivating your staff. In turn this can bring 
about better 'xiaoyi' . However, this shouldn't 
have been entirely our responsibility. The 
government should take over what should be its 
responsibility. If it cannot entirely take over, 
it should at least take over a major part of such 
responsibility. But this has not been the case. 
Instead the enterprise is entirely responsible. 
Education, for example, should not have been our 
responsibility. There are now more than two 
thousand kids in our primary school, kindergarten 
and nursery. Less than half of them are local 
kids. Many kids from outside the neighbourhood 
have come to us because they couldn't get into 
government schools. It should have been the 
government's responsibility to provide enough 
school places. It is very unreasonable that we 
are doing the government's job instead.
Whether or not the plant should give up its school was 
an issue of great contention. The plant was eager to get 
rid of the school. The government, however, was reluctant 
to take over. Mr. Wen, the school's principal, explained 
why the responsibility of education should be returned to 
the government:
The school building looks new, but it is in fact 
very old and dilapidated. Because the 'xiaoyi' of 
the plant has not been good, we have not been 
given the money to do something about it. In 
1992, we finanlly managed to paint the building. 
It cost us Y3 00,000. This at least gave the 
building a new look. Parents had been turned off 
by the shabby conditions of the building. So even 
though things were tight, the plant decided to 
put some money into face-lifting the building. 
The overall development of the school is, 
however, lagging behind. You see, in the past, 
education was not expensive. Running a school 
like this one cost you only one hundred to two 
hundred thousand yuan. The cost has now gone up 
to over a million yuan. This is a big burden to
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the plant. And because the 'xiaoyi' of the plant 
is not good, it simply cannot put more money into 
the school to meet its many needs. There are so 
many things that we want to do to improve the 
school and we have got many good ideas. We cannot 
but shelve these plans and ideas. You see, since 
reform, the plant is supposed to be on its own. 
The government no longer comes to our help. The 
plant, on the other hand, is busy with its own 
problems. State enterprises like us feel very 
strongly that we should return to society what 
belongs to society. Why should we be responsible 
for compulsory education? Compulsory education 
should be the responsibility of the government.
Teachers were for the government taking over the 
school for a more practical reason. Should they become 
government-school teachers, they would benefit from a more 
favorable retirement pension package. Mr. Wen explained:
In terms of wage, there is not really that much 
difference. Senior teachers in government primary 
schools are paid around Y800. Some may be paid 
more. Our senior teachers in the primary school 
are paid around Y700. There is, however, a big 
difference in their pensions. Government school 
teachers can have around 700 to 800 yuan a month 
for their pensions. Our retired teachers have 
much less, just around 300 to 4 00 yuan. Why? 
Because our pensions are largely calculated on 
the basis of basic wage. A major part of the Y700 
earned by our senior teachers is made up of bonus 
and various types of subsidies. Their basic wage 
is just around Y200. There is therefore a big 
difference between their pensions and the 
pensions of government school teachers. My staff 
do worry a lot about retirement. However, it is 
not likely that in the recent future they will 
get a big increase in their wage. For, you see, 
education is not the plant's priority area. The 
plant's priority area is production.
There was general agreement that the plant should give 
up the school and return it to the government. This would 
be to the advantage of all parties: it would reduce the
plant's welfare burden, give the school more resources for 
development and improve its teachers' retirement benefits. 
However, the government was not ready to take over. Mr. 
Wang, principal of the plant's vocational school, 
explained:
It takes time. You see, there are more than 
thirty enterprise-run schools in Guangzhou. This 
is not a small number. The government cannot take 
over all of them all at once. Enterprises would 
of course want to pass their schools to the 
government. The government, however, has to think 
twice. The problem is that these schools do vary 
in standard. For good schools, there is no big 
problem. For schools which are not that good, the 
government may have to do many things about them 
and put in a lot of resources. Moreover, once it 
takes over these schools, it has to pay their 
teachers too. This will be a rather heavy burden 
for the government.
In 1994, the government held talks with the Guangzhou 
Ship-Builder (Guangzhou Zaochuan Chang) to return its 
school to the government through a pilot scheme. The ship­
builder found the terms proposed by the government 
'difficult to accept'. The talks broke down. Plans for 
returning enterprise-run schools to the public school 
system were also shelved.
Acting on the Dilemma
The plant could neither give up its welfare 
responsibilities nor financially afford them were it to 
continue with its obligations. This section describes how 
the plant found a way out of its difficult situation and
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how in the end this ushered in a new welfare economy at the 
danwei.
The plant's primary strategy was to go quasi-market on 
welfare: to 'sell' to danwei members or external users or 
both parts of what used to be free or almost free benefits 
and services at prices calculated to either cover cost or 
make profit. The strategy, in other words, was to partially 
commodify danwei welfare: to be doing business and
providing welfare at the same time. The strategy allowed 
the danwei to 'walk on two legs' : to perform its welfare 
obligations on one hand and to engage in profit-making 
activities on the other hand.
Commodified benefits and services were differentiated 
from non-commodif ied benefits and services in two main 
ways: one, by way of price differentiation, i.e. there were 
'price differences' between commodified and non-commodified 
benefits and services, and two, by way of product 
differentiation, i.e. commodified and non-commodified 
benefits and services were different kinds of products. 
There was always a 'price difference' between commodified 
and non-commodified benefits and services. Users, in other 
words, paid more for commodified than for non-commodif ied 
benefits and services. Commodified housing was, for 
example, more expensive than rented housing. However, 
commodified benefits and services were not necessarily 
product-differentiated from non-commodif ied benefits and
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services. In other words, users could just be paying more 
for the same product. At the kindergarten, for example, 
pupils from outside the plant were paying a higher tuition 
fee than local pupils.
In addition to the quasi-market, the plant had also, 
in some areas, used the strategy of 'user-contribution', 
which made users contribute to, hence share the cost of the 
welfare provided to them. In the area of health-care, for 
example, patients had to be responsible for 2 0 per cent of 
their medical bills according to the hospital's cost- 
sharing formula.
Resulting from the changes introduced was a much more 
differentiated danwei welfare economy, one in which not 
just welfare but also commodities were distributed; not 
just the bureaucracy but also the market performed the 
distribution; users did not just receive benefits and 
services free but could also contribute to or pay for them; 
and they had an extended and more diversified range of 
products from which to make their choices. In the making 
was a danwei mixed economy of welfare.
There was, however, not just one model of quasi- 
market. The plant's various services had tried out 
different approaches to and applications of the quasi­
market concept, and had varying extent of success. The case 
studies to follow take a closer look at and assess the
- 238 -
application of the strategy in three areas: the hospital, 
the canteens, and the school.
The Hospital
The strategy here was to market the service of the 
hospital to outside users.
DFMW provided Labour Insurance (laobao yiliao) to its 
employees through its in-house hospital and through 
reimbursing their referral visits to other hospitals in the 
city. It was a costly service because, in addition to 
reimbursing these visits, it was also maintaining a 
hospital staffed by more than 70 doctors, para-medical 
professionals and nurses. This was a medium-scale hospital 
among hospitals attached to work-units.
Could it not, to cut cost, give up the hospital, which 
was, after all, inefficient and very much under-utilized? 
Dr. Shan, deputy-director of the hospital, argued the case 
for a clinic of a much smaller scale:
Myself being a medical professional, I will not 
be so extreme as to say that the hospital is 
totally useless. But if the enterprise could, in 
stead of having the hospital, keep just a small 
clinic, it would solve many problems. Ring the 
ambulance if there are really serious cases. The 
money saved from radicaly downscaling the 
facility can be put to better uses. For example, 
it can be used to give every one a pay rise, or 
top up subsidies and allowances. Many township 
and joint-venture enterprises do it this way. 
Whether or not an old enterprise such as this one
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should continue to have a hospital very much 
depends on the attitude of management and the 
policy of the government. Nothing is impossible. 
You see, the primary function of the enterprise 
is production. It should concentrate on 
production. The hospital is a problem from the 
past. In the past, a large-scale enterprise was 
run just like a small society. It had its 
nurseries, hospitals, schools and canteens and so 
on. Whether or not this should continue is now 
very questionable.
But, according to Dr. Mao, director of the hospital, 
it could cost the enterprise even more were it to give up 
the hospital. She explained why:
The enterprise cannot be without its hospital. 
That you don't have one does not mean you won't 
have to pay for the health care of your 
employees. You'll still have to pay. The per 
capita cost of health care in the city last year 
was Yl,270. Our per capita cost was just one- 
third as much, Y360. In other words, had all our 
patients been referred to outside hospitals, our 
medical bill would have been three times as 
expensive. We have saved a lot of money for the 
plant.
Though over-staffed and under-utilized, the hospital 
had nevertheless rendered a service that was much cheaper 
than what was provided by other hospitals in the city. The 
plant could end up paying more for the health care of its 
employees if it did not have its in-house facility. Dr. Mao 
explained how the hospital kept its cost down:
Public hospitals are run like a business. The 
more patients they have, the more profits they 
can make, and the fatter is the pay for their 
staff. We are in a different situation. All that 
we can do is to try to economize and spend our 
money carefully. Old drugs, for instance, though
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much cheaper than new drugs, are not always less 
effective. You could be spending many times more 
on new drugs than on old drugs for the same 
results. Treating leukaemia, for instance, costs 
around 700 to 800 yuan. Public hospitals can't do 
it even for 70 to 80 thousand yuan. You do not 
have to spend more to cure. You can even spend 
less to achieve the same result. Because what we 
have is a very lean budget, we need to be careful 
and reasonable with how we spend our money.
The hospital did not just spend less on drugs. 
Compared to public hospitals, it also paid its doctors 
less, the differences varying from around Y400 for junior 
to Y700 for senior doctors. Dr. Mao, for example, earned 
around Y700, Y500 less than her public hospital
counterparts.
But even if the plant was to give up the hospital, it 
was unlikely any public hospital would want to take it 
over. Dr. Shan explained:
Would any big hospital want to have us? No. For, 
you see, our equipment is poor and the quality of 
our staff not that good. If no hospital is 
willing to give us a home, and if we are 
transferred out, we will have to stand on our own 
two feet, which means we will need to make a lot 
of adjustment. Beggers used to their way of life 
are reluctant to change. They don't jump at job 
offers.
The plant was therefore left with few options. 
Perforce it had to keep the hospital because, without one, 
it would have to pay even more for laobao yiliao. But even 
if it would want to give up the hospital, the government 
was not likely to be welcoming. Its staff might also be
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against the change.
In September 1994, it was decided that the hospital 
should try to also market its service to outside users. The 
approach, as Dr. Mao explained, was to 'save a fish by 
putting it back into the water7 , or, in other words, to 
allow the hospital to engage in profit-making business 
activities:
With our limited budget there is not much that we 
can do to either improve the service of the 
hospital or give our staff better pay. Plant 
management has now given us the green light to 
move over to new premises at Hostel 27. The new 
premises face the street and are much more 
accessible. Once we are there we can go in two 
directions. One, we'll carry on with our usual 
service. Two, we can also extend our service to 
the outside community. We will face competition 
from other hospitals, of course. But I think we 
can find our ninche if we can keep our fees low 
and reasonable. Enterprises which cannot afford 
heavy 'laobao7 cost may come to us.
The hospital would share 20 per cent of its 'profit7, 
if any, with the plant and divide the rest among its staff 
members as 'labour service fees7 (laowu fei). While Dr. Mao 
was confident that this new development would breathe life 
into the hospital, her deputy was skeptical. Dr. Shan 
explained:
This is a marvellous idea, but I don't think it 
is going to work. It is all right so long as the 
hospital remains an in-house operation. Once it 
opens up, it will be competing with hospitals at 
various levels of the city. These hospitals all 
have well defined positions in the city's health­
care market. It will be be easy for us to get in.
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We will be competing with them for patients and 
they won't be happy about it. For, you see, this 
is a matter of economic interest. The Health 
Department has already made it very clear it does 
not welcome our move. It will set up many 
hurdles, require us to go through many procedures 
and make us pay heavily to obtain its approval.
There were all together 216 hospitals, 9 santorium and 
1, 668 out-patient clinics in the city (Guangzhou Shi Tongji 
Ju 1995:429). Were the hospital to get into the health 
market, it would be competing with a large number of 
competitors. The hospital did eventually get the required 
approval and in October 1995 its out-patient department was 
in operation at the new premises. Dr. Mao up-dated its 
development during the researcher's return visit to the 
plant in December 1995:
Business is not as good as expected. I would say 
only one-tenth of our patients are now from 
outside the danwei. Patients who are on 'laobao' 
won't come to us. They'd rather see doctors at 
big hospitals. We are, after all, not that well 
equipped. Patients who are not on 'laobao' but 
who are well-off, like geti hu (private 
entrepreneurs), also don't come to us. They can 
afford to go to big hospitals. We have managed to 
attract only a few local peasants and migrant 
workers. Do we charge them a different set of 
fees? No. We charge the same kind of fees. We 
just make them pay more by giving them more 
check-ups and prescribing more drugs. But even 
our staff are not enthusiastic. You see, they do 
not find that many incentives.
The initial attempt of the hospital to go quasi-market 
appeared then to founder, for three reasons. First, its 
service was not competitive in a 'market' already dominated
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by major public hospitals. Secondly, it had failed to 
attract 'customers' on laobao yiliao. Because their medical 
expenses were covered by laobao yiliao, these 'customers' 
could afford the expensive service provided by major public 
hospitals. Thirdly, it did not have the suport of its 
staff.
The strategy of 'user contribution' had also 
foundered. Beginning 1 August 1994, users were required to 
contribute to, in the case of employees, 20 per cent and in 
the case of retirees, 10 per cent, of their medical bills. 
The strategy foundered because of a 'protection point'
(baohu xian) provision which limited the respective 
contributions by employees and retirees to Y500 and Y350 
but at the same time committed the plant to all above-limit 
expenses. The 'protection point' provision had the 
unintended consequence of encouraging patients to spend 
beyond the 'point', their doctors to over-prescribe, and, 
as a result, the plant to over-spend its health-care 
budget. The plant soon recognized the overwhelming 
financial implications of the provision and decided that it 
be removed as from January 1995.
Towards the end of 1995, plans were also under way to 
'contract out' laobao yiliao responsibility to the plant's 
subsidiary companies. The plan was to give to each 
subsidiary company a laobao yiliao grant, on head-count 
basis of Y500 for each employee, and make it responsible
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for the laobao yiliao expenses of its employees. This would 
mean that each subsidiary company would have to find its 
own method of meeting the health-care expenses of its 
members. This would very likely lead to a proliferation of 
all kinds of cost-sharing formulae and arrangements between 
subsidiary companies and their employees. It would also 
mean that, because subsidiary companies did greatly vary in 
terms of 'xiaoyi' and financial resources, those with 
unhealthy balance sheets would have difficulties providing 
the same degree of protection to their employees as the 
rest.
As subsidiary companies took over the financial side 
of laobao yiliao responsibilities, the hospital would be 
left with the specific responsibility of providing only 
direct service. According to these plans, the hospital 
would also be made party to a 'contract responsibility'
(chengbao) arrangement with the plant. It would be given a 
much leaner budget than what it used to receive and be 
expected to generate revenue from its own activities to 
finance any shortfalls. It would very much be standing on 
its own feet.
The Canteens
The canteens were run on a somewhat different quasi- 
market model. While the hospital aimed its quasi-market at 
outside users, the canteens aimed its at internal users.
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The canteens were managed by the Labour Services 
Company (laodong fuwu gongsi) , a subsidiary company 
incorporated in January 1994. The company was previously 
the plant's general service unit (Xingzheng chu) . Xingzheng 
chu provided a wide range of 'domestic' (houqin) services 
to the plant community, including, besides canteens, 
nursery, kindergarten, pest control, sanitation, and 
delivery of bottled gas. It had over four hundred 
employees. Houqin units and services were regular features 
of state-owned enterprises. In 1995, houqin units in the 
country's state-owned enterprises employed as many as 20 
million workers. Their total assets were worth Y1,000 
million (Xiao 1996:111).
Houqin services had always been provided free or 
heavily subsidized to danwei members. But, as Mr. Qian, 
general manager of laodong fuwu gongsi, explained, this had 
to change:
We could no longer provide these as welfare. 
Houqin, you see, was a big thing. It covered many 
areas and employed several hundred workers. We 
were talking about feeding seven to eight 
thousand people, placing over a thousand kids in 
kindergarten and nurseries, public sanitation, 
pest control and so on. It was a big financial 
burden for the plant. Also, you see, when it was 
the plant which paid for everything, we just 
didn't feel the need to improve and work hard. 
Welfare had made us all very lazy.
In 1991, the plant decided to- give up 'pure welfare'
(chun fuli) and instead operate houqin as a ' low-profit-
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making' (weili) 'business' (jingying) . Mr. Qian explained 
the changes involved:
It was weili because it was not operated entirely 
as a profit-making business. It was still very 
much welfare. But instead of providing all these 
services free or largely free, we were allowed to 
try to make some profit out of them and pay our 
own wage and bonus out of what we earned. At 
first, we were not sure if this was right. Could 
there be no welfare in a socialist enterprise? 
And if a socialist enterprise was to continue 
with welfare, could it be compatible with the 
socialist market economy? We had wondered about 
questions such as these.
What had obtained between the plant and xingzheng chu 
was a 'contract responsibility' (chengbao) arrangement. The 
responsibility of providing houqin services was 'contracted 
out' to xingzheng chu. Xingzheng chu could try to make 
profits out of its responsibility and keep whatever it 
earned. As a condition, however, it had to be responsible 
for the wage and bonus of its workers. Xingzheng chu 
applied the same chengbao arrangement to its sub-units: it 
further 'contracted out' its houqin responsibilities to 
units at the next lower level of administration. The 
canteens were one of these sub-units.
Mr. Qian described how the canteens were operated as 
a sub-contracted low-profit-making business:
We have four canteens. In the past, they were 
very heavily subsidized. Prices were more or less 
fixed and kept very low. At one time, you could 
have a hot meal with rice, vegetable and meat for 
just 8 cents! It was an impossible business. What
- 247 -
we have done is this: we keep the canteens but 
turn part of each canteen into a more well 
decorated restaurant. The canteens continue to 
serve food at very low prices. The restaurants, 
however, provide better food and service, and 
charge accordingly. You see, we must make sure 
that, in the process of change, the welfare side 
of canteens is not affected. There should still 
be cheap food. At the canteens, for example, 
workers can have a meal for just 2 yuan. But if 
they can afford it, they can choose to spend more 
at the restaurants. There they can have a table 
and invite friends to a more decent lunch or 
dinner for one to two hundred yuan. The canteens 
more or less break even. The restaurants are 
making profits. The return is between 20 to 30 
percent.
The canteens had created a quasi-market by 
differentiating both its products and prices. The strategy 
enabled the canteens to combine welfare with business. The 
strategy was apparently successful, according to Mr. Qian:
We did worry at first. What would happen if we 
suffered losses? The livelihood of several 
hundred workers was at stake and we must not let 
things go wrong. We all felt a sense of urgency
and crisis. All worked doubly hard. Every body
worked more than eight hours and stayed until 10 
p.m. No one complained about working over-time.
And we did it. We were able to not only break
even but also make profits. The pay of our 
workers has risen by 40 to 50 per cent in three 
years time.
The chengbao contracts agreed between xingzheng chu 
and its sub-units provided neither 'profit ceilings' (shang 
bu fengding) nor 'subsidies for losses' (xia bu budi) . Sub­
units could keep whatever profits they made. But losses 
were also entirely theirs and xingzheng chu would not bail 
them out even if they suffered very bad losses. In other
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words, they had to stand on their own two feet and be 
responsible for all consequences. Removed was the security 
of the 'iron rice bowl' and workers could not but work hard 
to secure their livelihood.
The canteens had passed the 'first test of the 
market'. However, Mr. Liang recognized that there were 
limits to what were essentially in-house operations:
There is not much room for development if we just 
stay where we are. There are, you see, plenty of 
opportunities beyond the danwei walls. We must 
reach out, find our position in the market, and 
be prepared to compete with other operations. We 
can, for example, sell boxed fast-food to workers 
in other units. Our competitors will do a better 
job than us if we don't prepare ourselves for the 
market beyond the danwei.
The quasi-market of the canteens was originally for 
danwei members. Over time it had evolved into one catering 
also to external users. By December 1995, two production- 
lines for boxed food were in operation and the canteens 
were, as Mr. Qian envisioned, beginning to sell beyond the 
danwei walls.
The canteens had successfully combined business with 
welfare. By going quasi-market, the canteens had ceased its 
losses and begun making profit. Their employees were 
earning more than before. The quality of food improved and 
users had more choices. And, by taking over from the plant 
what used to be its welfare responsibility, they had also
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relieved the plant of a part of its welfare burden.
The kindergarten, although also on chengbao contract 
with the xingzheng chu, had pursued a somewhat different 
quasi-market strategy.
The kindergarten had more than 70 teachers and minor 
staff. What it had tried to do with an annual allocation of 
only Y60, 000 from xingzheng chu was to open its doors to 
'outside' students and charge them a much higher tuition 
fee. In 1994, of its more than 700 students nearly half 
were 'external' students paying tuition fees from Y92 to 
Y12 0 a month, treble that of Y36 paid by 'local' students. 
What the kindergarten had created was a quasi-market 
involving external users and using 'price differentiation' 
to distinguish between marketed service and welfare.
The School
The school was, by the city's standard, a big one: 
with 1,200 students in 14 primary and 12 junior secondary 
classes.
Unlike the kindergarten, the school was not on 
contract responsibility, or chengbao, arrangement with the 
danwei. It was, as Mr. Wen the principal put it, the 'last 
place in the danwei still not required to stand on its own 
own feet'. In 1994, it had a budget of Y1.2 million to
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cover, among other expenses, the wage and bonus for its 98 
teaching and supporting staff.
Importantly also, unlike for the kindergarten, tuition 
fees were not a source of its income. Mr. Wen explained:
You see, because there is nine-year compulsory 
education in this country, students from the 
first year of the primary school to the third 
year of the secondary school do not have to pay 
tuition fees. This has important financial 
implications. Primary schools do not receive any 
revenue from tuition fees for six years and 
secondary schools for three years. Because ours 
is both a primary and a junior secondary school, 
this means we are not getting any revenue from 
tuition fees for nine years. Yes, we do have 
external students. Half of our secondary places 
are for external students. This is required by 
the government as a condition for allowing our 
students to progress to other public schools in 
the city after they have completed junior 
secondary school. Half of our secondary students 
are now from outside the danwei. But, just as 
local students, they do not have to pay tuition 
fees.
Hence the school could not use the same strategy as 
used by the kindergarten to generate income, i.e., charging 
external students higher tuition fees. What it had tried to 
do instead was to make use of its facilities and 
professional manpower and to market educational facilities 
and services to users both inside and outside the school. 
The strategy, as Mr. Wen described it, was one 'using the 
school to support the school' (yi xue yang xue). A variety 
of ways were used.
For example, it had rented its language laboratory on
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Sundays to schools without the facility for these schools 
to run English language enhancement classes for their 
students, charging Y60 to Y80 per student for each six- 
month course. The proceeds from the 'business' went into 
the school's staff welfare fund.
It had also organized evening tutorial classes for 
students on a voluntary and fee-charging basis, each tutee 
paying Y5 to Y8 a month for 2 0 tutorial sessions. The 
revenue went to the teachers.
More formally and with the permission of the 
government, the school had started a one-year pre-primary 
head-start programme for children who just completed 
kindergarten classes. There were 46 students in the head- 
start programme. Each student was paying a tuition fee of 
Y3 0 a month.
But what had been most successful in terms of 
generating revenue and using the revenue generated to 
enhance the quality of education was its entrepreneurial 
experience in promoting computer education. Mr. Wen 
described what had happened:
Not that many schools in the city are equipped 
with computer facilities. However, we believe we 
must give our kids a computer education and 
prepare them for the twenty-first century. The 
plant couldn't give us any help. So we had to 
find our own ways to raise funds. We knocked down 
one of the walls, the wall facing the street, and 
invited people to bid for the right to rent the
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seven hawking stalls built on the space cleared 
from knocking down the wall. We made ¥30,000. We 
topped this up to ¥50,000, using savings from 
another line of business activity, bought 10 PCs, 
set up a computer laboratory, and began running 
computer courses for our students. Each student 
paid Y10 a month to enrol in the course. We 
reinvested the revenue and bought more PCs. There 
are now all together 30 PCs. We intend to 
increase the number to 50 and upgrade the 
machines from 386 to 486. I think we have been 
right to work on computer education. Parents very 
much appreciate our initiatives and there is 
tremendous support for what we have done. All 
these would not have been possible if we were 
passive, just sitting and waiting for the danwei 
to give us what we wanted.
What the school had created was a quasi-market 
'selling' a range of educational services to both external 
and internal users. In going quasi-market the school had 
achieved what would have been impossible were it to depend 
entirely on the enterprise: improving its equipment and
facilities and providing a 'better' education for its 
students. Mr. Wen was proud of the school's achievement:
Our overall rating both among schools in the 
district and in the city as a whole has improved. 
Of the 140 students graduating from the junior 
secondary school this year, 3 have reached the 
city's best level and 7 have been admitted into 
the city's top schools. These are very good news, 
and for our teachers this is very much the kind 
of incentives that they badly need, besides 
material incentives.
Conclusion
This chapter examined how one- state-owned enterprise 
re-organized its danwei welfare economy in its attempts to
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reduce welfare burden without giving up welfare
responsibilities.
Welfare had become for the enterprise a heavy-
financial burden. It was seriously affecting its xiaoyi, 
diminishing its profit, draining capital funds and
upsetting production. The burden was, moreover, becoming 
heavier and heavier as more and more workers retired and as 
it became increasingly costly to provide housing and health 
care to the danwei's members.
Though weighed down by the burden, the enterprise was 
hesistant about cutting welfare, for four main reasons. 
First, the plant reckoned it had a moral obligation to its 
old workers. Secondly, it was concerned that cutting 
welfare could cause hardship among affected workers and 
precipitate unrest and disorder. Thirdly, welfare had
become an important means for inducing incentives and 
commitment. Cutting welfare could make it even more 
difficult for the enterprise to stabilize its workforce and 
compete with non-state-sector enterprises for skilled 
manpower. Fourthly, the government was not ready to take 
over from the enterprise what it would want to give up, for 
example, its school.
To be or not to be? The answer was neither to give up 
welfare nor not to do anything about it. The enterprise' 
strategy was to 'go quasi-market': to partially commodify
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welfare or, in other words, to combine welfare with 
business. The strategy allowed the enterprise to 'walk on 
two legs7: to perform its welfare responsibilities at the 
same time as it tried to generate income from marketing its 
services.
The chapter examined the application of the strategy 
in three case studies and found considerable variations. 
For example, while the strategy of the hospital was to 
'market7 its service to 'outsiders7, that of the canteens 
was to 'sell7 'differentiated products7 to 'local7 buyers. 
The school provided a range of 'differentiated products7 to 
not only 'local7 but also 'outside7 users. It became
involved in not only an 'internal7, but also an 'external7 
market.
Users, in all cases, paid more for marketized
services. But 'outsiders7 did not always pay more than 
'local7 users for the same service. For example, 'external7 
students paid just as much as 'local7 students for the 
school's computer classes.
Outcomes also varied. By bringing out 'differentiated 
products7, the school and the canteens had extended the 
range of 'consumer choice7 and improved the quality of 
their services. The hospital, unlike the school and the 
canteens, had not 'produced7 any new 'product7 or service.
Its strategy was instead to extend its 'old7 service to
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'outsiders'. 'Local' users of its service had not benefited 
from a widened range of choice and an improved service.
Performance, in terms of generating income, also 
varied. The canteens were, compared to the hospital and the 
school, most 'successful'. 'Going quasi-market' enabled the 
canteens to generate enough income to stand on their own 
feet and substantially increase the income of their 
employees. The school was financially dependent on the 
enterprise. However, by 'going quasi-market', it had, 
without turning to the enterprise for help, built its 
computer laboratory and increased the income of its staff. 
The hospital was the least 'successful' of the three. 
'Going quasi-market' had not made any significant impact on 
either the income of its staff or the quality of its 
service.
There was not, therefore, a unified approach. Nor was 
there a formula or recipie for success.
But what seemed common in the experience of the 
canteens and the school was that they both began with 
'internal markets': the canteens selling food to customers 
at the 'upper end' of the internal market and the school 
enrolling students in computer classes. In the case of the 
canteens, it was only after they had 'passed the test' of 
the internal market that they began eyeing the 
'opportunities beyond the danwei walls'. The hospital never
- 256 -
went through the test of the internal market. It got at 
once into the 'external market' and lost out in its
competition with other hospitals in the city. The 
experience earned from the internal market appeared to have 
prepared the canteens for the much keener competition and 
greater risk in the external market. 'First the internal 
market, then the external market'(Baogang 1995:129) seemed 
a safe strategy for 'going quasi-market'.
In 'going quasi-market', the three services had also 
become unequally dependent on the enterprise. The canteens 
had become, of the three, least dependent. They were 
becoming self-supporting. The school was still very much 
dependent on the danwei. But, by being able to generate
some income, it had also in its modest way reduced its
dependence. The hospital remained highly dependent and a 
heavy financial burden to the enterprise.
In becoming less dependent, the canteens and the
school had helped the enterprise reduce its welfare burden 
without giving up its welfare responsibilities.
But what the canteens, and to some extent the school, 
had gained was not only less dependence but also, 
importantly, more independence, the independence from a 
centrally planned budget and the managerial control of the 
danwei bureaucracy. This independence gave them a freer 
hand to do their jobs. It encouraged initiatives and
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innovation. But at the same time as they exploited this 
newly gained independence, to good effect, the canteens 
were also exposed to risks of a new kind, business risks 
which they otherwise would not have were they entirely 
dependent on the enterprise.
The danwei economy of welfare emerging from these 
changes was more diversified and pluralistic than what it 
used to be. In the making was a danwei welfare economy in 
which not just welfare but also commodities were 
distributed; not only the bureaucracy but also the market 
performed the distribution; distribution was based not just 
on needs but also on prices and the ability to pay; users 
could also be consumers; there were both internal and 
external markets; there were at once more products and 
services for distribution, giving users a wider range of 
choice; and there was not one singular and unified but 
different approaches to providing welfare. It was a mixed 
danwei economy of welfare.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Redistributing Risks and Responsibilities
Introduction
A key component of Chinese occupational welfare was a 
comprehensive 'Labour Insurance' (laodong baoxian) scheme 
which required, by law,1 state enterprises to provide old- 
age pensions and a wide range of benefits covering 
maternity and birth, illness, accidents and death to 
employees and their dependents (Table 1.1, Chapter 1).
The scheme was non-contributory and insurance funds 
were borne in full by the employers. Enterprises 
participating in the scheme each made a contribution to a 
Labour Insurance Fund partly managed by the enterprises and 
partly managed by the trade unions, which would 'transfer 
about 30 percent of the contributions to a higher level of 
trade union organization so that a certain degree of 
redistribution could be effected between enterprises of 
varying financial commitments' (Chow 1988:40).
This arrangement was disrupted during the Cultural 
Revolution and formally ended in 1969, when the Ministry of
1 The 'Labour Insurance Regulations of the People's 
Republic of China' promulgated in 1951. See Chapter 3 on 
its origins.
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Finance issued an order which in effect stopped the Labour 
Insurance funds, ended the involvement of trade unions in 
the administration of the scheme and made enterprises 
responsible for administering and financing Labour 
Insurance.2
In other words, from then on the risk as well as the 
responsibility of providing Labour Insurance fell on the 
enterprises. Before reform, this was not a problem for the 
enterprises because it was the state which was ultimately 
responsible and because enterprises were not required to 
produce for profit. The occupational welfare of Labour 
Insurance was financed by the government.
Everything changed since economic reforms: state
enterprises had to produce for profit, be responsible for 
their own profits and losses, and they could no longer look 
to the state to bail them out of their difficulties. Labour 
Insurance entered into cost-efficiency considerations.
Since economic reforms, the problem rested with the 
fact that the scheme was both statutory and non­
contributory. Because it was statutory, there was little 
that the enterprise could do to absolve itself of this 
responsibility. And because it was non-contributory, the 
enterprise had to bear this responsibility all by itself. 
Enterprises had been made to bear the entire risk and the
2 See Chapter 3 on the origins of labour insurance.
- 260 -
responsibility of providing Labour Insurance.
In the new context of market transition, it had become 
increasingly clear that this was not a viable state of 
affairs. State enterprises held responsible for Labour 
Insurance could not compete as equals with nonstate 
counterparts which had few welfare responsibilies. In this 
chapter, we look at how the state took on and tackled the 
problem: how it tried to bring about a more viable scheme 
by re-distributing the risks and the responsibilities 
involved between the state, the enterprises, and the 
individual workers. The result of what had been attempted 
so far was a system of labour insurance combining both 
statutory and nonstatutory arrangements, giving the state, 
the enterprise, and the individuals each a share of the 
risks and the responsibilities involved. Emerging from the 
change was a 'mixed' system of Labour Insurance.
Problems with the Inherited System
There were three main problems with the system of 
Labour Insurance inherited from the pre-reform days. These 
were, first, its narrow coverage, or exclusivity; secondly, 
that it was not portable; and thirdly, that it had made the 
enterprise bear all financial responsibility. In other 
words, risk and responsibility were highly 'localized' in 
separate enterprises. Let me take each in turn.
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1. Exclusivity: The services available to state
employees were largely denied rural workers and other 
occupational groups in the cities (Table 7.1). Such near­
exclusive rights and benefits gave state workers a distinct 
'status'3 and divided them from other 'status groups' in 
the society.
Such a status division was meant to be strategic: its 
purpose was to induce discipline and co-operation from an 
elite sector of the labour force which was expected to make 
strategic contributions to the goal of socialist 
industrialization.4 However, what had been strategic and 
functional in the early years of the Republic had become 
anachronisitc and dysfunctional in the new context of a 
socialist economy in a process of market transition.
From the point of view of equity such a status 
division is undesirable and difficult to justify, 'given 
that it is now accepted that the Chinese economy will 
retain diverse forms of ownership (state, collective, 
foreign and private), and that both state and collective 
ownership would undergo important changes' (Hussain
3 T.H. Marshall defined 'status' in a manner 
applicable here as 'a position to which is attached a 
bundle of rights and duties, privileges and obligations, 
legal capacities and incapacities, which are publicly 
recognized and which can be defined and enforced by public 
authority' (quoted in Poggi 1978:43).
4 See Chapter 3, above, on the nature of China's 
socialist industrialization strategy and its commitment to 
labour welfare.
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1993:37). It was also difficult to justify given the 
declining importance and productivity of the state-sector. 
In 1994, for instance, state-owned enterprises, employing 
two-thirds of the country's urban labour force, were 
producing just one-third of the country's total industrial 
output (Table 1.4, Chapter 1). By limiting its coverage to 
state-sector employees, the scheme 'leaves out a 
significant section of the labour force which could be 
included' (Hussain 1993:15) : employees of town and village 
enterprises, private firms and joint ventures. This meant 
that, in 1991, it had left out around 96 million employees 
at town and village enterprises and 3 million employees 
with joint venture, foreign capital and private enterprises 
in the cities (State Statistical Bureau 1995:84-85).
It was not fair from the point of view of equity to 
exclude these workers from benefits enjoyed by their state- 
sector counterparts just because they were not state 
employees. Such inequity flew in the face of citizenship 
rights enshrined in the Constitution.5 Article 45 of the 
Constitution, for example, clearly states that 'citizens of 
the People's Republic of China have the right to material 
assistance from the state and society when they are old and 
disabled' and that 'the state develops social insurance, 
social relief and medical and health services that are
5 Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's 
Congree and Promulgated for Implementation by the 
Proclamation of the National People's Congress on December
4, 1982. Foreign Language Press, Beijing, 1987.
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required for citizens to enjoy the right'. Article 44 
stipulates that 'the state applies the system of retirement 
for workers and staff of enterprises and institutions and 
for functionaries of organs of state according to law' and 
that 'the livelihood of retired personnel is ensured by the 
state and society'. Article 42 promises citizens 'the right 
as well as the duty to work' and pledges the state's 
commitment to creating conditions for employment and 
increasing 'remuneration for work and welfare benefits'. 
Clearly, according to the Constitution, nonstate employees, 
as citizens, are as much entitled to the various rights and 
benefits provided by Labour Insurance as their state-sector 
counterparts.
The status division had also become increasingly 
dysfunctional because 'it hinders the mobility of labour 
across enterprises' (Hussain 1993:37). It made nonstate 
jobs less desirable and discouraged state workers from 
leaving their jobs. It slowed the flow of labour from state 
to non-state enterprises and distorted, therefore, the 
allocation of labour in what could have been a competitive 
labour market. Hence the 'best' persons might not have gone 
to the 'best' jobs. State enterprises 'kept' people who 
otherwise might have left and non-state enterprises did not 
get people who otherwise might have been recruited.
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Table 7.1 Labour Insurance and Benefits for Workers in Nonstate Sectors
item
1. Health insurance 
Employees
Dependents
2. Pension as % of 
salary
3. Injury, 
disability, and 
death benefits
Injury
Disability
Death
Collectives 
by Municipal 
Bureau
Collectives 
by Urban 
District or 
Rural County
Same as state Same as state
up to 50% 
coverage
60-90%
same as state 
same as state 
limited 
amount for 
funeral
up to 50% 
coverage
60-90%
same as state 
same as state 
limited 
amount for 
funeral
Collectives
by
Subdistrict
Government
up to 75% 
coverage 
limited 
amount
60% fixed
one-time
limited
payment
limited
amount for
funeral
Collectives 
by Township 
Government
50-70%
coverage
limited
amount
vary, up to 
60%
one-time
limited
payment
limited
amount for
funeral
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Village 
Cooperative, 
and Private 
Sectors
none
none
none
ask help from
government
none
4. Benefits for 
women workers 
3-month 
maternity 
leave 
Longer 
maternity 
leave 
Infant 
nursery 
allowance 
Day-care 
allowance
same as state same as state same as state 50% of salary
same as state none
limited
amount
limited
amount
none
none
none
none
none
none
none
none
Holiday, sick 
leave, and 
leave of absence 
benefits 
Holiday 
Sick leave 
Leave of 
absence
same as state same as state same as state same as state
same as state same as state 50% pay limited pay
same as state same as state no pay no pay
6. Other benefits limited limited none none
Source: Bian (1994: 184-5)
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none
none
none
none
none
none
none
none
2. Non-portability: What had also impeded labour
mobility was that Labour Insurance was not portable: 
workers changing their jobs could not carry their insurance 
benefits with them to their new jobs. Quitting state sector 
jobs meant therefore forfeiting the security and protection 
of labour insurance. It also meant that in the increasingly 
likely event of a worker losing his job, he and his 
dependents also lost the security and protection of Labour 
Insurance.
The non-portability of Labour Insurance had to do with 
four inter-related features of the scheme: first, the
absence of a specialized labour insurance administration 
(e.g. a governmental or professional agency); secondly, the 
absence of some kind of pooling arrangements across 
enterprises; thirdly, the financing of Labour Insurance 
resting entirely with individual enterprises; and fourthly, 
the integration of labour insurance administration with 
enterprise management. In other words, because both the 
financing and the day-to-day administration of Labour 
Insurance rested with the enterprises, and because beyond 
individual enterprises there was no other administrative or 
financial arrangement for Labour Insurance, the scheme had 
become very much a 'localized' (within individual 
enterprises) scheme. In brief, the scheme had become 
characterized by 'extreme fragmentation' (Wong et al. 
1995:13).
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This 'extreme fragmentation7 was not a problem before 
reform because there was more or less permanent employment 
in the same workplace for most workers and because there 
were few job transfers. It did not matter if each 
enterprise had its own administration of Labour Insurance 
and if there was no record of job changes and no across- 
enterprise administrative arrangements. But this degree of 
fragmentation was incompatible with an increasingly 
marketized economy with contractual employment, mobility of 
labour and increasing instances of unemployment arising 
from bankruptcies, mergers, and enterprises reducing their 
surplus labour force. There clearly was the need for a less 
fragmented and more portable arrangement, one which could 
continue to give protection to workers when they either 
changed or lost their jobs.
Fragmentation was also undesirable from the point of 
view of equity. It meant that there could be great inter­
unit variations in provision and coverage, hence not giving 
the same standard and quality of security and protection to 
workers in different enterprises. A less fragmented and 
more unified system would be less inequitable.
3. Localized financial responsibility: The financial 
responsibility for Labour Insurance was entirely borne by 
the enterprise. This was not a problem before reform 
because firstly, it was the government which carried the 
ultimate responsibility for maintaining Labour Insurance
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and because, secondly, enterprises were not required to 
produce for profit and be responsible for their profits and 
losses. Cost was also not a big problem then because there 
were relatively few retired employees and because the cost 
of health care insurance was relatively low.
This state of affairs was no longer viable when 
enterprises faced market competition and had to be 
responsible for their own profits and losses. Labour 
Insurance became a financial burden. Expenditures on Labour 
Insurance benefits raised production costs and reduced 
enterprise profits. They made state enterprises less 
competitive and aggravated the financial difficulties of 
many loss-making enterprises.
The size of this financial burden was reflected in the 
rapid growth of expenditures of state-owned enterprises on 
'Labour Insurance and Welfare Funds', which increased from 
14.3 percent of their total wage bill in 1978 to 31.5 
percent in 1994. The total number of retired workers in 
state-owned enterprises increased nearly ten times from 
2.84 million in 1978 to 22.49 million in 1994. Expenditures 
on retirement benefits increased by more than 60 times 
during the same period. The cost of medical care increased 
by almost six times between 1984 and 1994 and was expected 
to rise at an annual rate of 30 percent (Table 1 and 2, 
Chapter 1).
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The aim of enterprise reforms was to invigorate state 
enterprises and turn them into profit- and market-oriented 
actors. But unless they were shorn of their welfare 
responsibilities or had these reduced, state enterprises 
could never compete on equal grounds with enterprises which 
had less or none of these responsibilities. Labour 
Insurance had become such a financial burden for state 
enterprises that change was inevitable. An important aim of 
this change had to be a reduction in their financial 
responsibilities.
In short, the system of Labour Insurance inherited 
from the pre-reform days was unsuitable for a socialist 
economy in market transition. The system had to change in 
three vital respects. First, it needed to extend its 
coverage to include new urban occupational groups 
employees of private, joint ventures and foreign capital 
enterprises - as well as employees of fast growing town and 
village enterprises in the precincts of cities.
Secondly, the system had to be made more portable. 
This would necessitate the separation of labour insurance 
administration from enterprise management, the setting up 
of some specialized labour insurance administration, and 
the development of some kind of financial arrangement for 
labour insurance across enterprises.
Thirdly, the system needed to find ways of reducing
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the financial responsibility of the enterprises. This could 
be done by implementing one or more of the following 
changes: a new formula for employees' contribution, the
introduction of a more equitable risk-sharing arrangement 
between enterprises, persuading the government to share 
part of the financial responsibility, and providing a new 
scheme of supplementary non-statutory benefits and 
protection. It is difficult to say in retrospect which 
combination of these policy options would have worked out 
in the 1980's. All of these were under consideration.
Reforms, along these lines, would not be easy, for 
five main reasons. First, wages were still very low.6 This 
made it difficult to make workers contribute to Labour 
Insurance. Contributions which were of only a very low 
level would be insignificant both in terms of providing for 
their old age and security and in terms of reducing the 
financial burden of the enterprise. Contributions set at a 
level high enough to have significance could be difficult 
for workers to afford.
Secondly, the 'old' system had been in existence for 
over three decades and workers were used to their benefits 
and entitlements. 'Anything less favourable or even slight 
changes would immediately arouse their resistance as the
6 In 1985, for example, the average annual wage of 
employees in state-owned units was only Y1213, or just 
slightly more than Y100 a month (State Statistical Bureau 
1995:113).
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benefits provided are directly affecting their present and 
future standard of living' (Chow 1988:71-2).
Thirdly, the entire scheme was immensely complex, 
covering many kinds of benefits, benefits ranging from 
health insurance to injury, disability and death benefits, 
to pension, to holiday, sick leave and leave of absence 
benefits. It was inevitable that as these reforms were 
implemented they would develop in different directions and 
at different speeds with regard to different groups of 
workers. Such a complex pattern of change was certain to 
result in a major problem of 're-integrating' a diversity 
of schemes in the future.
Fourthly, it would be difficult to bring enterprises 
of very diverse profiles and backgrounds together within 
some common administrative and financial framework. Serious 
conflicts of interest between them would become 
unavoidable. For example, a pooling arrangement for pension 
funds helped share risk among enterprises. However, in the 
short run, such an arrangement would be likely to benefit 
enterprises with many old workers and retirees and 
disadvantage those with many young workers and few old 
workers and retirees. It would not be in the interest of 
the enterprises with few old workers to participate in a 
scheme which produced benefits in only the long run.
Fifthly, given the significant regional variations in
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levels of economic development as, for example, between 
coastal and in-land cities,7 it would be unrealistic to 
have a single and unified nation-wide system. As Chow 
(1983) observes, 'as incomes in most parts of China are 
still very low, it implies that contributory insurance 
schemes can only be applied in the more affluent regions' 
(p.73). This problem of inter-regional and inter-city 
diversity continues to pose a major problem with regard to 
the future reintegration of the Chinese social security 
system.
Reforming Labour Insurance
By mid-1980s, it was widely acknowledged among 
professionals and government officials that there were 
serious flaws with the 'old' system of Labour Insurance.8 
Various reform proposals,9 including ones from the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Labour and Personnel,
7 The gross output value of industry in 1994, for 
example, was, for Eastern Cities, Y5168.96 billion, for 
Central Cities, Y1544.53 billion, and, for Western Cities, 
Y734.83 billion (State Statistical Bureau 1995: 298-99).
8 On this see a good discussion in (Chow 1988:59-74).
9 Among these was a proposal from the World Bank. The 
World Bank sent an economic mission to China in 1984 and 
completed a report in 1985 on the key developmental issues 
that China might face in the next two decades. The report, 
entitled China: Long-Term Development Issues and Options, 
included a discussion on the Chinese social security 
system. For an outline on relevant issues in this report, 
see (Chow 1988:70-72).
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were also drafting new blue-prints for future reforms.10 
Four salient concepts or principles underpinned the 
proposals drafted by the two Ministries. The first of these 
was the idea that the sources of funding should be 
diversified and that they should come from the state, the 
enterprises, and individuals. The second was the idea that 
there should not be just one fund for many purposes but 
different funds for different purposes. For example, there 
could be a fund specifically for old age insurance and 
another fund for health care insurance. There could be, in 
other words, a functionally differentiated labour insurance 
system. The third idea was that enterprises could pool 
together their resources to share and reduce risks. The 
fourth principle embodied in these proposals was that users 
should contribute to or pay fees for benefits or services 
received. It was, for example, suggested that part of the 
medical expenses which were currently provided freely to 
employees in state-enterprises should henceforth be 
recovered by charging fees.
Reforms were heralded by the introduction of a 
contributory old age pension scheme for workers on 
'contract employment" and the establishment of a special 
fund to provide protection to unemployed workers.
In 1986, the government promulgated four regulations
10 Chow (1988:66-70) outlines main points presented in 
these proposals.
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to further reforms in contract employment (Guowuyuan [State 
Council] 1986). Two of these regulations announced the 
setting up of a dual programme consisting of a contributory 
pension fund for workers on 'employment contracts' and an 
unemployment insurance fund for state-sector employees who 
had been laid off for one reason or another (See Chapter 
4) .
The 'Temporary Regulations on the Implementation of 
Labour Contracts in State-owned Enterprises' required 
enterprises to contribute a sum equivalent to 15 percent of 
the standard wages of the contract workers towards an old 
age pension fund managed by a social insurance organ set up 
under the supervision of the appropriate labour bureau. 
Workers were also required to contribute a sum not 
exceeding 3 percent of their standard wage.
The 'Temporary Regulations on Unemployment Insurance 
for Workers in State-owned Enterprises', on the other hand, 
required enterprises to set up an insurance fund by 
contributing to it a sum equivalent to 1 percent of the 
standard wages of all workers employed. The fund would be 
managed by designated banks and given subsidies by local 
government if it fell short of the amount required to meet 
its obligations. The regulation specified the level of 
benefits which unemployed workers were to receive from the 
insurance fund up to a maximum of two years. During the 
first twelve months of their unemoployment, they were to
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receive 60 to 75 percent of their standard wages. 
Thereafter for the next twelve months they were to receive 
50 percent of their standard wages. The insurance fund also 
provided assistance for their dependents while they were 
awaiting employment and covered against future medical and 
burial expenses.
These reforms, while still modest, were important 
breakthroughs and 'will go down in history as a milestone 
in the development of the social security system in China' 
(Chow 1988:80). They embodied some of the most important 
concepts and principles which were to guide subsequent 
reforms, namely, the concept of pooling, the idea of 
workers making contributions to their old age pensions, the 
principle of an independent insurance administration which 
was separate from enterprise management, and the provision 
of functionally demarcated insurance funds designed to 
cover different contingencies and different groups of 
employees.
Reforming Old-age Pensions
The State Council's decision in 1991 to introduce on 
a nationwide scale a new system of old age pensions for 
state-sector employees was the next milestone in Labour 
Insurance reforms (Guowuyuan [State Council] 1991). The 
'Decisions' (as they were described in Chinese 
nomenclature) required all state-owned enterprises to set
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up contributory pension funds for their employees. In 
addition to this 'basic pension fund' (jiben yanglao 
baoxian jijin), it also required enterprises to provide, 
from their own funds, 'enterprise supplementary pensions'
(qiye buchong yanglao baoxian) for their employees when 
they reached a specified level of productivity. In 
addition, it encouraged employees, on a voluntary basis, to 
put aside savings for 'individual pensions plans' (geren 
chuxuxing yanglao baoxian) .
There were a number of noteworthy features in this 
three-tiered insurance system which consisted of three 
levels of income provision -- basic, supplementary, and 
individual.
First, it combined both statutory and non-statutory 
components. While the basic and the supplementary plans 
were statutory, the individual plans were non-statutory and 
optional. In this respect, this added a pluralist dimension 
to the scheme.
Secondly, it required all three parties - the state, 
the enterprise and the employees - to contribute to basic 
pensions. The contributions of the enterprise and the 
employees were respectively 24.5 percent of the total wage 
bill of an enterprise and up to 3 percent of a worker's 
standard wage. The state contributed indirectly by allowing 
the enterprise to include its own contribution as a cost
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item. As a cost item it was not taxed. In other words, the 
state made its contribution by not taxing what could have 
been part of an enterprise's pre-tax profit.
Thirdly, basic pension costs were pooled (tongyi 
chouji, or shehui tongchou) . The costs of 'enterprise 
supplementary pensions' were borne entirely by the 
enterprises. In the case of 'individual pension plans', all 
of the cost fell on individual employees. The 'three-tiered 
system' combined, therefore, both a risk-sharing and a non- 
risk-sharing component.
Fourthly, the 'three-tiered system' provided both 
'basic' and 'supplementary' forms of protection. 'Basic' 
protection was provided at a more or less uniform level. 
'Supplementary' protection depended on the enterprise and 
the individuals concerned. With regard to enterprises, the 
system took into account their performances, and in the 
case of individuals, their income levels. Thus we can see 
that it was a complex and diverse system which was designed 
both to guarantee basic levels of subsistence provision and 
to make allowance for performance-related criteria of 
provision. It was these criteria that added to the system's 
diversity and complexity.
Fifthly, the pension plans were portable. All 
participating workers had a 'worker old age insurance 
handbook' (jigong yanglao baoxian shouce) listing their
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basic pension entitlements. The handbook included both the 
employer's and the worker's record of contributions. When 
they changed jobs, workers could take their 'handbooks' to 
their new employers. The social insurance agency then 
completed the necessary paperwork and recorded for 
transfer. All workers who were members of the 'enterprise 
supplementary pensions' also had their individual 
'handbooks' (jigong buchongyanglao baoxian chubeijin 
shouce) . Once again, when workers left their jobs, they 
took their 'handbooks' with them to their new employers. In 
summary, both the 'basic' and 'supplementary' pension 
schemes were part of a personalized pension account system 
designed to encourage portability.
Sixthly, pension funds were deposited in designated 
banks, administered by a social insurance agency and 
supervised by a government pension committee. The 
administration and supervision of labour insurance had 
become, in other words, dissociated from enterprise 
management and made the responsibility of specialized 
professional and administrative bodies.
What was emerging from these reforms was a system of 
old age insurance that combined both contributory and non­
contributory, statutory and non-statutory, compulsory and 
optional, basic and supplementary, and pooling and non­
pooling features. It was also a system that provided 
portability and made sure there was separation of insurance
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administration from enterprise management.
In 1993, 'basic pension funds' were covering 83 
million state-sector employees and 17.7 million retirees 
or, in terms of percentage, 71.8 percent and 81.2 percent 
respectively, of all state-sector employees and retirees 
(Liu 1995:32). In Guangzhou, in 1994, 'basic pensions' 
covered 376,000 state-sector and 134,000 collective-sector 
workers (Guangzhou Shi Tigaiwei [Guangzhou City Economic 
Restructuring Commission] 1994:29).
In 1995 the State Council formally announced the 
extension of the system (with some modifications) to cover 
non-state as well as state sector employees (Guowuyuan 
[State Council] 1995). The 'basic' part of the system was 
now officially designated as one 'combining the pooling of 
costs for basic old age insurance with personalized 
accounts for the individual workers' (qiye jigong jiben 
yanglao baoxian shehui tongchou yu geren zhanghu xiang 
jiehe). Instead of a 'handbook', all workers would have a 
'personalized basic old age insurance fund account' (jiben 
yanglao baoxian geren zhanghu) which they would keep for 
the rest of their life. Members would be identified by 
either a newly established social security number or by 
their resident identity card numbers. The account would 
keep a record of their employers' contributions as well as 
their own contributions. Each individual contribution began 
with no more than 3 percent of the member's average wage in
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the previous year which was scheduled to increase by one 
percentage point every two years thereafter. On retirement, 
members would be paid a monthly pension equal to the 
accumulated amounts in their accounts, divided by 120. 
Depending on whether there were 'enterprise supplementary 
pensions' and on whether they had saved for an 'individual 
pensions plan', the amount could be topped up by additional 
pension contributions and benefits.
Reforming Health Insurance
Reforms in old age insurance had pointed the way 
forward for reforms in health insurance, which did not 
really begin until 1994. Under Labour Insurance, health 
insurance covered a comprehensive range of benefits, 
including primary health care and hospital treatment, 
surgery, maternity benefits and drugs. There was, in 
effect, almost a free medical service. Other benefits 
included pay during sickness and maternity leave. Medical 
benefits could also be extended to cover the immediate 
dependents of employees.
As in the case of old age insurance before 1995, 
health care costs were not pooled and each enterprise was 
responsible for the cost of its employees and retirees. 
With the rise in health insurance cost in the 1980s 
(Hussain 1993:26), this had become a serious problem. 
Enterprises had responded by shifting part of the cost to
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users. There were various ways of cost-sharing. One common 
formula for cost-sharing was that each year the enterprise 
paid the full cost up to a fixed amount, and thereafter the 
user paid the full cost or a percentage of the amount. 
Another common formula was for the user to pay up to a 
fixed amount; the enterprise then paid whatever exceeded 
the fixed amount.11 To keep medical cost under control, 
some enterprises also entered into contracts with hospitals 
for the medical care of their employees (Hussain 1993:27). 
Employees were only re-imbursed for visits to hospitals 
designated under the contracts.
Cost-sharing was at best, however, a stop-gap measure. 
Enterprises varied greatly in their financial resources and 
there were also wide variations in the formula for cost 
sharing. These differences produced inequities in levels of 
provisions and coverage, sometimes resulting in under­
provision and inadequate coverage. There were no incentives 
to control cost because the scheme did not impose limits on 
what the medical-care providers could charge for individual 
services. Consequently, costs continued to escalate. These 
problems pointed to the need for further reforms in the new 
scheme of things, such as requirements to pool cost, to 
create a centralised system of health insurance management, 
to standardize payments for particular services, and to 
specify which services and needs could be covered.
11 For an example of this formula of cost-sharing, 
please refer to the case of the danwei hospital discussed 
in Chapter 6.
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With these objectives in mind, a new set of health 
insurance reforms were introduced in 1994 (Guojia Jinji
Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui [State Economic Restructuring 
Commission] 1995:156-169). This took the form of two pilot 
programmes jointly initiated by four government 
departments: the State Economic Restructuring Commission, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Labour and 
Personnel, and the Ministry of Health. These pilot 
programmes were started in the cities of Zhen Jiang in the 
province of Jiang Su and Jiu Jiang in the province of Jiang 
Xi. They were designed to establish 'a social insurance 
system combining the pooling of medical funds with a 
personalized medical care account' (jianli shehui tong zhou 
yiliao jijin yu geren yiliao zhanghu xian jiehe ti shehui 
baoxian zhidu) . The concept, simply, was to have two types 
of funds: one, a pooled 'basic' fund and two, funds for 
individual medical care accounts. As in the 'basic 
pensions' model, all three parties - the state, the 
enterprise, and the employees - made contributions to both 
funds. The enterprise contributed an amount equal to 10 
percent of the sum of its total annual wage bill and its 
total expenditure on retirement benefits. One part of this 
fund was put into the pool; the other part was put into the 
individual medical insurance accounts of employees and 
retired employees. Each employee made a contribution equal 
to 1 percent of his annual wage income. As in the case of 
'basic pensions funds', the state contributed only 
indirectly, by not taxing the enterprise's contributions.
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As in the case of 'basic pensions' , there was for each 
insured worker a portable 'personalized account'. The 
account kept records of their shares in the enterprise's 
contributions and their own contributons. They could use 
their acounts to pay expenses incurred as a result of 
visits to designated hospitals. If in any given year their 
expenditures exceeded what they had in their accounts by 
more than 5 percent of their annual wage, they would need 
to make a contribution towards meeting the excess costs. 
The more a member 'overspent' , the more he had to pay the 
overspent amount from his own pocket.
Both the pooled and the non-pooled parts of the funds 
were deposited in a designated bank, managed by a 
specialized insurance agency and supervised by a special 
government body. In order to control costs, coverage and 
payment terms were laid down and standardized.
In neither Zhen Jiang nor Jiu Jiang did the pilot 
programmes provide universal coverage, i.e. coverage of all 
kinds of workers in all kinds of enterprises. The Zhen 
Jiang programme excluded employees of private enterprises 
and village and town enterprises. Except for these, all 
others, including workers on contract employment and 
temporary workers, were covered. The Jiu Jiang programme 
excluded employees of private enterprises, village and town 
enterprises and individual entrepreneurs but did not rule 
out the possibility of including them in the future.
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But what was particularly noteworthy was that both 
programmes covered not just workers who used to be covered 
by Labour Insurance but also employees in government 
departments who used to be covered by another health care 
insurance scheme, the 'government-funded health care 
insurance' programme (gongfei yiliao). In other words, 
these initiatives cut through sectoral-administrative 
boundaries, unified two different schemes and brought them 
both under a common administrative and fianncial framework.
The pilot programmes were hailed as a success. Their 
achievements were described as having 'set up new fund­
raising mechanisms; raised the standards of security and 
protection in health care; curbed rising costs; induced 
changes within hospitals; and gained much experience useful 
for deepening reforms of the health care insurance system'
(Guojia Tigai Wei [State Economic Restructuring Commission] 
et al. 1996). In 1996, the State Council decided that the 
pilot programmes be tried out in more cities. Though still 
on an experimental basis, it was already clear that the 
government sees these as a model with great potential for 
the future.
Reforms in other areas of Labour Insurance have not 
moved as fast and covered as much ground as have the 
reforms in health, old-age and unemployment insurance. In 
1994, a non-contributory maternity insurance scheme 
covering maternity leave and hospitalization expenses was
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introduced on a trial basis (Liu 1995). Funds for maternity 
insurance were pooled; each enterprise contributed up to 1 
percent of its total wage to the pool. In 1993, a non­
contributory accident insurance scheme was also launched. 
It appeared at the time of writing, however, that this 
scheme had not been implemented on a nation-wide basis. As 
late as May 1995 an official spokesman for the Ministry of 
Labour wrote a significant article in a collection of 
essays published by the State Economic Restructuring 
Commission. In the article (Zheng 1995) the official 
outlined a plan for the future reforms of accident 
insurance. He proposed the setting up of a non-contributory 
insurance programme with each participating enterprise
contributing not more than 1 percent of its total wage to 
a pool of funds.
Such uneven development notwithstanding, there has
been, on the whole, very significant progress. As a result 
of the reforms, particularly with regard to the three core 
programmes - old-age, health and unemployment insurance - 
Labour Insurance has moved away from what it was before the 
economic reforms, when it was an entirely non-contributory 
and enterprise-based system of benefits. From a unified and 
undifferentiated package of benefits it has been
transformed into a system of functionally differentiated 
insurance programmes each with its own set of policy, 
rules, administration, and financial arrangement. From 
being a programme exclusively concerned with state-sector
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employees it has been extended to include many employees 
who were previously excluded from Labour Insurance. This 
extension of membership has been greater in some programmes 
than in others. Furthermore, the enterprise-based system of 
social insurance has been dissociated from enterprise 
management and its control and supervision has been taken 
over by specialized professional and administrative bodies. 
It has become at one and the same time both much less 
localized and much more portable.
' Four themes in these changes are particularly 
noteworthy. The first has been the re-distribution of risks 
and responsibilities. All three parties - the state, the 
enterprise, and the individual employees - now carry a 
share of the risks and the responsibilities involved. The 
second change is the trend towards 'universalization'-- the 
extension of benefits and rights to other occupational 
groups who were previously excluded. The third trend is 
the process of increasing functional differentiation. 
Schemes that were once combined together in one unified 
framework have become independent and separate, with each 
one assuming its own distinct set of purposes and 
functions. The fourth trend of significance has been the 
growth of professionalization. Services hitherto 
undifferentiated from enterprise management have now been 
taken over by specialized professional and governmental 
agencies.
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The new system of labour insurance is not without its 
problems, however. The biggest problem has to do with the 
fact that individual contributions are very modest. For old 
age pensions, they account for no more than 3 percent of a 
worker's standard wage; for health insurance, for only 1 
percent of his annual wage; and, for other insurance 
programmes, workers make no contribution at all. The modest 
levels of workers' contributions have to be compared with 
the very substantial contributions of the enterprise. In 
the case of the three core programmes alone - old age, 
health and unemployment insurance - the enterprise's 
contributions amounted to 35.5 percent of their total wage 
bill. The relative contributions of the enterprise and the 
individual members can therefore be seen to be very 
unequal.
From the point of view of individual welfare this was 
not desirable because it does not do much to help the 
individual to appreciate the value and importance of his 
own role and responsibility.
This division of responsibility is equally undesirable 
in its effect on the efficiency of the enterprises. They 
are still carrying a very heavy responsibility for the 
welfare and security of their employees. It has become 
quite common for enterprises and particularly loss-making 
enterprises to default on their contributions -- despite 
the introduction of penalty for overdue payment. In
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Guangzhou in 1994, for example, the overdue payment to the 
city's pension pool amounted to Y50 million. Pool revenues 
and expenditures are supposed to balance on an annual 
basis. Overdue payments upset this balance and further 
increase the risk of insolvency.
Clearly, the balance of responsibilities between the 
enterprises and the individuals will have to be further 
adjusted and fine-tuned in order to give the individuals 
more and the enterprises less responsibilities.
Conclusion
The pre-reform system of Labour Insurance was 
unsuitable for a socialist economy in market transition. It 
was too exclusive. It was non-portable. Most importantly, 
it was also making the enterprise carry all the risk and 
responsibility. These arrangements were not appropriate for 
an economy which was becoming increasingly characterized by 
contractual employment arrangements, higher rates of labour 
mobility, more market competition, and more production for 
profit.
In this chapter, we have examined what has been done 
since 1986 to reform Labour Insurance. Reforms began in 
1986 with the introduction of old-age pensions for workers 
on contractual employment and an unemployment insurance 
programme for state employees. These were followed in 1991,
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and subsequently in 1995, by the introduction of a system 
of old-age insurance combining both statutory and non- 
statutory features and combining both the concept of 
pooling and the concept of a personalized account. Reforms 
in health insurance began in 1994 with two pilot programmes 
which were also based upon these concepts. Though still on 
a trial basis, these new initiatives and pilot schemes are 
pointing the way for further reforms.
The reform process has been incremental in character. 
The separate reforms of the various programmes making up 
Labour Insurance have not all moved in the same direction 
all at the same pace. Some general themes, however, can be 
identified. First, there has been some re-distribution of 
risks and responsibilities between the state, the 
enterprise and the individual; secondly, what had hitherto 
been the exclusive rights and benefits of state-sector 
employees have been increasingly universalized; thirdly, 
the old system of Labour Insurance has become more 
functionally differentiated; and fourthly, the management 
and administration of the various insurance programmes has 
become notably more professionalized.
Emerging from the reforms is a 'mixed7 system of 
social security, one combining both contributory and non­
contributory, statutory and non-statutory, compulsory and 
optional, basic and supplementary; and pooling and non­
pooling features.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusion: Towards a Chinese Model of Welfare Pluralism
Introduction
China has since the fifties developed a system of 
occupational welfare which provides 'from cradle to grave' 
benefits and services to urban state-sector employees. 
This study sets out to explain the origins of such a system 
and to describe the processes of radical change which are 
transforming it into a more pluralistic system. Using the 
empirical evidence and field data collected in a large- 
scale state-owned enterprise in Guangzhou, it attempts to 
explain how and why these changes took place and to 
reappraise the relevance of a number of key Western 
concepts and theories to Chinese models of welfare.
In seeking to explain the origins of Chinese 
occupational welfare, we have taken the 'new institutional' 
position which regards state socialism as a distinct social 
formation with its own institutional logic and dynamics of 
development. It follows from this position that Chinese 
occupational welfare should best be studied in its national 
and historical contexts and as part of an institutional 
configuration characteristic of state socialism.
In this perspective, we have found it useful to
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explain the origins of Chinese occupational welfare in 
terms of the unique state formation experiences of the 
Chinese socialist state. Specifically, these were the 
experience of guerrila warfare, the experience of 
rehabilitating a war-devastated urban economy, and the 
experience of socialist industrialization.
We then used the concept of 'dependence' to help 
anchor and organize our analysis of Chinese occupational 
welfare. We argued that Chinese occupational welfare is a 
rare and extreme case of 'near-complete dependence', a 
situation in which the employer assumes a comprehensive 
range of responsibilities for meeting the needs of the 
employees and the employees have few alternatives for 
satisfying these needs. This situation is in marked 
contrast with the more common situation of 'limited 
dependence' in which the employer assumes only a limited 
range of responsibilities and the employees have access to 
other alternative sources for satisfying their needs.
We posited that, in the Chinese case, 'near-complete 
dependence' on occupational welfare explains a range of 
significant outcomes: the Gemeinschaftlich character of the 
danwei community, the control of the danwei over many 
aspects of the life of its members, the paternalism and 
egalitarianism in danwei life, inefficiency and waste, and 
the consent and acceptance of communist rule, or, in other 
words, the legitimating function of occupational welfare.
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We hypothesized that, in the course of market 
transition, Chinese occupational welfare has undergone very 
significant changes: it has moved away from 'near-complete 
dependence' towards a model of 'limited dependence' that 
combines in a unique way strategic uses of the mixed 
economy. This results in a mixed economy of welfare with 
distinct institutional and cultural characteristics.
These concepts and hypothesis have been sustained by 
the study. Empirical evidence and field data have 
furthermore (1) borne out the relevance and validity of 
several other key concepts and (2) added specificity and 
details to the hypothesis proposed, as follows:
First, besides the concepts of 'near-complete 
dependence' and 'limited dependence', empirical evidence 
and field data have also drawn our attention to 
'entitlements and obligations', 'equity and inequity', 
'alternatives and choices', 'efficiency and inefficiency', 
'distribution of risks and responsibilities', and 
'legitimacy and growth' as significant and useful 
perspectives and themes for describing the nature of 
Chinese occupational welfare and for understanding this 
system of occupational welfare undergoing a process of 
change. The meanings and' implications of these concepts 
will be discussed under 'The Nature of Chinese Occupational 
Welfare' later on in this chapter.
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Secondly, while confirming the hypothesis that in 
market transition Chinese occupational welfare is moving 
away from 'near-complete dependence' towards a distinctive 
pattern of 'limited dependence', empirical data has also 
shown that this change has come about through three 
separate yet inter-related processes at the individual, the 
work unit, and the government level: the process reshaping 
dependence, the process reshaping the danwei welfare 
economy, and the process reforming Labour Insurance. These 
processes of change have jointly transformed Chinese 
occupational welfare and put a mixed economy of welfare in 
its place. Emerging from the change is a model of welfare 
pluralism with unique cultural and institutional 
characteristics.
The Origins of Chinese Occupational Welfare
As we studied the origins of Chinese occupational 
welfare we were impressed by three striking features. 
First, the danwei was more than a workplace. It assumed 
many functions and was in fact an all-important channel for 
making available a wide range of goods and services to its 
members. Secondly, the system was highly exclusive. It 
mainly covered urban workers in employment in the state- 
sector, excluding rural workers and other non-state sector 
workers in the cities. Thirdly, the Chinese socialist state 
was involved in a wide range of functions and 
responsibilities. These included determining wages,
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allocating people to jobs and distribution of goods and 
services.
We argued in the thesis that these distinct features 
had arisen from the unique historical experience of the 
Chinese socialist state. More specifically, we showed that 
the institutional and policy features characteristic of 
Chinese occupational welfare had evolved from three sets of 
state-formation experiences of the Chinese socialist state: 
the experience of guerrila warfare, the experience of 
rehabilitating the post-war economy, and the experience of 
socialist industrialization.
1. Guerrila warfare: The communist ascendency to
power in 1949 was preceded by nearly a decade of guerrila 
warfare fought in the border region of Shansi-Kansu- 
Ninghsia against the armies of Japanese and Guomindang 
governments. For most of the time the border region was 
besieged and blockaded. There was severe shortage of 
supplies and great economic hardship. To overcome its 
difficulties the guerrila government had developed a number 
of key policies and measures. The most important of these 
included the involvement of troops and public-sector 
organizations in self-supporting production activities, the 
practice of a supply system (gongji zhi) among 
'institutional households', the adoption of the 'mass line' 
which required the party and the government to care for the 
people and consider their problems and needs, and, towards
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the later phase of war, militarizing and mobilizing 
peasants for war and production.
These wartime experiences had important bearing on the 
development of subsequent policies and institutions. The 
'institutional households' of armies, government organs and 
schools were the organizational prototype of the danwei, 
the socialist work unit which performed many functions for 
its members. The supply system foreshadowed the system of 
rationing and bureaucratized distribution of goods' in the 
cities since the 1950s. The spirit of egalitarianism and 
the welfare value implied in the 'mass line' had become a 
persistent part of the ideology of the socialist state.
2. Rehabilitation of the Post-war Economy: After they
gained control of the cities, the communists proceeded to 
tackle two difficult economic problems: curbing a chronic 
hyperinflation and providing jobs to several millions of 
unemployed urban residents.
A number of drastic measures were introduced to bring 
the inflation under control. These included taking over all 
the banking system to gain control of credit, paying public 
employees in subsistence goods with a small money 
supplement and setting up nationwide trading associations 
in each major commodity to gain control of goods. As a 
result of these and related counter-inflationary measures, 
the state had, in a very significant way, gained control
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over the economy. This then paved the way for even more 
drastic measures introduced in less than ten years time to 
nationalize the economy.
The government used a combination of radical measures 
to reduce unemployment. These included the policies of re­
engaging en bloc Guomindang officials, requiring private 
enterprises to apply for permission to either hire or 
discharge workers, job introduction through government 
labour bureaus, and centralized allocation of jobs.
As a result of these measures, the state had come to 
assume an all-important role and responsibility in urban 
employment. Urban residents looked to and depended on the 
state, instead of the market, for jobs and, once allocated, 
jobs were more or less for life.
3. Socialist industrialization: The overriding
concern of the Chinese Communist Party in the early years 
of the Republic was to achieve industrialization--to 
develop industrial production and realise economic growth.
We argued in the thesis that in pursuance of this goal 
the Chinese Communist Party had followed a distinct 
socialist industrialization stategy characterized by the 
importance attached to the strategic role of the urban- 
industrial labour force, by its emphasis on heavy industry, 
its neglect of services and consumption, and by the
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enforcement of a system of strict rural-urban migration 
controls.
In the thesis, we showed that these policy features 
explained the privileged status of urban workers in 
employment in the state sector, the introduction of a 
system of rationing and distribution through the 
workplaces, and the provision by the workplaces of a wide 
range of facilities and services.
In short, we have shown in the thesis that Chinese 
occupational welfare originated from important policies and 
institutions shaped in China's state formation experiences.
The Nature of Chinese Occupational Welfare
In the course of this study, we have found seven sets 
of concepts valid and relevant for describing the nature of 
Chinese occupational welfare and the system undergoing a 
process of change. Let me re-capitulate what we have found.
1. Near-complete and limited dependence
In the pre-reform days, Chinese workers were near- 
completlely dependent on occupational welfare. We have 
found this very much the case with workers in Dong fang 
Heavy Machinery Works. In the pre-reform days, they 
depended on the danwei for a wide range of facilities and 
services typical of a 'large and comprehensive' (da erh
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chuan) state-owned enterprise. They had access to its many 
facilities and services, including its hospital, nursery, 
day-care centre, school, and canteens. Many of them lived 
in danwei-provided housing for which they needed only to 
pay very low rentals. They enjoyed retirement, health care, 
and various benefits provided through laobao yiliao (labour 
insurance). They were regularly given various kinds of 
allowances and subsidies (butei) that considerably topped 
up their money wage income. During the sixties and most of 
the seventies, it was also through the danwei that they 
obtained ration coupons for various commodities and basic 
necessities. Because employment was more or less permanent 
during these years, because wages were low, and also 
because there were few alternative sources providing these 
benefits and services, they were very heavily dependent on 
the danwei. It was a situation of near-complete dependence.
When this study was undertaken, very important changes 
had happened to social and economic life in the country and 
to the enterprise. As described in Chapter Four, economic 
reforms and market transition had ushered in a mixed 
economy and induced many changes at various levels of the 
economy. There were now many more alternatives to what used 
to be distributed through the danwei. Workers were earning 
many times more than in the past. There were now also many 
opportunities for moonlighting, or chaogang, in the non­
state sector. Workers could even change jobs or set 
themselves up as 'private entrepreneurs' {gete hu) . 'Exit'
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from the danwei became a real option.
In other words, since reform, workers were moving 
away from the situation of near-complete dependence towards 
one of limited dependence on occupational welfare.
How limited was such dependence? Field data showed 
that this varied both between workers and between different 
types of benefits and services.
Findings described in Chapter Five showed that 
workers' dependence on occupational welfare varied 
importantly between male and female workers, between 
workers of different age-groups, and between workers who 
had and workers who did not have the advantage of a 
supportive family strategy. There were, in other words, 
gender, generational, as well as family differences in 
welfare dependence.
Workers' dependence also varied with different 
benefits and services. They were still very dependent on 
danwei housing, but were less dependent on such other 
collective facilities as the school and the hospital. They 
were still very dependent on Labour Insurance (laobao 
yiliao) but would become less dependent on it when it 
assumed more contributory and non-statutory features. They 
were now much less dependent on rations and 'in-kind 
distributions', but still depended on various allowances
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and subsidies to top-up their wage income.
In other words, moving away from near-complete 
dependence, workers' dependence on occupational workers was 
at once also more varied and differentiated both among 
workers and with regard to different benefits and services.
2. Entitlements and obligations
The situation of 'near-complete dependence' is one in 
which the employer assumes many obligations and the 
employees have many welfare entitlements. In the pre-reform 
days, what was obtained in the danwei was also 
'paternalistic dependence', a situation in which it was 
taken for granted that the danwei had the obligation to 
take care of and provide for nearly every aspect of the 
life of its members and its members had the right to its 
unlimited care and benevolence. As observed in Chapter One, 
'paternalistic dependence' had become very much a danwei 
culture. The culture obliged the danwei and its members to 
their respective 'carer' and 'cared for' roles. While 
workers were expected to be co-operative and obedient, the 
danwei was expected to do whatever it could to take 'good' 
care of its workers. The culture of paternalistic 
dependence stabilized their reciprocal expectations and set 
moral standards for their behaviour.
Field data showed that this pre-existing pattern of 
dependence had been up-set by the process of change. The
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danwei had been suffering from poor xiaoyi (profitability 
and performance) and it was clear that, to help itself out 
of its difficult situation, it had to try to reduce its 
welfare burden. This implied re-defining, if perhaps also 
reducing, welfare obligations and entitlements.
This was not easy. It would be difficult, for example, 
to change obligations and entitlements in ways affecting 
old workers. In part this was because plant management 
still believed it had a moral obligation to its old 
workers, to take care of them in their old age after they 
had given their best years to the enterprise. In part this 
was also because old workers reckoned they had a legitimate 
claim. They 'expect (ed) the plant to look after them in 
their old age because, for many years before retirement, 
they had been paid less than what they deserved' (Mr. 
Dong). And, in their view, 'the plant owes it to them to 
look after them and provide for their security in old age' 
(Mr. Liao).
There were, in other words, commonly shared moral 
values and expectations about the danwei's and the workers' 
respective obligations and entitlements.
Changes side-stepping these shared values and 
expectations had nevertheless been introduced, and, as 
could be expected, evoked strong reactions. Old workers, 
for example, were up-set when the plant decided on a policy
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which advantaged high-fliers in the allocation of danwei 
housing. They were also up-set by a policy which required 
users to contribute to twenty percent of their medical 
bills.
The process was fraught, therefore, with difficulties 
because it up-set paternalistic values and expectations 
about the danwei's welfare obligations and its members' 
welfare entitlements. The pre-existing pattern of welfare 
dependence became an obstacle to change.
3 . Equi ty and inequi ty
Chinese occupational welfare was characterized by a 
paradoxical combination of equitable and inequitable 
features.
Its inequitable features can be seen when the danwei 
is considered in its total social context. Chinese 
occupational welfare was the near-exclusive right of urban 
workers employed in state productive units. The danwei made 
state employees into a distinct 'status group' enjoying 
benefits and services largely denied to rural workers and 
other occupational groups in the cities. In other words, 
Chinese occupational welfare 'stratified' China's working 
population in ways which significantly and differentially 
shaped their welfare and life chances. It engendered 
inequality, and this was not fair because, according to the 
Chinese Constitution, rural workers and non-state employees
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were as much entitled to their citizenship rights as state 
employees. This was also difficult to justify, given the 
declining importance and productivity of the state-sector 
and the rising importance and productivity of the non-state 
sector.
Nevertheless within the relatively privileged world of 
state employees the distribution of occuptional welfare was 
generally equitable. Most benefits and services were 
distributed or made available on an egalitarian basis to 
all members of the same unit and, with regard to statutory 
benefits, across all units.
What had happened since reforms had up-set these pre­
existing patterns, in two important ways. First, as 
described in Chapter Seven, important changes had been 
brought about through reforms of the Labour Insurance 
system to make it a less exclusive scheme and to gradually 
extend its rights and benefits to other occupational groups 
which were previously excluded. For example, beginning from 
1995, 'basic pensions' were to cover non-state as well as 
state-sector employees. The exclusive rights and benefits 
of state-sector employees became increasingly 
universalized.
Secondly, as described in Chapter Six, within the 
danwei, reforms were underway reshaping the danwei welfare 
economy. Emerging from the changes introduced was a mixed
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economy of welfare, one combining welfare and business and 
using both the bureaucracy and the market in the 
distribution of goods and services. Housing, for example, 
was becoming commodified. Increasingly its distribution was 
on a basis reflecting differences in the ability to pay. 
The implication, from the point of view of equity, was very 
clear: workers unable to pay would be disadvantaged. As 
observed in Chapter Five, the inequitable implication of 
commodified housing had been a cause of much frustration 
and anger among ordinary workers.
The transformation of Chinese occupational welfare 
involved, in other words, both the redistribution of 
interests between different social and economic groups in 
the society and the redistribution of interests between 
different groups of workers in the danwei. On the one hand 
this was giving rise to more equitable consequences and on 
the other hand, inequitable consequences. The exact impact 
of these consequences has yet to be observed and studied.
4. Alternatives and choices
There were few alternatives and choices over what to 
have and what not to have when workers were almost 
completely dependent on occupational welfare. They had to 
take whatever was provided through the danwei however poor 
its quality might be. They had no choice. They had no 
choice because there were no options. Before the reforms, 
there was no private trade and service sector which might
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have provided alternative sources for the satisfaction of 
many needs. Even if such a sector had existed, most workers 
would not have been able to afford its services because 
their wages were very low.
Danwei workers had so little choice also because 
Chinese occupational welfare was not organized to meet the 
needs of 'consumers'. It was neither market- nor profit- 
oriented in its approach to service delivery. Consumers7 
preferences and choices were deemed to be irrelevant in the 
danwei scheme of things.
Field data showed that, as workers moved away from 
near-complete dependence, they were also having more 
choices than before. Chapter Five found evidence of workers 
exercising preferences and using occupational welfare more 
selectively and calculatively. No longer just passive 
recipients, they were making choices of, and from, danwei 
benefits and services. With more alternatives and with 
better income, they could afford to choose between making 
greater or lesser use of, or even not using, a danwei 
service altogether. They were also more quality conscious 
and more demanding. For example, they could choose not to 
send their children to the danwei school. They could choose 
to have better food in the canteens. They could choose not 
to see doctors at the danwei hospital. They could even 
choose not to move into danwei flats.
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In other words, as they moved away from near-complete 
dependence, workers were also becoming less recipients and 
more consumers of services, exercising their preferences 
and more ready to articulate their demands.
5. Efficiency and inefficiency
Chinese occupational welfare was meant to be an 
efficient system. The bureaucracy distributed benefits and 
services to their recipients without reference to any kind 
of market criteria. It minimized market transaction costs. 
It was also efficient from the welfare point of view 
because it provided a range of basic services 'cheaply' - 
at cost or even below cost - and equitably, to their
recipients.
This system had turned out, however, to be very 
inefficient. Field data described in Chapter Six showed 
that it was poorly run; there was plenty of waste; the 
quality of its goods and services was poor; and consumers 
were given few choices. The danwei hospital, for example, 
was over-staffed. Its 'doctors and nurses out-numbered
their patiens' and were consulted only for 'minor illnesses 
and cuts and wounds'. It was, as one informant put it, 'a
sub-standard and filthy facility where patients hated to
go' . Patients turned away from the hospital; they 
preferred to see outside doctors. Doctors at the danwei 
hospital were ready to give referrals. As Dr. Mao the 
director of the hospital explained, 'Doctors, you see,
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don't care. After all, it is not their money. It is public 
money, the state's money. And why not, when they can use 
the power to sign referral letters to exchange favors with 
guanxi.' Patients were re-imbursed their visits to outside 
doctors. Because these visits were expensive, heavy use of 
these visits consumed the danwei's health-care budget, 
leaving very little to up-grade the hospital's facilities 
and services. Because facilities and services were poor, 
patients turned to outside doctors. The vicious cycle came 
full circle.
The system was inefficient primarily because 
expenditures were passed directly to the state budget and 
did not represent a cost to enterprise management. Hence 
there were few incentives to control cost. Secondly, it was 
inefficient because there was no competition from either 
within or outside the danwei. It was a closed system and 
there was no pressure on the system to improve. Thirdly, it 
was inefficient also because its staff and workers could 
afford to be inefficient. Just as their colleagues in 
production units, their jobs were 'iron rice bowl' jobs. 
Even if they had performed poorly, it was unlikely that 
they would lose their jobs. The situation of the hospital, 
the school and other units providing welfare services 
mirrored exactly that of the danwei of which they were sub­
units .
Reforms reshaping the danwei welfare economy had
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brought about very important changes. These changes were 
not uniform across all units providing welfare. Some units 
had moved faster and had introduced more radical changes 
than the others. The general direction of the changes were, 
however, very clear. These changes openned up the 
previously closed system, brought the market in, introduced 
competition, increased the managerial autonomy of these 
units, and made them responsible for their own profits and 
losses. The overall effects of these changes, as had
happened to the canteens, were to make these units more 
efficient service-providers. As described by Qian, general 
manager of Labour Service Company, what had happened were 
most remarkable: 'We all felt a sense of urgency and
crisis. All worked doubly hard. Every body worked more than 
eight hours and stayed until 10 p.m. No one complained
about working over-time. And we did it. We were able to not 
only break even but also make profits. The pay of our 
workers has risen by 4 0 to 50 per cent in three years 
time.'
Field data showed that the danwei welfare economy
emerging from the changes that had happened had become on 
the whole more efficient. As a result it had also become 
less a burden and liability to the danwei.
6. Distribution of risks and responsibilities
The Chinese system of occupational welfare made state- 
sector units bear all risks and responsibilities. This was
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both unsound and unfair. It was unsound because it gave 
rise to substantial cost that in the long run could not be 
met. It was unfair because it exempted employees from all 
reasonable risks and responsibilities.
The changes that had occurred through reforms of the 
Labour Insurance system involved an important move in the 
direction of re-distributing these risks and
responsibilities. Instead of the state enterprises bearing 
all risks and responsibilities, individual workers and
their families were to assume increasing shares of risks 
and responsibilities. Old-age pensions, for example, were 
no longer the sole responsibility of employers. Workers 
were required to contribute to 'basic pensions', beginning 
with a modest 3 percent of a worker's wage in the previous 
year but scheduled to increase by one percentge point every 
two years thereafter. They were also encouraged to set 
asise savings for 'individual pensions plans'.
Besides the shifting of parts of the risks and
responsibilities to the workers and their families, there 
was also the significant move to pool risks between
enterprises. The three key insurance programmes, 
'unemployment insurance', 'basic pensions' and 'health 
insurance', all contained important pooling features.
As described in Chapter Seven, these developments 
significantly reduced the risks and responsibilities
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concentrating on individual enterprises and redistributed 
these both across enterprises and between enterprises and 
their workers.
7. Legitimacy and growth
Chinese occupational welfare was an important source 
of regime legitimation. As Walder (1986) points out, 'The 
extraordinary job security and benefits, the goods and 
services distributed by the state enterprise in a situation 
of scarcity that affects other sectors of the workforce 
more severely, is an important source of acceptance of the 
system' (p.249).
More specifically, Chinese occupational welfare 
secured the loyalty and support of urban workers in 
employment in the state-sector. This was very important in 
the early years of the Republic because the socialist state 
was then embarking on a course of socialist 
industrialization which placed strategic emphases on heavy 
industry and on the accumulation of capital through forced 
saving and low wages. As we explained in Chapter 3, the 
success of this industrialization strategy depended to no 
small extent on the co-operation and support of a hard­
working industrial labour force. Chinese occupational 
welfare performed the important function of inducing 
productivity and discipline from this strategic sector of 
the working population. In other words, the legitimating 
function of Chinese occupational welfare was crucial for
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'growth7-- for creating wealth and prosperity and economic 
development.
However, by the late 1970s, it was clear the 
socialist economy had failed its task. After three decades 
of socialism, China remained a very poor country. Its per 
capita GNP was among the lowest of centrally planned 
economies. The economy had almost ground to a standstill. 
Stagnation in agricultural production had posed serious 
problems for urban food supplies. In industry, there were 
serious problems of inefficiency and poor co-ordination. 
Stagnant wage rates and a breakdown in work-place 
disciplines produced extremely low worker morale and high 
absenteeism. As described in Chapter Four, these problems 
pointed to the need for some type of economic reforms.
The response of the reform leaders was to liberalise 
the economy -- to reduce the role and presence of the 
bureaucracy and to bring the market back in. More 
importance was attached to market forces, to competition, 
and to profit and wage incentives in the allocation of 
resources and the distribution of goods. Alternate forms of 
ownership were allowed to co-exist with state ownership. 
State enterprises were to assume a greater degree of 
independence. They were to produce for the market and be 
responsible for their own profits and losses.
The pre-reform system of occupational welfare was
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incompatible with these new developments. It was too 
exclusive; it failed to cover new occupational groups; it 
impeded mobility; it was inefficient and it undermined 
productive efficiency; and, most importantly, it had become 
a heavy financial burden for state enterprises. From a 
political asset -- an important means for obtaining the 
loyalty and support of state industrial workers, it had 
become an economic liability -- an obstacle to growth.
These then called for change -- revamping the old 
system and putting in its place a new system of welfare 
compatible with the growth strategy of a socialist economy 
in market transition.
The Emergence of a Pluralistic System of Chinese 
Occupational Welfare
In short, the pre-reform system of Chinese 
occupational welfare engendered and perpetuated dependence. 
It provided few alternatives and choices. It was 
inefficient and it was inequitable because it gave 
unjustifiable privileges to a particular group of workers. 
The way in which it distributed risks and responsibilities 
was both unsound and unfair. From an asset providing a 
source of legitimation it had turned into a liability, an 
obstacle to growth.
This thesis has explored the process by which the pre­
reform Chinese system of occupational welfare has been
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superceded by a new system in which 'near-complete" 
dependence has given way to a model of 'limited' 
dependence. The new arrangements allow more autonomy and 
more choices to workers. It is more efficient, more 
flexible, more equitable and characterized by a more viable 
division of risks and responsibilities. It also compells 
the bureaucracy to take more account of market forces and 
encourages closer interaction between the public and 
private sectors and the formal and informal aspects of 
social and economic life. Chinese occupational welfare is, 
in brief, evolving from a unitary into a pluralistic 
system--a mixed economy of welfare.
Empirical evidence and field data showed that three 
separate yet inter-related sets of processes have been 
responsible for bringing about these changes. At the 
individual, the enterprise, and the government level, these 
processes have reshaped patterns of dependence and the 
manner in which the danwei operates its welfare services. 
They have also led to a major reform of Labour Insurance 
involving significant changes in the re-distribution of 
risks and responsibilities.
I. Reshaping Dependence
The rise of the mixed economy had opened up new 
opportunities and options for danwei members. It was now 
possible to have second jobs, to retire early and, while on 
pensions, collect another pay-cheque from a new job in the
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private sector, or simply to give up and quit work 
altogether. Workers were no longer as near-completely 
dependent on and tied to the same danwei as in the past.
Workers had devised various strategies to enable them 
to make the most out of these new options and 
opportunities. The exemplary case of Ms. Feng, an unskilled 
worker, illustrated some of the most commonly followed 
strategies. Ms. Feng planned to retire in three years' time 
when she reached the retirement age of forty-five. Upon 
retirement, she intended to take up a job in the non-state 
sector. As a retiree, she would be entitled to not just her 
monthly pensions but also danwei housing and most danwei 
benefits. The strategy would allow her to hold on to what
she was having at the danwei at the same time as it enabled
her to collect another pay-cheque from a non-state job.
But, even more strategically, Ms. Feng's husband, a
co-worker, would also be quitting his job in one to two
years' time to take up a job in the non-state sector. The 
strategy, in other words, was to combine the concept of 
'one family, two systems' with the concept of 'husbands go, 
wives stay'. Positioning key members of the family in both 
the state and the non-state sectors, the strategy enabled 
the family to maximize what it could gain from both sectors 
and minimize the risks of the couple either both staying in 
the same danwei or both quitting their jobs. What was being 
worked out was an arrangement straddling two systems of
315
advantages and opportunities, enabling the family to have 
the best of both worlds -- the security and welfare of the 
public sector and the profits and challenge of the private 
sector.
The 'one family, two systems' and 'husbands go, wives 
stay' strategy did not always work out. It depended on 
whether one was young or old, whether one was married or 
not married, whether both husband and wife were working, 
whether they were both working in the same danwei, whether 
both were ready to retire, and so on. Gender, generational 
and familial differences such as these openned up, just as 
they also closed off, different options and opportunities 
for workers in different stages of life and family 
situations. Because there were these differences, there 
were also many variations in the strategies actually worked 
out. These then led to differential outcomes: some workers 
were more able than other workers to gain from arrangements 
straddling two systems of advantages and opporunities. As 
a result they became also better able than other workers to 
move away from their near-complete dependence on the 
danwei.
What was happening was, in short, a process reshaping 
dependence. Emerging from this process was increasingly a 
pattern of limited instead of near-complete, and 
differentiated instead of uniform dependence on 
occupational welfare.
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2. Reshaping the Danwei Welfare Economy
The danwei had to reshape its welfare economy because 
it was inefficient and not cost-effective. The quality of 
its service and what it distributed to its memebers was 
poor. Choice by users was limited. Most importantly, 
welfare was becoming a financial burden to the enterprise.
However, the danwei had but few options. Giving up 
welfare altogether was out of the question because firstly, 
it had a responsibility to its workers, secondly, the 
government was not always willing and ready to take over 
what the danwei gave up, thirdly, the government was 
against the danwei giving up their welfare responsibilities 
altogether because this might have wider social and 
political ramifications, and fourthly, welfare was a 
valuable work incentive, instrumental for motivating 
workers and inducing them to stay within their enterprises.
The danwei was given the 'impossible' task of reducing 
its financial welfare burden without giving up its welfare 
responsibilities. The main strategy to accomplish this, as 
exemplified in our case study, has been to combine welfare 
with business and to link the bureaucracy to the market, 
or, in other words, to 'go quasi-market'.
Specifically, this involves pricing and selling for 
profit part of what used to be free or almost free benefits
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and services to users either within or outside the danwei 
or both. Such policy changes, however, require some kind of 
product or price differentiation between 'commodified' and 
'non-commodified' goods and services. It also requires the 
creation of markets-- either internal or external or both 
internal and external, in which to sell 'commodified' goods 
and services.
The strategy of 'going quasi-market' has resulted in 
a differentiated danwei welfare economy, one which uses the 
bureauracy to distribute benefits and services at the same 
time as it employs the service of the market to sell for 
profit price- and product-differentiated goods and 
services. In these respects the danwei system is becoming 
a mixed economy of welfare.
This mixed danwei economy of welfare extends the range 
of goods and services made available to its members. It 
offers more choices. By bringing in the market, it 
generates competition and gives more priority to consumer 
preferences and consumer needs. It encourages the danwei to 
be more productive.
What is also important is that it enables danwei sub­
units like canteens and nurseries to generate income from 
their business activities which goes towards improving 
their services or increasing what they pay their workers. 
The mixed economy of welfare helps reduce, therefore, their
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dependence on the danwei and to some extent enables them to 
stand on their own feet. By helping these sub-units to 
stand on their feet, welfare becomes less a financial 
burden for the danwei.
As a result of 'going quasi-market', danwei sub-units 
providing welfare become differentiated both in terms of 
their performance and their financial dependence.
The danwei economy of welfare emerging from the 
changes that have occurred is at once more efficient, more 
open, more flexible and more responsive. It is also more 
pluralistic and more differentiated. The monolithic, rigid, 
closed and inefficient system of the past has given way to 
a mixed danwei economy of welfare.
3 . Reforming Labour Insurance
The hall-mark of Chinese occupational welfare was a 
comprehensive Labour Insurance scheme covering old-age 
pensions, maternity and birth, health insurance, and 
accidents and death for state-sector employees and their 
dependents.
The scheme was non-contributory, non-portable, and it 
excluded rural workers and other urban occupational groups. 
Since 1969, the scheme had also made the state enterprises 
bear all the financial responsibility. While it had worked 
in the past, it had by the 1980's become unfit for an
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economy increasingly characterized by contractual 
employment and mobility of labour, by the rise of new 
occupational groups outside the state-sector, by market 
competition, and by increasing instances of bankruptcies, 
mergers, and workers becoming unemployed. It had also 
become, for the state enterprises, a big financial burden, 
as insurance costs increased and as more and more workers 
joined the growing army of retired workers.
The Labour Insurance reforms were based on six key 
concepts and ideas-- of risk pooling, of a. personalized 
insurance account to which the employer and the employee 
both made contributions, the sharing of responsibilities 
between the state, the enterprise, the individual, the idea 
that 'basic' statutory insurance should be supplemented by 
additional non-statutory, optional insurance programmes to 
provide for more flexibility and protection, the idea that 
the financing and administation of insurance should be 
separate from enterprise management, and the idea that 
there could be different insurance programmes for different 
groups of workers and for different purposes.
These reforms started in 1986 with the introduction of 
old age pensions for workers on contractual employment and 
unemployment insurance for state workers displaced from 
their jobs. They were followed in 1991 by the introduction 
of a new nation-wide system of old age pensions combining 
the concept of pooling and individual contributions for
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state-sector employees. Further changes took place in 1995 
with the extension of this system to nonstatutory 
employees. In 1994, two pilot programmes in health 
insurance were launched in two cities and subsequently 
extended to more cities in 1996. At the same time a non­
contributory maternity insurance scheme was implemented on 
a trial basis in 1994. Finally, a non-contributory accident 
insurance scheme was launched, again on a trial basis, in 
a few selected cities in 1993.
Although the pace of development has been uneven, much 
significant progress has in fact been made. As a result of 
these reforms, Labour Insurance has ceased to be the kind 
of enterprise-based, non-contributory and non-portable 
system which it was before the reforms. It has been 
transformed into a system of insurance programmes embodying 
the concepts of pooling of risks, of employee contribution, 
of portability, and the separation of insurance 
administration and enterprise management. From being the 
exclusive rights of state employees the new system has been 
extended to cover also other occupational groups in the 
cities. Most importantly, the new system has also achieved 
the re-distribution of risks and responsibilities away from 
the enterprise to the state and to individual workers.
Towards a Chinese Model of Welfare Pluralism
In short, the three processes of reshaping dependence,
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reshaping the danwei economy of welfare and reforming 
Labour Insurance have jointly transformed Chinese 
occupational welfare. The system emerging from the change 
is no longer a unitary system worked entirely through the 
danwei bureaucracy and is no longer the exclusive rights 
and privileges of a special group of workers. The new 
system has broken with the near-complete and paternalistic 
dependencies of the past and it no longer exempts 
individuals from their shares of risks and 
responsibilities.
The system emerging from the change combines the state 
with the nonstate sector and the bureaucracy with the 
market. It depends both on formal structures and on the 
informal organizations of the family and social networks. 
Its formal plans and policies leave plenty of scope for 
individual values and initiatives. The emerging system of 
occupational welfare is at once more diversified, more 
differentiated and more pluralistic. It is also, therefore, 
becoming more like the welfare systems of Western 
capitalism, suggesting, perhaps, that there is a tendency 
in the change toward 'convergence', a theme alluded to by 
Mishra (1977) in his earlier reflections on the nature of 
social policy in the former Soviet-type societies:
Moreover, recent economic reforms in Soviet and 
East European societies point toward a greater 
use of market mechanism in the economy and wide 
income differentials. These economic policies 
cannot help affecting social policy. The 
situation remains somewhat unclear but in the
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long run their general effect may be to limit 
movement toward the increasing 'social' 
distribution decreed in Marxist ideology. This no 
doubt suggests a tendency toward 'convergence', 
namely that both Western and socialist societies 
may have to work with some kind of institutional 
welfare - a mixture of social and economic 
(market) distribution of goods and services 
(p.149).
Indeed there are striking parallels and similarities 
between the Western and the Chinese models of development. 
In the British case, for example, the development during 
the 198 0s, under successive Conservative administration, 
had been one of 'reducing the role of the state and 
encouraging the growth of welfare pluralism' (Pinker 
1992:277) . This development has led to the proliferation of 
a great variety of models of and approaches to funding and 
providing social services (Le Grand et al. 1993; Wistow et 
al. 1994) . The trend is unlikely to reverse under Labour
administration, however. 'Stakeholder welfare' (Field 
1996), a key Labour concept, for example, recognizes that 
there are limits to what the state can do to satisfy the 
needs of the people and that they will have to resume 
greater responsibility for their own welfare. Labour 
advocated, for instance, the 'compulsory universalization 
of second pension provision to run alongside the state 
retirement pension' (Field 1996:35).
In both China and Britain, therefore, there have been 
developments converging on a model of welfare pluralism 
characterized by the diversity of welfare institutions.
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Both recognize the limitations of a model of welfare giving 
the state an all-important position. Both seek a bigger and 
more active role for non-state institutions, particularly 
the market and the individuals and their families.
That notwithstanding their very different political 
systems and cultural traditions there are nevertheless 
converging developments in these two countries suggests, 
perhaps, then, that, as Isaiah Berlin observes, 'the world 
that we encounter is one in which we are faced with choices 
between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, 
the realization of some of which must inevitably involve 
the sacrifice of others' (Berlin 1969:168). In other words, 
there cannot be 'a total acceptance of any single end' and 
governments in these societies, be they politically 
pluralist, as in Britain, or authoritarian, as in China, 
should accept that there are a plurality of means to reach 
these ends. These include not just 'a policy mix of the 
invisible hand of the market and the visible hands of 
public institutions' (Keegan 1993: 104, cited in Pinker
1994) but also, filling the gaps between and negotiating 
with both the market and the public institutions, 'familial 
and community-based forms of mutual aid' (Pinker 1994) .
The Social and Political Implications of the Transformation 
of Chinese Occupational Welfare
The transformation of a system of occupational welfare 
which is as important to the life of the people as is the
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Chinese system will no doubt have very significant social 
and political implications. Let me, therefore, conclude 
this study by pointing out and speculating on some of the 
most significant implications which are likely to follow 
from the changes.
First, the end of near-complete dependence on the 
danwei and the re-distribution of risks and 
responsibilities away from the enterprise implies 
inevitably a shifting of more responsibilities and risks 
back to the family. How might these changes affect the 
family? Both 'positive' and 'negative' outcomes are 
possible. On one hand, 'given new incentives for 
individuals to develop family- and kin-based strategies of 
cooperation, one would...expect a resurgence of...risk- 
sharing institutions' (Davis and Harrell 1993:18) and the 
emergence of new forms of family solidarity. On the other 
hand, the 'greater competition at the workplace and more 
approval of individualistic striving undermined the 
willingness of some family members to sacrifice for 
another' (Davis and Harrell 1993:19). The assumption by the 
family of more welfare functions and responsibilities could 
accentuate the tension between two core traditional values 
of urban Chinese families: the desire to sacrifice for
dependents, and the commitment to 'judicious investment of 
family resources. . . [for the advancement] of the social 
status of the family' (Phillips 1993:298) . In other words, 
it could also generate new tensions and undermine family
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solidarity.
Secondly, the danwei is becoming less and less the 
Gemeinschaft model that it had once been. It is ceasing to 
be the kind of 'total community' (Shirk 1993:31) which 
embraced and controlled so many aspects of the life of its 
members. The availability of alternatives and exit options, 
the rise of a danwei mixed economy of welfare, the shiting 
of risks and responsibilities to the individual workers and 
the end of near-complete dependence are all contributing to 
its decline. The demise of the danwei as a total community 
implies a decline in the control of individuals by a 
society that has been labeled 'intrusive, supervised, 
molded, centrally planned, totalistic' (Bernstein 
1982:160). As pointed out by Litwak (1965), 'Where the 
giver is never in a position to provide the entire service, 
then he is not in a position to ask for complete 
subservience' (p.310). The decline of the danwei community 
implies the decline of control over the individuals and 
their families by the socialist state and, for the 
individuals and their families, increasing independence, 
autonomy and individuality.
Thirdly, the extension to other occupational groups in 
society of rights previously enjoyed only by state-sector 
employees has two important implications. First, it means 
the decline of state employees as a 'status group' and of 
the function of occupational welfare in status
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stratification. Secondly, as the importance of 'status7 
declines and as other groups in society come to share the 
rights previously enjoyed by one privileged sector, the 
concept of citizenship begins to assume a more universalist 
character.
Citizenship begins where status ends. The 
transformation of Chinese occupational welfare heralds the 
beginning of the end of status and status privileges. The 
next big status division to be crossed in the long march to 
universal and uniform citizenship rights will be the 
division between rural and urban workers. This was a system 
of unequal rights which has been legimitated since 1958 
with the introduction of household registration 
requirements.
It is perhaps appropriate, therefore, that this study 
should end on a Marshallian note. In his classic 
formulation Marshall describes social rights as embracing 
'the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in 
the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized 
being according to the standards prevailing in society7 
(Marshall 1963:74). Chinese occupational welfare should be 
seen as part of a broader progressive history of expanding 
citizenship and citizenship rights in China.
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Qualifications Regarding Relevance
China is a big country. Just the province of Guangdong 
is geographically as big as the United Kingdom. In this big 
country, there are great inter-regional economic as well as 
cultural differences. These differences are most pronounced 
between the cities and the countryside and between coastal 
and inland cities. It is appropriate, therefore, that we 
should end this study by pointing out its limitations. This 
is, after all, a case study carried out in one industrial 
enterprise in one coastal city in a big country. It is 
important that it should refrain from over-claiming what it 
could generalize about situations in the country as a 
whole.
At the present time, much interesting empirical 
research is being undertaken in different parts of China.1 
Large part of this huge country is still un-researched. It 
may very well be that as the process of marketization 
proceeds, a number of different models or sub-models will 
emerge in the Chinese context. In brief, future comparisons 
may show not only that the Chinese system is markedly 
different from the Western model in some key respects, but 
also that there are some very significant differences 
within China.
1 These include, among others, Henderson and Cohen 
(1984), Nee (1989), Oi (1989), Wong (1992), Bian (1994), 
Yang (1994).
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The natural interest in developing broad comparative 
models as quickly as possible should nevertheless be 
resisted. In our view, the best way forward is by careful 
case studies over a period of time undertaken in key 
localities which will reveal the differences as well as the 
similarities. With regard to the quality of life enjoyed by 
ordinary people and the notion of justice which they 
entertain, it may well be that the differences may prove to 
be politically more important than their similarities.
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APPENDIX I
FIELDWORK CHECKLIST
The Dongfang Heavy Machinery Works
1. The Evolution and Development of the Plant up to the 
Present:
When was it established?
What did/does it produce?
How and when did it become a state enterprise?
how the size and composition of its work-force has changed
over time
its supervisory structure (from which government 
departments did/does it receive orders)
its management structure--has it changed over time?
its labor, wage and bonus systems
'Workers' Congress': its position and role in the plant
the Party: its position and role in the plant
How had it fared (e.g. during the Great Leap Forward, 1958
- 60, and during the Cultural Revolution 1967 - 76)? What 
happened?
its economic performance: output, productivity, profits and 
losses
2. The Plant's Evolution into a 'Mini Welfare State':
past and present : the range and nature of welfare and
benefits (subsidies, labour insurance, pension, hardship 
allowances, single-child allowance, health care, housing, 
canteen, nursery, housing etc.) provided through the danwei
past and present : who were/are entitled to what; how
were/are benefits actually distributed; through what 
policies, rules, norms, procedures and mechanisms were/are 
these distributed; who were/are involved in making 
decisions which have bearing on the distribution of welfare 
and benefits? which departments/sections/bureaus were/are 
involved? how equally and equitably were/are these
- 330 -
benefits distributed?
past and present : how did/do danwei members regard and use 
welfare benefits? the meanings of welfare and benefits to 
them
How come the danwei had taken on more and more welfare 
responsibilities? How and when did these changes occur? Had 
there been 'cut-backs' in the welfare and benefits 
distributed through the danwei? What had changed? What had 
not changed during all these years?
What explained these changes and developments?
historical contexts (e.g. state formation, First Five 
Year Plan, Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution)
urban political economy (e.g. planned economy, 
employment problems, strict control over rural-urban 
migration, retarded development of the tertiary 
sector)
ideas (how were these changes and developments 
explained?)
state policies (e.g. policies favouring urban and 
industrial development)
values and ideology (e.g. PRC's Constitution, 
socialist ideology, traditional cultural values)
macro politics (e.g. state's quest for legitimacy and 
control, inter-departmental competition)
micro-politics (interaction between Party, plant 
management, workers, guanxi, and local bureaucrats, 
party cadres, and community elites)
The Challenge of the Market
How did economic reforms since 1979--emergence of a dual- 
track economy, financial reforms which give more autonomy 
to the enterprises, director responsibility system, 
contract labour and bankruptcy law and so on--impact on the 
plant?
What has happened to its economic performance, operations 
and management, size and composition of its staff, labour 
and wage policies?
In what ways have these affected the danwei's policies and 
provisions of welfare and benefits?
Do these have different kinds of impacts on danwei members?
How do danwei members regard these changes?
Have these caused changes in their values, orientations and 
relations? Have they become more individualistic and 
instrumental in their relations with one another and with 
the danwei collectivity?
Have these affected management-worker relations? How?
Are new policies being considered and debated? Who have 
espoused which positions?
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APPENDIX II
INTERVIEWING SCHEDULE
male/female
Name:
Sex:
Age:
Marital Status: 
Job/Position:
Party Member: yes/no
Cadre: yes/no
Household Information: 
Name Age
(same danwei?)
Relation with 
Interviewee
Oocupaticn
(Yes/No)
1. When did you join the plant?
2. What was your job and position then?
3. Do you remember the wage that you earned then?
4. Besides wage, what other non-wage income and benefits did
you receive from the danwei, on a regular basis and then on 
special occasions? Could you itemize for us?
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(1) Were you and/or your family 
housing?
entitled to danwei
(2) Did you live there?
(3) Could you describe its size?
(4) How much rent did you paid for it?
Did you and/or your family make much use of other
facilities and services provided by the danwei?
7. Much of what you have just told us must have changed 
between then and now. Could you describe to us how things 
have changed? What are some of the more recent changes? 
(Check: wage, non-wage income and benefits, housing, other 
facilities and services)
8. Let us concentrate on changes since 1979.
(1) Were these changes related to changed policies in the 
plant?
(2) What were these? (Probe: wage reform, employment 
reform, housing reform, pension reform...)
9. In your view, what were the reasons behind such policy 
changes?
10. (1) Were the changes related also to wider social, 
political and economic changes?
(2) What were/are these?
11. (1) In what ways have the changes which you have just told 
us affected you and your family?
(2) How have you and you family adjusted to these changes? 
(Probe: for example, moon-lighting)
12. Are the experiences of you and your family quite typical or 
exceptional?
(if typical) Do you know of workers and their families 
whose experiences are atypical? Could you tell us about 
their experiences? (for example: contract and young
workers)
(if exceptional) Do you know of workers and their families
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whose experiences are very common in the danwei? Could you 
tell us about their experiences?
In your view, are the changes for the better, or for the
worse,
(1) for yourself and your family,
(2) for workers like yourself, and their families,
(3) for other categories of danwei members (check where
applicable: cadres, managerial staff, professional
staff, technical staff, ordinary workers, service 
workers), and
(4) for the plant as a whole?
We have talked about danwei welfare and benefits. Let us 
now look at the people. Workmates can be good friends.
(1) In your experience, has it been easy to make friends
in the plant? With whom?
(2) What do friends do? Please give us some examples of
what good friends do for each other.
In your own experience, are friends becoming more or less 
easy to make? Are they as 'good' as in the past?
(1) Besides friends, would you say that there are guanxi 
(personal connections) which would be important and/or 
useful for people to have?
(2) In what ways are these guanxi important and/or useful?
(1) Has the nature of guanxi in the danwei changed much 
during your time here? In what ways?
(2) How would you explain such changes?
(3) Do you like or dislike such changes?
(1) Could you describe to us the guanxi that are important 
to vou personally?
(2) In what ways are they important?
(3) Who are your important guanxi?
(4) How do you nurture your guanxi?
19.
20.
2 1 .
22 .
23 .
24.
25.
26.
(1) Has your own guanxi changed much during your time 
here? In what ways has it changed?
(2) Could you explain the changes?
(3) Do you like or dislike such changes?
(1) Danwei lingdao (leaders) are important people in the 
plant. Could you tell us why in your view they are 
important?
(2) Are they becoming more important or less important? 
Why?
What about the Party? Do you find any difference in its 
position and role in the plant?
(1) Let's come to the labor union. Has it been able to do 
much for workers? What has it done?
(2) Has the labour union changed much during your time 
here?
We all try to improve our lot, and some have done it better
than the others. In your view, what are the sorts of things
that one should try to do or have. the right kind of
behaviour and attitudes, so to speak, in order to keep up 
with, let alone to be better than, the others in the
danwei?
It is common for workers to feel a sense of belongingness 
to their danwei. Some feel it stronger than the others.
(1) In your view, do workers in your plant generally feel 
a sense of belongingness to the danwei? Why would you 
say so?
(2) Now during your time here, would you say that workers' 
sense of belongingness has grown stronger, or weaker? 
Why's that?
Now, on the whole, would you say that your danwei has 
become a better place or a worse place to work in?
(1) Given the chance, would you quit and look for better 
opportunities elsewhere?
(2) If you were to quit and go elsewhere, where would you
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go?
27. If you could have it all over again, would you still have 
preferred this danwei?
(If yes) Tell us why.
(If no) Tell us what could have been a better danwei for 
you and why you think it could be better?
28. There is now much discussion and debate about reforming 
danwei benefits and welfare. One viewpoint has it that 
danwei should no longer be as heavily committed to welfare 
and that workers should pay, at least partially, for what 
they are getting. What is your own view on this?
29. Now, talking about the future, do you have particular 
changes or contingencies in mind?
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APPENDIX III
LIST OF INFORMANTS INTERVIEWED
Informants interviewed. Pseudonyms given, age when 
interviewed, jobs held.
1. Ms. Cao, 43, semi-skilled worker
2. Mr. Chen, 50's, head of progapanda department
3. Ms. Chen, 50's, teacher at vocational school
4. Mr. Deng, 50, director of a subsidiary company
5. Mr. Dong, 50's, deputy party secretary
6. Mr. Feng, 42, unskilled worker
7. Mr. Han, 30's, chief of secretariat of the general 
affairs office
8. Miss He, 20's, computer programmer
9. Mr. Li, 40' s, deputy head of personnel department
10. Mr. Liao, 50's, head of the plant's general affairs
office
11. Ms. Ma, 43, skilled worker
12. Dr. Mao, 40's, director of hospital
13. Mr. Peng, 40, skilled worker
14. Mr. Qian, 40's, general manager of the plant's labour
services company
15. Mr. Qiao, chief of secretariat of the general affairs 
office
16. Dr. Shan, 40's, deputy director of hospital
17. Mr. Shi, 40's, deputy head of corporate management
department
18. Mr. Tai, 50's, chairman of labour union
19. Mr. Tan, 40's, headmistress of nursery
20. Mr. Tang, 30's, senior accountant
21. Mr. Tao, 24, driver
22. Mr. Wang, 50's, principal of vocational school
- 338 -
23 . Mr. Wei, 40's, deputy general manager of the plant
24. Mr. Wen, 30's, principal of the plant's school
25. Mr. Wu, 40's, deputy head of propaganda department
26. Mr. Xu, 40's, general manager of the plant
27. Ms. Zhou., 41, semi-skilled worker
00<N Mr. Zhu, 37, skilled worker
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APPENDIX IV
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
anlau fenpei
baohu xian 
bao xia lai
butei
changzhang fuzezhi
changping cang 
chaogang 
chejian 
cheng bao 
chengshi hukou 
chun fuli 
da erh chuan 
da qingnian 
daigan
danwei
daogong
digongzi, gao jiuyie, 
gao fuli
m u
m i
j w b
f#W
distribution to each 
according to one's work
protection point
take all and be
responsible for all
subsidies
factory director
responsibility system
ever-normal granary
moonlight ing
workshops
contract responsibility
urban residence
pure welfare
large and comprehensive
'old' young people
rest and wait for a job; 
wait for a posting
work unit
robbing the public
low wage, high
employment, high welfare
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Dongfang Qiye Jituan 
Gongsi
duan qi wankuai chi nou, 
fang xia kuaizi wa H a n g
fang shui yang yu
fei shengchanxing
jianshe touji
fenchang 
fengbi xing
fenli qiyie ban shehui 
zhineng
fuli jijin 
fuli xing
fBfUSSsfe
HlfUtt
fuyu jigong Ig^flSX
Gangau tongbao
geren chuxuxiang yanglao {Ml A-lfl] Hf fifeSt 
baoxian
geti hu
gong fei yiliao
gongji zhi
Dongfang Group Holding 
Company
cursing between
mouthfuls
save a fish by putting it 
back into the water
non-production-related 
construction and
investment
branches
its being a closed system
dissociating the
enterprise from its 
welfare functions
welfare fund
free or heavily
subsidized benefits and 
services
surplus workers
Chinese people in Hong 
Kong and Macau
individual pensions
plans
private entrepreneurs; 
individual firms
government-funded 
health care
supply system
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gongling X I seniority
guanxi 
guanli fei 
hei hu 
huiguan 
hukou 
hukou bu 
houqin 
jianli jijin
connections
management expenditure
black household
guilds
residency status
residence booklet
domestic services
bonus fund
jianli shehui tongzhou establish a social
yiliao jijin yu geren ® i n s u r a n c e  system
yiliao zhanghu xian combining the pooling of
jiehe ti shehui baoxian medical funds with a
zhidu personalized medical
care account
jiben yanglao baoxian 
geren zhanghu
jiben yanglao baoxian 
jijin
juan ban
laobao yiliao
laodong fuwu gongsi
laodong hetung zhi
laodong jieshao suo
m m m
personalized basic old 
age insurance fund
basic pension funds
financing and
implementing
labour insurance
labour service company
contract employment
system
j ob-introduction 
offices
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laowu fei labour service fees
fefcfjsp
lingdao 
nancho nu liu 
nongcun hukou 
pingjun zhuyi 
puji tang 
qiaojuan
qinshu wang HEjlilPI
giye huchong yanglao 
baoxian
qiye zhigong jiben Y M  
yanglao baoxian shehui 
tongchou yu geren 
zhanghu xiang jiehe
cadres and managers 
husbands go, wives stay 
rural residence 
egalitarianism 
poor houses
dependents of overseas 
Chinese
networks of kin 
enterprise
supplementary pensions
Combining the pooling of 
costs for basic old age 
insurance with
personalized accounts 
for the individual
workers
qiyie ban shehui
quan yu 
quane jijian
ft# enterprises
society
run the
Sit
san ge ren di fan wu ge 
ren chi
shangpin hua
shantang m.
prompt and endorse
fully floating piece 
rate
share the rice for three 
among five persons
commodifying
benevolent halls
shang bu fengding no profit ceilings
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she cang 
shehui hua 
shehui tongchou 
shuangxian xuanze 
siying qiye 
tingchan ban tingchan
tingti
tongyi chouji 
tou gai dai
weili jingying
wu fang 
xia bu budi 
xia gang 
xiang qian kan 
xiao shehei 
xiao erh chuan 
xiaoyi
xingzheng chu
T^ fSJ
TfSJ
xin ren xin banfa, jui 
ren jui banfa
yi cang W & M
community granaries
socializing
pooling of funds
bi-lateral choices
private business
stopping or half- 
stopping production
replacement of parents' 
jobs by their children
pooling of funds
converting fund
allocation to bank loans
low-profit-making 
business
the 'five-antis'
no subsidies for losses
leave their posts
money-oriented
small society
small but comprehensive
profitability
general service unit
new workers new method, 
old workers old method
public granaries
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yi jia liang zhi one family, two systems
yj. xue yang xue
yuying tang
youhua laodong zuhe
u m m m
p i
zhigong buchong yanglao 111 HI 3^ 
baoxian chubejian shouce
zhigong fuli
zhigong yanglao baoxian 
shouce
zi gongsi
zifu yingkui
ziwo fazhan 
Ziwo fuwu xing 
ziwo jingying 
ziwo yaoshu
w m & m
smwtm
smssm
using the school to 
support the school
orphanages
prioritizing work force 
composition
worker supplementary 
pensions handbook
employee welfare
worker old age insurance 
handbook
subsidiary companies
self-responsible for 
profits and losses
self-developing
self-serving
self-managing
self-regulating
(WORD)MKL-1062.NOT
MKL/nt
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